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Influencing Consumer Resistance through Priming: The Role of Mindsets and 
Motivational Orientation 
 
Brian Harman 
 
Abstract 
Counterarguing (bolstering) mindsets increase (decrease) consumer resistance to 
persuasive appeals (Xu & Wyer, 2012). To date, research has neither replicated these 
mindsets nor examined their boundary conditions. Six experiments were conducted to 
(a) address these issues and (b) to contribute to the scarce literature of consumer-
resistance mindsets. This research extends the work of Xu and Wyer (2012) in a 
number of ways. First, it examined whether approach (avoidance) motivation 
moderates the perceptual, behavioural and cognitive effects of bolstering 
(counterarguing) mindsets. Second, it tested the hypothesis that bolstering 
(counterarguing) mindsets attenuate (accentuate) an individual’s ability to detect 
deceptive marketing tactics (Study 2 and Study 3). Third, it investigated whether an 
individual’s chronic persuasion knowledge moderates the effect of a bolstering 
mindset (Study 3). Finally, the research tested the hypothesis that bolstering 
(counterarguing) mindsets may be activated via episodic recall (Studies, 3, 4 and 6). 
Study 1 failed to replicate the counterarguing mindset. However, the study does 
tender methodological contributions to the mindset priming literature. Study 2 and 
Study 3 successfully replicated the effects of a bolstering mindset and provide 
evidence that both strong approach motivation (Study 2) and weak approach 
motivation (Study 3) can increase an individual's willingness to pay. The bolstering 
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mindset is also found to increase non-monetary, behavioural intentions (i.e. petition 
signing) and can favourably influence perceptual responses (i.e. product 
attractiveness). The research also demonstrates that bolstering (counterarguing) 
mindsets can inhibit the generation of incongruent thoughts and regulate the 
activation of Persuasion Knowledge. Importantly, both mindsets are found to strongly 
influence an individual’s willingness to pay which has important implications for both 
consumers and marketers. The research also suggests that the counterarguing mindset 
may be activated via episodic recall. While the observed mindset priming effects are 
weak they are generally consistent with the results reported by Xu and Wyer (2012).  
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CHAPTER  1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
“We must give up the insane illusion that a conscious self, however virtuous and however intelligent, 
can do its work singlehanded and without assistance”  (Aldous Huxley (1956) - The Education of an 
Amphibian). 
 
Non-conscious behaviours are important determinants of human behaviour 
(Dijksterhuis, 2010). Indeed, it has long been recognised that outsourcing cognitive 
tasks to non-conscious processes allows individuals to efficiently navigate everyday 
life (James, 1890). Since individuals now spend much of their lives within consumer 
domains it must follow that consumer behaviours are often directed by non-conscious 
processes (Dijksterhuis, Smith, van Baaren, & Wigboldus, 2005). The increasing 
recognition of this fact is evidenced by the growing body of academic research on 
consumer mindsets. Much of this research suggests that consumer “mindsets” make 
individuals more vulnerable to persuasive appeals and compliance gaining attempts 
(e.g. Dhar, Huber, & Khan, 2007; Xu & Wyer, 2007, 2008). However, few studies 
have investigated how behavioural mindsets regulate consumer resistance strategies. 
Indeed, Knowles and Linn (2004) contend that consumer resistance and consumer 
protection appear to be underdeveloped themes within consumer research. This seems 
unusual considering the important role that consumer resistance plays in everyday 
life. Public environments now serve as “platforms for advertising” (Habermas, 1991; 
p. 181) in which embattled consumers are exposed to roughly 1000 adverts a day 
(Fennis & Strobe, 2010).  
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Resistance is the most important element in the persuasion process (Knowles 
& Linn, 2004). Accordingly, mindsets that regulate consumer resistance are especially 
important phenomena. Indeed, mindsets which regulate resistance strategies are 
pivotal to the vested interests of consumers and marketers alike. Counterarguing and 
bolstering are frequently used to resist persuasion attempts (Knowles & Linn, 2004). 
Counterarguing occurs when an individual generates thoughts that refute the 
arguments being made in a persuasive message (Rucker & Petty, 2004). Furthermore, 
counterarguing is found to be the most effective resistance strategy available to 
individuals (Zuwerink Jacks & Cameron, 2003). In contrast, bolstering occurs when a 
person reaffirms their own beliefs when evaluating a persuasive message. An 
individual’s beliefs may be congruent or incongruent with the position being 
advocated by the message. Accordingly, bolstering a personal belief can induce 
resistance (Zuwerink Jacks & Cameron, 2003) or can induce persuasion (Xu & Wyer, 
2012). The result depends upon the valence of the thoughts being bolstered. 
Counterarguing and bolstering may be enacted across the full gamut of persuasion 
scenarios and compliance gaining contexts. Consequently, both of these cognitive 
strategies are central to consumer welfare and autonomy. 
Recent research suggests that bolstering and counterarguing behaviours can be 
activated outside of conscious awareness (Xu & Wyer, 2012). The research 
demonstrated that inducing individuals to generate opposing thoughts 
(counterarguing) or supporting thoughts (bolstering) in one domain increases the 
likelihood of these thought processes being adopted when evaluating subsequently 
encountered messages. The research provided the first demonstration that behavioural 
mindsets can regulate resistance processes and influence perceptions of persuasive 
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communications. More specifically, Xu and Wyer (2012) demonstrated that bolstering 
(or conversely counterarguing) mindsets increase (or conversely decrease) the 
favourability of future evaluative judgements of adverts (i.e. advert persuasiveness 
and advert appeal) and products featured in the adverts (i.e. product attractiveness). 
The authors also examined the underlying mediating process (i.e. thought generation) 
that governs the generation of these mindsets. However, Xu and Wyer (2012) did not 
examine the boundary conditions of these mindsets nor test for any moderating 
factors. Using a social psychological lens, this doctoral research employs an 
experimental approach to investigate these outstanding questions. This research aims 
to extend our general understanding of these behavioural mindsets and their carryover 
effects in three ways.  
First, the research tests the hypothesis that an individual’s motivational 
orientation (approach, avoidance) moderates bolstering and counterarguing mindsets. 
Specifically, it is hypothesised that individuals exhibiting strong approach (or 
conversely avoidance) orientations will exhibit stronger priming effects when primed 
with a bolstering (or conversely counterarguing) mindset. Past research has already 
demonstrated that motivational orientation can moderate perceptions of advertising 
(Gerend & Shepherd, 2007; Hevey & Dolan, 2014; Mann, Sherman, & Updegraff, 
2004; Sherman, Mann, & Updegraff, 2006; Updegraff, Sherman, Luyster, & Mann, 
2007). However, to the author’s knowledge, no research has yet tested if motivational 
orientation moderates the carryover effects of bolstering and counterarguing mindsets. 
This research makes a valuable theoretical contribution to the scarce literature on 
these behavioural mindsets by demonstrating that motivational orientation does 
indeed moderate their effects. Specifically, the research demonstrates that individuals 
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exhibiting strong approach motivation are especially influenced by the bolstering 
mindset. Interestingly, the results suggest that strong approach motivation can both 
accentuate and attenuate the effects of the mindset. This finding provides an important 
new insight into the operation of this mindset and extends our knowledge of its 
consumptive implications for consumers in the marketplace.  
Second, this research tests the hypothesis that bolstering and counterarguing 
mindsets regulate an individual’s willingness to pay for commercial products and 
aversive propositions (e.g. taxation). Individual’s willingness to pay is an especially 
important metric for marketers and thus occupies a central position within marketing 
theory (e.g. Avnet & Higgins, 2006). The current research demonstrates that an 
individual’s willingness to pay is influenced by counterarguing and bolstering 
mindsets. Furthermore, the research demonstrates that the circumstances under which 
these mindsets can influence an individual’s willingness to pay are not as narrow 
defined than previously thought. Specifically, the research demonstrates that 
bolstering and counterarguing mindsets can influence an individual’s willingness to 
pay even when the mindset is congruent with the person’s initial thoughts regarding 
the target object. Importantly, the research provides the first evidence that the 
bolstering mindset can increase individuals’ willingness to pay for both aversive 
products and commercial products. These findings again extend our knowledge of the 
consumptive implications of these mindsets in the marketplace. 
Third, the current research tests the hypothesis that counterarguing and 
bolstering mindsets can be induced by past memories associated with these 
behaviours. Previously, Xu and Wyer (2012) employed priming procedures that 
activated mindsets in real time. Yet the broader literature on mindsets and priming 
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procedures distinguishes between at least two different types of priming procedures 
i.e. procedurally primed mindsets (Fujita & Trope, 2014; Shen & Wyer, 2008; Xu & 
Wyer, 2008) and episodic primed mindsets (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Kray & 
Galinsky, 2003). Indeed, a recent study by Fransen and Fennis (2014) demonstrated 
that an episodic recall task could be used to activate resistance by priming “persuasive 
intent”. The researchers found that asking participants to recall a situation in which 
someone tried to influence them was sufficient to activate future resistance to adverts. 
Indeed, priming persuasive intent induced comparable levels of resistance to explicit 
forewarnings of upcoming persuasive attempts. However, the authors did not prime a 
specific resistance strategy. Consequently, there is no way to know what type of 
resistance strategies were activated as a result of this episodic priming task. The 
current research seeks to address this problem by testing if activating memories of 
episodes involving specific resistance strategies (counterarguing or bolstering) can 
prime the deployment of counterarguing behaviours in future, unrelated domains. The 
research provides evidence to suggest that a counterarguing mindset can be activated 
by simply recalling past episodic memories.  
The research also tests the hypothesis that bolstering and counterarguing 
mindsets regulate the activation of Persuasion Knowledge (PK). Consumers rely upon 
PK to assess the credibility and honesty of persuasive communications (Kirmani & 
Campbell, 2009). However, the research found limited evidence to support this 
hypothesis. Nevertheless, the current research serves as an important first replication 
effort for bolstering and counterarguing mindsets. To the author’s knowledge, no 
research has yet attempted to replicate these important mindsets. The research tests 
both the robustness and generalisability of these behavioural mindsets. In attempting 
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to replicate these mindsets this research answers the urgent call and pressing needs for 
increased replication efforts within psychology (Kahneman, 2012; Simons, 2014). 
Replication is the sine qua non of science (Finkel, Eastwick, & Reis, 2015). In recent 
times, the importance of replication efforts has come to the fore (Chambers & 
Sumner, 2012; Makel, Plucker, & Hegarty, 2012; Simons, 2014). Replication allows 
researchers to map the boundary conditions and provide future researchers with more 
accurate estimations of effect sizes. The results of this research make a theoretical 
contribution to the scarce literature by virtue of the fact that, to the author’s 
knowledge, these results represent the first replication of bolstering and 
counterarguing mindsets.  
 
1.1. Structure of thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 1 includes an introduction and 
outlines the aims and contributions of the present research. It also provides an 
overview of the structure of the thesis. Chapter 2 begins by introducing the reader to 
the concept of priming and the principle of knowledge accessibility which underpins 
all explanations of priming effects. Having provided the reader with a conceptual 
outline of the priming literature the chapter narrows its focus effects to priming 
effects within consumer behaviour and persuasion contexts. Of particular importance 
are consumer “mindsets” which have enjoyed considerable attention within the 
academic literature in recent years. The author examines the concept of mindset and 
describes the processes that govern the activation and operation of this cognitive 
phenomenon. Finally, a literature review of consumer mindsets explores how 
mindsets influence various facets of consumer behaviour. Particular attention is paid 
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to mindsets that regulate consumer resistance and influence how consumers enact 
self-defence strategies. The chapter closes by discussing the theoretical importance of 
two recently discovered mindsets; i.e., the bolstering mindset and the counterarguing 
mindset. 
Chapter 3 aims to demonstrate the powerful influence of approach and 
avoidance tendencies on human behaviour. Drawing upon both motivational and self-
regulation literatures, the author outlines how approach and avoidance tendencies 
guide perceptual, cognitive, behavioural and goal-directed processes. The author 
highlights the central role that approach and avoidance tendencies play within 
consumer domains. The author reviews the large body of empirical evidence which 
finds that consumer responses to marketing stimuli are largely dependent on their 
approach and avoidance tendencies. Regulatory Fit Theory is then used as an 
overarching theoretical framework to demonstrate the strong evidence for fit effects. 
The information processing implications of fit and non-fit effects are discussed and 
their implications for consumer persuasion and consumer resistance are outlined. The 
chapter closes by discussing the feasibility of motivational orientation as a mindset 
moderator of counterarguing and bolstering mindsets. The author also discusses the 
possibility of fit effects between mindset and motivational orientation.  
Chapter 4 formalises the hypotheses being tested in this research project and 
provides an overview of the research studies that were conducted. The chapter also 
provides a critical review of the literature on priming research and outlines the 
importance of replication efforts in psychology. The challenges associated with 
replicating psychological studies and in particular, priming studies are also discussed.  
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Chapter 5 contains the empirical studies on counterarguing and bolstering 
mindsets. Four studies are reported. Study 1 attempted to replicate the bolstering and 
counterarguing mindsets using the same procedural priming procedure employed by 
Xu and Wyer (2012). However, the study failed to replicate the effects of these 
behavioural mindsets with no difference in perceptions of subsequently encountered 
adverts being observed across conditions. Study 2 again used a similar procedural 
priming procedure. The study demonstrated that bolstering (or conversely 
counterarguing) mindsets increased (or conversely decreased) evaluative judgements 
of persuasive communications. As expected, approach motivation moderated the 
effects of a bolstering mindset such that individuals exhibiting high (or conversely 
low) approach motivation subsequently generated more (less) favourable judgements 
of a persuasive communication. Furthermore, the bolstering mindset was found to 
desensitise participants to manipulative persuasion tactics. Study 3 adopted a similar 
experimental design to Study 2 but an episodic priming procedure was included for 
exploratory purposes. While the episodic priming procedure failed to induce the 
mindsets, the procedural priming procedure was successful. Contrary to expectation, 
individuals exhibiting strong approach motivation exhibited a decreased willingness 
to pay when primed with a bolstering mindset. Study 4 again tested an episodic 
priming procedure. The results suggest that the mindsets can be induced using this 
novel priming procedure. Overall, the findings show weak priming effects and only 
some support for the moderating role of motivational orientation (i.e. approach, 
avoidance). The results imply that these behavioural mindsets are more subtle and 
more complex than originally conceptualised.  
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Chapter 6 summarises the results of the research and provides a general 
discussion on the findings. The theoretical and methodological contributions of the 
research are outlined and its practical implications are discussed. The limitations of 
the research are also acknowledged. The chapter also discusses the current political 
climate within social psychology and maps out the likely future trajectory of 
consumer research within this field of study.  
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CHAPTER  2:  PRIMING AND MINDSETS 
 
2.1. The History of Unconscious Thought 
 
“Let’s say you pick up a rock and you throw it. And in mid-flight you give that rock consciousness and 
a rational mind. That little rock will think it has free will and will give you a highly rational account of 
why it has decided to take the route it is taking” (Wolfe, 2004; p. 283). 
 
From the time of the Ancient Greeks, man’s interest in (un)conscious cognition has 
been a recurring theme. Greek philosophers speculated that exposure to different 
stimuli promoted processes that allowed thoughts to bubble to the surface of 
consciousness (Lagerlund, 2011). Indeed, Dijksterhuis (2010) asserts that the first 
reference to unconscious thought may have been written as early as 3 AD. 
Specifically, it was Plotinus who wrote “the absence of a conscious perception is no 
proof of the absence of mental activity” (Koestler, 1964; p.148). From Dante to Da 
Vinci, Cervantes to Shakespeare, various influential thinkers have deliberated on the 
non-conscious processes that characterise the human condition. Indeed, the core 
components that drive unconscious behaviour have been widely debated for centuries. 
Speculation relating to the existence of mental representations date back to the 12th 
century (Higgins & Eitam, 2014). However, it was not until the 18th century that 
German philosopher Ernest Platner coined the term “unconscious”. More striking still, 
it is only in the last forty years that social psychologists have begun the task of 
scientifically exploring the unconsciousness. During this period of discovery, 
“priming” has been an experimental tool that has allowed psychologists to gain new 
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insights into how unconscious processes colour perceptions and drive human 
behaviours (Janiszewski & Wyer, 2014). 
 
2.2. Priming 
Priming is an implicit memory effect which creates a perceptual readiness by 
increasing the accessibility of mental content (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). This 
perceptual readiness to “go beyond the information given” (Bruner, 1957) “primes” 
individuals to process subsequently encountered stimuli in specific ways (Higgins, 
1996). Priming effects are “ubiquitous and pervasive across the major forms of 
psychological phenomena: appraisal and evaluation, motivation and goal pursuit, 
social perception and judgment, and social behaviour” (Bargh, 2006; p. 148). 
Recently activated cognitive procedures or concepts can induce information 
processing strategies that influence the individual’s cognitive, affective or behavioural 
responses to stimuli outside of conscious awareness. Priming effects punctuate our 
daily lives and unconsciously usher our everyday behaviours. Many priming effects 
are harmless, even humorous. To illustrate the point consider the following anecdote. 
 
Picture the scene. The author is standing alone in a lecture hall in Dublin City University. Exam scripts 
clutched in hand, he patiently waits for the students to be granted entry into the exam hall.  Outside, in 
the corridor, the anticipation builds as students nervously chat to their classmates. As the minutes creep 
by the author’s mind begins to wander. Door opens. Abruptly, this nomadic journey into the 
introspective blankness is halted by the sight of students entering the hall. Snapping to attention he 
finds himself humming a tune as he prepares to greet the students. Hmm hmm hmmmm hmmmm hmm 
hmm hmmm hmm hmm. The French national anthem, La Marseillaise. How strange. I wonder where 
that came from he muses. Oh well, back to work. 
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It was a number of minutes later when the author made the conceptual link between 
the prime and the behaviour. Those were French language students who had been 
chatting outside the lecture hall. Aha! The chatter of French students had primed the 
author to begin humming La Marseillaise. For individuals less aware of priming 
effects, this curious incident would have perhaps gone unnoticed and unchecked. As 
the above case illustrates, priming effects are pervasive yet their subtle influence 
remains largely hidden and often benign. However, in consumer domains, the risk of 
exposure to primes is greater and the consequences of exposure more serious. Here, 
the associative costs of priming effects can escalate quickly. What’s more, unlike the 
benign consequences outlined in the above example, within consumer domains, the 
implications of priming are more likely to be monetary than melodic in nature. This 
chapter outlines how mindset priming effects can erode consumer resistance and 
promote purchasing behaviours.  
The term “priming” first appeared in academic literature to describe the 
heightened accessibility of mental representations (Lashley, 1951). Karl Lashley 
coined the term priming to describe responses that were consciously generated. 
However, it was almost a decade later before the term priming was expanded to 
encompass the broader remit of non-conscious cognition. Specifically, Segal and 
Cofer (1960) made the landmark discovery that mere exposure to a list of words could 
increase the likelihood of these words being used in a subsequent free association 
task. The authors used the term “priming” to describe the heightened probability of a 
recently activated concept influencing a subsequent, unrelated task (Segal & Cofer, 
1960). However, it was not until the seminal social psychology study by Higgins, 
Rholes and Jones (1977) that researchers began to examine the social implications of 
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priming effects. The authors provided the first evidence that social processes such as 
impression formation could be influenced by priming. For example, in one study 
participants memorised words relating to either positive traits (adventurous, self-
confident, independent, persistence) or negative traits (reckless, conceited, aloof, 
stubborn). In an ostensibly unrelated task, participants then read a paragraph 
describing a fictitious character named Donald whose behaviours could be construed 
as either being adventurous or reckless (Donald was considering doing a skydive or 
crossing the Atlantic in a sailboat). The results indicated that participants who had 
memorised words relating to positive (or conversely negative) traits were 
subsequently more likely to disambiguate Donald’s behaviours in a positive (or 
conversely negative) light. The study provided evidence that activating trait concepts 
in one domain can lead to these concepts being used as evaluative criteria in 
conceptually similar yet unrelated future scenarios. Similarly, Srull and Wyer (1979) 
showed that priming the concept of hostility using a scrambled sentence task induced 
individuals to view target stimuli as more hostile in an unrelated task.  
In the intervening years since these first priming studies, priming has evolved 
from a research methodology to an area of study in its own right. Priming has gone 
“from being the stagehand to being the star of the show” (Higgins & Eitam, 2014; p. 
225). Indeed, the volume and the variety of empirical evidence for priming effects 
represents an “embarrassment of riches” (Bargh 2006; p. 148). Priming effects are 
found to manifest themselves across all knowledge categories (for a review see 
Janiszewski & Wyer 2014): semantic (e.g. Adaval & Monroe 2002; Nedungadi, 
1990), affective (Schwarz & Clore, 1983), goal-related (Chartrand, Huber, Shiv & 
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Tanner, 2008; Förster & Friedman, 2008; Kruglanski, 2006) and behavioural (Bargh, 
Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Shen, Wyer, & Cai, 2012; Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2008).  
Over the last 40 years a diverse collection of over 12,000 priming studies have 
been published within the social sciences (Janiszewski & Wyer, 2014). This body 
of research provides convincing evidence that primes have the power to exert 
(in)direct influence across a wide range of social contexts and domains (Janiszewski 
& Wyer, 2014). Regardless of the type of priming effect; content and process primes 
all manifest themselves as a consequence of heightened knowledge accessibility. 
 
2.2.1. Knowledge Accessibility 
Knowledge accessibility refers to the activation potential of a mental construct 
(Higgins, 1996). As such, knowledge accessibility underpins all explanations of 
priming effects. The knowledge that we have access to at any given moment is 
determined by a multitude of factors (for reviews see Higgins, 1996; Wyer, 2006). For 
example, the frequency and recency of knowledge activation determines how easily 
this knowledge comes to mind (Wyer, 2008). Consequently, the strength of the 
associative links between a prime and a “target” (stimulus that is affected by the 
prime) will determine the strength of the priming effect. 
While individuals may be aware of the presence of a prime (e.g. mindset 
priming) or unaware of the presence of a prime (e.g. subliminal priming), all priming 
effects occur because individuals do not realise that the thoughts that come to mind 
are influenced by their exposure to the prime. Indeed, research finds that when 
individuals are forewarned about misattributing their thoughts, priming effects 
disappear (Loersch & Payne, 2012; Verwijmeren, Karremans, Bernritter, Stroebe, & 
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Wigboldus, 2013). The researchers also showed a prime frequency effect whereby the 
rate of decay over time (5 minutes, one hour, one day) was a function of the strength 
of this semantic priming task. For example, participants who solved a low number of 
scrambled sentences related to hostility (i.e. 6 sentences) demonstrated weaker 
priming effects than those who had solved a higher number of scrambled sentences 
relating to hostility (i.e. 24 sentences). Interestingly, Bargh and Pietromonaco (1982) 
demonstrated that the hostility priming effects could also be produced subliminally. 
Subliminal primes (supraliminal primes) are primes that are consciously 
(unconsciously) attended to during the priming manipulation. This research 
demonstrated that primes can exert influence even when they are processed below the 
“liminal” (i.e. the threshold of conscious awareness).  
 
2.2.2. Content vs. Process Priming 
Priming research can be dichotomised into two broad categories; “content 
priming” and “process priming” (Janiszewski & Wyer, 2014). Content priming occurs 
when a piece of information makes a mental representation more cognitively 
accessible and primes behaviour that is conceptually associated with it (Janiszewski & 
Wyer, 2014). For example, priming a stereotype of a professor increases performance 
in a general knowledge test (Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1998), exposing 
individuals to the smell of a cleaning product induces cleaning behaviour (Holland, 
Hendriks, & Aarts, 2005), or exposing individuals to money primes can make them 
more independently minded (Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2006). Content priming 
therefore increases the accessibility of mental representations relating to the prime. 
For example, priming the concept of a mother (prime) has been shown to increase 
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motivation and task performance (target) in subsequent tasks (Fitzsimons & Bargh, 
2003). The authors contend that individuals naturally want to please their parents and 
so the strong associative link between the concept of mother and achievement goals is 
responsible for these priming effects. Of course such priming effects would not occur 
if the individual was estranged from their mother because this associative link would 
not exist.  
In contrast, process priming involves “a mental act that results in the 
manipulation, transformation, or reorganisation of content” (Janiszewski & Wyer, 
2014; p. 106). For example, Shen and Wyer (2008) demonstrated that asking 
individuals to rank items from low to high or from high to low in terms of different 
dimensions (e.g. price, tests scores, favourableness) dictated how they later searched 
for hotels in an ostensibly unrelated task. Participants were asked to estimate the 
average price for a hotel stay. The results indicated that individuals who had 
previously enacted a cognitive procedure in which they ranked items from low to high 
(high to low) were likely to enact this cognitive procedure in the second task. 
Specifically, individuals who ranked items from low to high (or conversely, from high 
to low) in the first task were found to pay relatively more attention to the lower (or 
conversely to the higher) priced hotels in the second task. Accordingly, individuals in 
the low to high (or conversely high to low) conditions estimated the average hotel 
price to be lower (or conversely higher) because of the procedural search bias that 
carried over from the initial priming task. Interestingly, cognitive procedures may 
carryover at various levels of abstraction (Shen et al., 2012). For example, the 
researchers demonstrated that inducing individuals to speak slowly (or conversely 
quickly) in one task primed them to complete a questionnaire slowly (quickly) in an 
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ostensibly unrelated task. Process priming thus occurs when the cognitive processes 
enacted in one situation are carried over and activated in a subsequent situation. The 
likelihood of carryover effects being exhibited are dependent upon the accessibility of 
the cognitive procedure and its conceptual similarity, thereby applicability, within the 
second situation.  
 
2.2.3. Studying Priming Effects 
Today, “ever-larger, more complex and sophisticated representations are 
hypothesized to be prime-able” (Bargh, 2006; p. 151). However, priming research is 
already nearing “childhoods end” and there are now calls for researchers to move 
beyond “first generation questions” which are strictly concerned with identifying 
novel priming effects (Bargh, 2006; p. 147). Within social psychology, research 
questions may be classified as first generation, second generation or third generation 
questions (Tenenbaum & Eklund, 2007). First generation questions are typically “is” 
questions that ask whether there is a phenomenon, an effect or a relationship present.  
Second generation questions involve determining when effects will occur and are 
therefore involved in the search for moderating variables. Finally, third generation 
questions seek to identify mediating variables that can help answer how and why 
these effects manifest themselves (Tenenbaum & Eklund, 2007). 
In recent years, numerous authors have highlighted the urgent need for greater 
replication efforts within social psychology (Cesario, 2014; Koole & Lakens, 2012; 
Simons, 2014). Replications allow researchers to test the robustness and 
generalisability of priming effects (Yong, 2012). Importantly, replication studies 
allow social scientists to narrow the effect sizes of priming to more ecologically valid 
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parameters. Consequently, replication efforts provide researchers with more 
confidence in both the strength and generalizability of the discovered priming effect 
(Simons, 2014).  
Consumer researchers have a particular interest in priming effects associated 
with “mindsets”. Mindsets have been found to influence a wide variety of consumer 
behaviours (for a review see Wyer & Xu, 2010). Newly discovered, bolstering and 
counterarguing and mindsets have been found to regulate consumer resistance (Xu & 
Wyer, 2012). Consequently, these mindsets have potentially far reaching implications 
for consumers and marketers. Counterarguing and bolstering responses occur across a 
wide range of consumer contexts and dictate the effectiveness of marketers’ 
persuasive appeals and consumers’ resistive responses. However, to our knowledge, 
no research has yet attempted to replicate these mindsets. The conditions that 
influence the strength of these mindsets is a theoretically important, second generation 
question that remains unanswered. Research that could provide a diagnostic tool for 
identifying individuals who are more vulnerable to bolstering and counterarguing 
mindsets would make an important contribution to the scarce literature. 
 
2.3. Mindsets 
 
‘‘The stream of our thought is like a river. On the whole, easy simple ﬂowing predominates in it, the 
drift of things is with the pull of gravity, and effortless attention is the rule’’ (James, 1890; p. 451). 
 
The Oxford English dictionary defines a mindset as “a set of attitudes or fixed ideas 
that somebody has and that are often difficult to change”. Within academic literature 
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the term mindset has been loosely defined. For example, some authors have 
conceptualised mindsets broadly as artefacts of culture (Uskul, Oyserman, Schwarz, 
Lee, & Xu, 2013; Xu, Shen, & Wyer, 2012) or as personality traits (Kühnen & 
Oyserman, 2002). Other researchers proffer more narrowly defined 
conceptualisations. For example, Xu and Wyer (2007; p. 556) define “procedural” 
mindsets as being characterised by “the persistence of cognitive processes and 
judgement criteria that are activated in the course of performing a task”. Since the 
current research seeks to extend the work of Xu and Wyer (2012), the author duly 
adopts their definition of mindset for the purposes of the current research. According 
to Xu and Wyer (2012), a bolstering mindset occurs when the cognitive procedure of 
reaffirming a belief is carried over and automatically enacted in a conceptually similar 
yet unrelated situation (Xu & Wyer, 2012). Conversely, a counterarguing mindset 
occurs when the cognitive procedure of refuting the implications of a message is 
carried over and automatically enacted in a conceptually similar yet unrelated 
situation (Xu & Wyer, 2012).  
 Hamilton et al. (2011) maintain that research on mindsets can be traced back 
to early psychology studies (see Ach, 1905). However, other authors adopt a narrower 
perspective on mindsets and thus attribute the seminal studies on mindset to more 
contemporary sources. For example, Xu (2010) suggest that the origins of research on 
mindsets can be traced back to studies on behavioural rigidity (Luchins, 1942; Rees & 
Israel, 1935). These studies demonstrated that when individuals successfully applied a 
strategy to solve a problem they were subsequently more likely to rely on this strategy 
to solve similar problems in the future. For example, Luchins (1942) provided 
participants with three jars of varying volumes and then asked them to measure out a 
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particular volume of water using only the containers provided. Solving the task 
required participants to use a particular sequence of steps in order to measure the 
correct volume of water. Specifically, participants were required to fill the largest 
container with water before then using the smaller containers to subtract the excess 
water to arrive at the correct volume. The research demonstrated that once individuals 
successfully completed the puzzle they were likely to use the same strategy to 
successfully complete similar puzzles. Luchins (1942) found that individuals 
employed the same problem solving strategy on subsequent tasks even though much 
easier solutions were available. In short, the research demonstrated that behavioural 
rigidity predisposed individuals to select cognitively accessible strategies that were 
inappropriate or ineffective in future situations (e.g. Luchins 1942; Rees & Israel 
1935). Despite the differing opinions regarding the nature and origins of mindsets, 
there is a general consensus among researchers that mindsets are cognitive 
phenomena which influence perceptual, behavioural, cognitive and even physiological 
responses to stimuli (Wyer & Xu, 2010).  
Mindsets are found to exert influence at all stages of information processing. 
For example, mindsets can influence comprehension (e.g. Higgins & Chaires, 1980; 
Ulrich Kühnen, Hannover, & Schubert, 2001; Wakslak & Trope, 2006), evaluation 
(e.g. Hirt, Kardes, & Markman, 2004; Kray & Galinsky, 2003) and decision making 
processes (e.g. Gollwitzer & Bayer, 1999; Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, & Steller, 1990; 
Shen & Wyer, 2010). Due to the fact that mindsets infiltrate and influence all stages 
of information processing, they influence a wide range of human behaviour both 
within and outside of consumer contexts (for a review see Wyer & Xu, 2010). For 
example, mindsets that influence comprehension processes often change the relational 
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connections between stimuli. Abstract (or conversely concrete) mindsets induce 
individuals to process information at higher (or conversely lower) levels of 
abstraction (Trope & Liberman, 2000). Individuals in an abstract (or conversely 
concrete) mindset attend to broad (or conversely fine grained) detail during 
information processing which predisposes them to sorting information into more 
wider (or conversely narrower) categories (Trope & Liberman, 2000). Metaphorically 
speaking, while those exhibiting an abstract mindset see the forest, those with a 
concrete mindset see the trees (Dhar & Kim, 2007). Similarly, while a holistic 
mindset induces individuals to view stimuli as whole entities, a piecemeal mindset 
induces individuals to consider the constituent parts of an entity (Higgins & Chaires, 
1980). Differences in relational thinking associated with these mindsets was found to 
influence an individual’s ability to solve the Dunker candle problem (a puzzle which 
requires individuals to find a way to mount a candle to a wall with a cardboard box 
and a bunch of tacks).  
Decision making processes may also be affected by mindset. For example, 
Kray and Galinsky (2003) found that when evaluating a goal, a counterfactual 
mindset induced individuals to become more sensitive to the potential disadvantages 
of pursing the goal. Similarly, Hirt et al. (2004) found that a counterfactual mindset 
induced individuals to make more realistic assessments of the likelihood of their 
favourite team winning the National Basketball Championship (NBA).  
Behaviours may also be affected by mindsets. Xu and Wyer (2008) 
demonstrated that making comparative evaluations in one scenario increased the 
likelihood of comparative evaluations being made in a subsequent shopping task. 
Since shopping behaviours typically involve making comparative judgements, the 
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carryover of this cognitive procedure was found to increase purchasing behaviours. 
For example, Xu and Wyer (2008) demonstrated that asking individuals to make 
comparisons between the physical attributes of different animals or making 
comparisons between two potential dating partners served to prime increased 
purchasing behaviours in a follow up task.  
Similarly, Shen and Wyer (2008) found that information search strategies (i.e. 
ranking items from high to low or low to high along a product dimension) induced 
future shopping behaviours to be informed by this type of behaviour. Mindsets can 
also improve learning ability and academic performance (Aronson, Fried, & Good, 
2002; Dweck, 2010; Good, Aronson, & Inzlicht, 2003). For example, Dweck (2010) 
demonstrated that a growth mindset can dramatically influence learning ability and 
academic performance, especially among children who belong to stereotyped groups 
(Aronson et al., 2002; Good et al., 2003). The influence of mindsets is not restricted to 
cognition.  
Mindsets may help individuals to “overcome physiological limits with 
psychological means” (Draganich & Erdal, 2014; p. 858). Perhaps the most well-
known manifestations of mindset is that of the placebo effect (Benson & Friedman, 
1996). Draganich and Erdal (2014) demonstrated that supplying individuals with false 
feedback regarding their past night sleep quality was sufficient to influence their 
subsequent performance on cognitive tasks. Specifically, participants who were led to 
believe that they were sleep deprived performed worse on cognitive tests than 
participants who were told they had gained sufficient sleep. Interestingly, individuals’ 
self-reported sleep did not influence their subsequent task performance. Mindset are 
even found to influence metabolism (Crum, Corbin, Brownell, & Salovey, 2011; 
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Crum & Langer, 2007). For example, Crum et al. (2011) found that individuals who 
believed they were drinking a low (high) calorie milkshake demonstrated different 
physiological responses to the same food. Specifically, individuals who believed that 
they had drunk a high calorie milkshake exhibited a more pronounced decline in the 
gut peptide ghrelin than individuals who believed they had drunk a low calorie 
milkshake. The authors concluded that an individual’s “mindset (sensible or 
indulgent) meaningfully affects physiological responses to food” (Crum et al, 2011; p. 
424). Other research has demonstrated that mindsets can improve visual acuity 
(Langer, Djikic, Pirson, Madenci, & Donohue, 2010). Specifically, the authors 
demonstrated that an individual’s vision could be improved by activating the concept 
of a pilot. Participants in the experimental condition were primed by undertaking a 
realistic flight simulator task. These individuals subsequently exhibited improved 
vision when compared to those in the control condition. Another study demonstrated 
that individuals primed with a motivational mindset “try and you will succeed” 
exhibited improved vision compared to those in the control condition (Langer et al., 
2010).  
A large body of research now demonstrates that mindsets can influence 
information processing at comprehension, evaluation and decision making stages (for 
a review see Wyer & Xu, 2010). Consequently, mindsets have the power to colour 
perceptions and thus steer behaviours outside of conscious awareness (Wyer & Xu, 
2010). For example, abstract mindsets promote decision making based on broad, 
personal values (Torelli & Kaikati, 2009) while concrete mindsets promote decision 
making based on low level, detailed analysis (Goldsmith & Dhar, 2008). Prevention-
focus mindsets induce individuals to focus on their responsibilities, while promotion-
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focus mindsets induce individuals to focus on their personal goals (Higgins, 1997). A 
holistic mindset promotes conceptual thinking, while a piecemeal mindset promotes 
thinking in fine grain detail (Higgins & Chaires, 1980). A counterfactual mindset 
induces individuals to consider alternatives (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Hirt et al. 
2004), while a mating mindset induces individuals to think creatively (Monga & 
Gürhan-Canli, 2012). A configural mindset aids decision making when distracted, 
while a featural mindset compromises decision making when distracted (Lerouge, 
2009).  
Mindsets may also influence relational thinking towards objects and people. 
For example, the consumer goal of utility maximisation (getting the most value for the 
investment made) can lead to a maximising mindset. A maximising mindset induces 
upward comparisons but also increases feelings of regret and loss (Ma & Roese, 
2014). The maximising mindset also increases both product dissatisfaction and the 
likelihood that an individual will return a product that fails to live up to expectation. 
Mindsets can also influence behaviours and goal pursuit strategies (Gollwitzer et al., 
1990). Deliberative mindsets promote open mindedness which facilitates critical 
thinking and unbiased decision-making. In contrast, an implemental mindset promotes 
closed mindedness and biased information processing. Consequently, a deliberative 
mindset facilitates the evaluation of pre-decisional goal pursuit options (Gollwitzer et 
al., 1990), while an implemental mindset facilitates post-decisional, goal focused 
behaviours (Gollwitzer et al., 1990). Research on implemental and deliberative 
mindsets has highlighted how mindsets may influence goal pursuit strategies that 
individuals enact both within and outside of consumer domains. However, little 
research has investigated specific goal pursuit strategies relating to the important goal 
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of resistance. The current research aims to address this imbalance in the academic 
literature. However, in order to fully appreciate the power that mindsets exert on 
consumer behaviour the reader must firstly understand the processes that govern their 
operation. 
 
2.4. Mechanics of Mindset: Declarative and Procedural Knowledge 
Mindsets are a manifestation of the activation of declarative and procedural 
knowledge (Shen et al., 2012; Shen & Wyer, 2008; Wyer & Xu, 2010). Declarative 
knowledge stores facts and semantic concepts (e.g. persons, places, things) and also 
the cognitive consequences of cognitively processing these concepts (e.g. attitudes, 
opinions and implicit theories) (Wyer & Xu, 2010). Mental representations of past 
episodic events (e.g. the time you failed your driving test), information relating to 
prototypic memories (e.g. going shopping for groceries) and implicit theories (e.g. the 
belief that car salesmen are untrustworthy) are also stored in declarative memory. 
Declarative knowledge is consciously processed and collected over time to facilitate 
future decisions (Smith, 1994). For example, within consumer buying situations, 
semantic concepts (e.g. price, perception of value, brand quality etc.) may be used to 
provide meaningful comparison criteria (Shen & Wyer, 2008).  
In contrast to declarative knowledge, “procedural knowledge refers to the 
sequences of actions that we perform in order to achieve a goal” (Xu & Wyer, 2010; 
p. 7). As such, procedural knowledge relates to the rules and thought processes that 
ensure the efficient processing of declarative knowledge. It provides the protocols for 
accessing declarative knowledge and “includes the sequences of interrelated 
operations that transform, store, retrieve or make inferences based on declarative 
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knowledge” (Smith, 1994; p. 101). Procedural Knowledge may be activated via two 
general thought processes known as “cognitive procedures” and “productions”. 
According to the ACT Model, postulated by Anderson (1983), “productions” are 
simple rule based thought processes that follow an “If X, then Y” structure. These 
thought processes that regulate routine, goal pursuit behaviours (e.g. driving) are 
chronically accessible and automated due to repeated activation (Wyer, 2010). 
Consequently, productions require little or no cognitive mediation (Schneider & 
Shiffrin, 1977). Less efficient thought processes that require more deliberate thought 
are known as “cognitive procedures” (Shen & Wyer, 2010).  Cognitive procedures are 
sequential strings of cognitive and motor actions that are used to achieve a goal. The 
complexity of the cognitive procedure is mirrored by the specificity or generality of 
the goal directed behaviour (e.g. ironing your shirt vs. correcting exam scripts). 
Cognitive procedures are used to access declarative knowledge and are stored as 
declarative knowledge. Consequently, unlike productions, individuals are often aware 
of the cognitive procedures they are implementing. For example, while individuals 
may not be aware of the productions that regulate their driver actions (e.g. gear 
change, braking, yielding at the roundabout etc.) they may be consciously aware of 
the cognitive procedures that they are employing when following the instructions 
issued by their sat nav (Wyer & Xu, 2010). 
Both cognitive procedures and productions are used to guide goal directed 
behaviours. While productions are used to pursue very concrete goals (Anderson, 
1983), cognitive procedures have a wider application and can be used to pursue more 
abstract goals (Kruglanski et al., 2002). Quite often individuals are unaware of the 
cognitive procedures that remain actively pursuing goals indirectly related to the 
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current situation. Indeed, cognitive procedures can influence an individual’s goal 
pursuit strategies in situations that are unrelated to the situation that prompted their 
initial activation.  
Mindsets represent the activation of non-conscious goal pursuit strategies that 
occur as a consequence of the orchestrated interaraction between declarative 
knowledge and procedural knowledge (Wyer & Xu, 2010). Goals are cognitive 
representations that contain both information on the desired end state and the 
information needed to achieve this desired end state (Kruglanski, 1996). Research 
suggests that goals can be activated outside of conscious awareness (e.g. Fitzsimons et 
al., 2008) and may drive much of our consumer behaviour (Dijksterhuis, Smith, van 
Baaren, & Wigboldus, 2005). “People use their goals as scaffolds with which to build 
mental representations of the present in a selective manner” (Fujita & Trope, 2014; p. 
73). Higher order (abstract) goals (e.g. to be happy) may be characterised as goals 
directed towards an end state (e.g. meeting friends or going shopping). In contrast, 
lower order (concrete) goals (e.g. making a cup of coffee) may be envisaged as a 
series of step-by-step procedures (i.e. filling the kettle, turning on the power, taking a 
cup from the cupboard etc.) used to achieve the desired end state (i.e. drinking a cup 
of refreshing tea). A hierarchy of goals and means (see Figure 1) may thus be 
envisaged. 
 
  
28 
 
Figure 1 
Hierarchy of Goals and Means 
 
 
Kruglanski et al. (2002) posited the concepts of equifinality and multifinality to 
explain goal pursuit strategies. Equifinality refers to a situation in which one specific 
goal may be achieved via a variety of sub-goals (see Figure 2). For example, in order 
to commute to college one might walk, cycle, jog, take a bus or get a taxi. All of these 
options will achieve the goal of arriving at college (i.e. equifinality). In contrast, 
multifinality refers to a situation in which one sub-goal may be applicable to a variety 
of different goals (see Figure 2). Either of these transport options (i.e. means) can 
serve a variety of goals (i.e. end states). For example, cycling to college may satisfy 
fitness goals by increasing general fitness (cardio vascular exercise), weight loss goals 
(burning calories) and cultural/education goals (allow the cyclist to listen to audio 
books of literary classics during the cycle). Wyer and Xu (2010) invoke the concepts 
of equifinality and multifinality to explain how mindsets exert their influence. For 
example, one mode of thinking (counterarguing) can be applied to various situations 
with different goals (resisting a TV advert message, resisting the sales patter of a sales 
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person etc.). Conversely, two different modes of thinking (e.g. deliberative thinking 
vs. implemental thinking) can be used to achieve one goal (e.g. shopping for a new 
car). This distinction between equifinality and multifinality is relevant for the present 
research because counterarguing and bolstering cognitive procedures can be applied 
across a range of consumer contexts. Counterarguing occurs when an individual 
refutes the implications of a message. In contrast, bolstering occurs when an 
individual generates supporting arguments in response to a message. According to Xu 
and Wyer (2012 p. 922) “making supportive elaborations in an earlier situation (can) 
activate a general procedure of generating supporting arguments, giving rise to a 
bolstering mind-set”. Conversely, “generating opposing arguments in an earlier 
situation (can) give rise to a counterarguing mind-set” (Xu and Wyer, 2012 p. 922).   
 
Figure 2  
Equifinality and Multifinality 
 
 
2.5. Mindsets within Consumer Domains 
Much of our everyday actions are “introspectively blank” (Dijksterhuis et al. 
2005). Indeed, much of human life is punctuated by states of unthinking automation; a 
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cognitive state known as “mindlessness” (Langer & Piper, 1987). Research on 
mindsets suggests that when many plans for pursuing a goal exist, individuals often 
choose the most cognitively accessible strategy (Forster, Liberman, & Förster, 2007; 
Higgins, 1996; Wyer, 2008). Consequently, past cognitive procedures that are fresh in 
the mind and readily accessible may determine which goal pursuit strategy is 
activated (Kruglanski et al., 2002). Understanding the role of goal pursuit within 
consumer domains is now a major research area within consumer research. By 
definition, all consumers are goal driven agents (Lee & Higgins, 2009). In recent 
years, considerable attention has also been paid to exploring how mindsets influence 
various facets of consumer behaviour including retail shopping behaviours (Büttner, 
Florack, & Göritz, 2013; Dhar et al., 2007; Lee & Ariely, 2006), brand evaluation 
strategies (Meyvis, Goldsmith, & Dhar, 2009; Monga & John, 2010), product 
evaluation strategies (Xu & Wyer, 2008; Xu & Wyer, 2007), information search 
strategies (Shen & Wyer, 2008), message evaluation strategies (Xu & Wyer, 2012), 
goal pursuit strategies (Gollwitzer et al. 1990; Shen et al. 2012; Shen & Wyer, 2010) 
and self-regulation (Bruyneel & Dewitte, 2006). Indeed, John and Park (2016) suggest 
that consumer mindsets have far reaching implications for a company’s advertising 
and branding activities. The authors assert that marketers need to fully appreciate the 
importance of consumer mindsets if they are to successfully implement tactical and 
strategic marketing plans. Knowing the mindset of those in the target market would 
help optimise tactical decision-making regarding advertising and promotional efforts. 
The mindset of those in the target market should also dictate marketers’ strategic 
decisions relating to brand positioning and brand architecture (John & Park, 2016). 
The growing body of scholarly work on mindsets reflects the importance of non-
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conscious goal pursuit behaviours within consumer domains. There is growing 
evidence to suggest that mindsets may be automatically activated within different 
shopping environments; online shopping environments (Van Noort, Kerkhof, & 
Fennis, 2007), in-store and out of store shopping environments (Lee & Ariely, 2006) 
or the general macroeconomic environment (Yabar, 2012). Past research has 
demonstrated that even incidental exposure to stimuli can prime behaviours 
(Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2003; North, Hargreaves, & McKendrick, 1999). The following 
sections provide a review of mindsets and cognitive states that increase and decrease 
consumer resistance. 
 
2.6. The Defenceless Consumer: Eroding Consumer Resistance 
Resistance may be defined as the ability to withstand a persuasion attempt 
(McGuire, 1964). Others have defined “resistance” as the “function of the magnitude 
of deterrence” (Fuegen & Brehm, 2004; p. 45). Resistance may be evidenced in 
action, affect or cognition and may be conceptualised as a motive or as a process 
(Knowles & Linn, 2004). Briñol et al. (2004) claim resistance is not merely an 
outcome; it may be viewed as a psychological process or as a motivation. It may also 
manifest itself as a quality of an attitude or person (Brinol et al. 2004). Some scholars 
believe resistance “is the important element in the persuasion process” (Knowles & 
Linn, 2004a; p. vii). Any influence that unconsciously undermines an individual’s 
ability to resist persuasive communications represents a serious threat to consumer 
welfare and autonomy and thus warrants further investigation (Laran, Dalton, & 
Andrade, 2011).  
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2.6.1. Deliberative and Implemental Mindsets 
Mindset theory posits two different “action stages” that govern goal pursuit; 
the pre-decisional stage and post decisional stage (Gollwitzer et al., 1990). In the pre-
decisional action stage, an individual considers the pros and cons of pursuing various 
means to achieving a goal. After the options are evaluated the best goal pursuit 
strategy is then selected. The planning of how a goal will be executed occurs at the 
post-decisional stage. Mindset theory suggests that deliberative (implemental) 
mindsets are activated in the pre-decisional (post decisional) stages of goal pursuit. 
Individuals exhibiting a deliberative (implemental) mindset are more (less) likely to 
entertain unrelated or disconfirming thoughts (Gollwitzer & Bayer, 1999; Gollwitzer 
et al., 1990). Research suggests that deliberative mindsets facilitate greater 
recognition and a greater sensitivity to incidental information (Fujita, Gollwitzer, & 
Oettingen, 2007). In contrast, implemental mindsets induce biased information 
processing which reinforces goals at the expense of other goal relevant information 
(Fujita et al., 2007). An implemental mindset is also found to increase attitude 
strength, even towards unrelated, non-goal focused objects (Henderson, de Liver, & 
Gollwitzer, 2008). Henderson et al. (2008) also found that an implemental 
(deliberative) mindset induces self-reported attitudes that are more (less) predictive of 
future behaviours. This goal focus associated with an implemental mindset can 
manifest itself as higher confidence levels and elevated levels of task performance 
(Armor & Taylor, 2003). These findings suggest that an implemental mindset 
influences cognition and goal striving behaviours. Consequently, participants in an 
implemental mindset are found to overestimate the amount of control they have over 
their environment which results in an “illusion of control” (Fujita et al., 2007). 
  
33 
 
Research suggests that participants in an implemental mindset exhibit a strong goal 
focus and are five times more likely to consider the pros of a situation rather than the 
cons of a situation (Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995). This research also suggests that an 
implemental mindset inhibits the production of negative thoughts and promotes a goal 
focused approach to information processing.  
Research suggests that implemental and deliberative mindsets may also 
influence consumer behaviour (Fujita et al., 2007). Since virtually all consumer 
behaviours involve some element of goal pursuit it is not surprising that implemental 
and deliberative mindsets underpin a number of consumer behaviours. For example, 
Nenkov (2012) found that shoppers in a “pre-decisional” stage of consumption exhibit 
a deliberative mindset and are likely to assess a number of alternative products. 
Conversely, individuals in a post-decisional stage of consumption exhibit an 
implemental mindset and are more likely to think specifically about using one 
particular product. Interestingly, individuals in the pre-decisional (or conversely post-
decisional) stage of consumption are more likely to be persuaded by adverts that use 
physiologically distant (close) language. These findings suggest a fit between 
message framing and these goal pursuit mindsets (Nenkov, 2012). These differences 
in thought processing occur because consumers “cross the Rubicon” from the 
decisional stages (pre-decisional and post-decisional phases) to actional stages 
(actional and post-actional phases (Gollwitzer, 1990). 
Deliberative and implemental mindsets can be situationally induced (e.g. 
Armor & Taylor, 2003; Fujita et al., 2007; Gollwitzer et al., 1990; Henderson et al., 
2008). For example, asking individuals to deliberate on the various pros and cons of 
resolving a personal problem induces a deliberative mindset. Conversely, outlining an 
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action plan to achieve a personal goal induces an implemental mindset (Gollwitzer et 
al., 1990). Deliberative and implemental mindsets may also be primed by situational 
norms. For example, action orientated planning within a bargaining situation induces 
an implemental mindset that promotes purchasing behaviour (Chandran & Morwitz, 
2014). The resulting implemental mindset is found to compromise an individual’s 
ability to properly perceive the cost and benefits associated with the product. 
Similarly, Büttner et al. (2013) demonstrated that customers exhibiting a task focused 
orientation are more likely to display cognitive procedures associated with an 
implemental mind-set. Other scenarios may also prime these mindsets.  
Lee and Ariely (2006) provide evidence that customers’ geographic proximity 
to a retail environment can dictate the mindset they are likely to exhibit. They 
formulate a two-stage “shopping goals theory” whereby shopping goals become more 
concrete as the consumer progresses through the shopping experience. For example, 
shoppers demonstrate more abstract (concrete) shopping goals when they are located 
inside (outside) a retail environment. This has implications for conditional coupon use 
because these mindsets determine how consumer approach the decision making 
process. Specifically, consumers inside (outside) a grocery store are likely to exhibit 
an implemental (deliberative) mindset and are thus less (more) likely to be influenced 
by coupons that offer conditional discounts. More recently, researchers have 
demonstrated that an implemental mindset can reduce resistance and promote 
purchasing behaviours. Specifically, research suggests that an implemental mindset 
may promote consumer spending by creating “shopping momentum” (Dhar et al., 
2007).  
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2.6.2. Shopping Momentum 
“Shopping momentum” is a state in which a consumer demonstrates a 
predisposition to keep spending after the initial purchase of a “driver item” (Dhar et 
al., 2007). The researchers demonstrated that the shopping momentum effect can be 
attributed to an implemental mindset (Dhar et al., 2007). The research suggests that 
the very act of making a purchase induces an implemental mindset which predisposes 
individuals to make further purchases. The shopping momentum effect was found to 
increase the accessibility of implemental thoughts. In addition, it manifested itself 
independently of any mood effects. Interestingly, the research revealed that the 
shopping momentum effect could be countered by introducing “friction”. Specifically, 
when participants were provided with two sources of finance to buy products (rather 
than one) the shopping momentum effect disappeared. This finding suggests that a 
secondary source of income disrupts the generation of shopping momentum by 
breaking the implemental mindset that drives it. In sum, Dhar et al. (2007) concluded 
that making a purchase can induce further purchasing behaviours. However, related 
research by Xu and Wyer (2007) contradicts the results of Dhar et al. (2007). 
Worryingly for consumers, Xu and Wyer (2007) suggest that a “which-to-buy” 
mindset can prime purchasing behaviour even without the necessity of a purchase.  
 
2.6.3. Which-to-Buy Mindsets 
The which-to buy mindset increases purchase intention regardless of purchase 
decision revocability or similarities between products. Xu and Wyer (2007) 
demonstrated that consumer resistance may be eroded by simply asking an individual 
to express a preference between two products. In their first study, participants were 
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exposed to descriptions of two products (computers). In one condition, participants 
were firstly asked to decide whether they would be willing to purchase one of the 
products. Participants in the second condition were asked to express a preference for 
one of the products before being asked if they were willing to make a purchase. 
Participants in both conditions were told that their purchasing decisions were either 
revocable or irrevocable. The results indicated that participants in the choice 
revocability condition exhibited reduced purchase intentions compared to participants 
in the choice irrevocability condition. Participants in the preference-first condition 
reported higher purchase intentions than participants in the decision-first condition. 
Furthermore, this trend was found to be stronger among those who were told their 
decision was irrevocable. The product ratings were also higher among participants in 
the preference-first condition.  
In Study 2, participants in the preference-first condition were again asked to 
state their preference between one of two computers. In this study, participants were 
not required to provide evaluations of the computers but instead asked to indicate 
their purchase intentions. Participants could also elect to defer their decision. Those in 
the decision-first condition were simply asked if they would be willing to purchase 
the computer. Later, in an ostensibly unrelated study all participants were asked to 
choose between one of two vacation packages being advertised. The results indicated 
that participants in the preference-first condition were more likely to choose a 
vacation package (68%) than participants in the decision-first condition (42%). The 
results also showed that those in the decision-first condition were equally likely to 
report purchase intentions in task two, regardless of whether they indicated a positive 
or negative purchase decision in the first task. This finding conflicts with those of 
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Dhar et al. (2007) who attribute the shopping momentum effect to the generation of 
an implemental mindset primed by affirmative purchase decisions.  
Study 3 adopted the same two task procedure that was used in Study 2. 
However, in this study, participants in the preference-first condition were asked to 
report their final purchase decision (choose a computer or defer the decision). In 
Study 2, participants had not been obliged to make a purchase decision. Participants 
in the decision only condition were first asked if they wished to purchase one of the 
computers or if they wished to defer the decision. All participants were then asked 
how much they liked the computer before undertaking the second, ostensibly 
unrelated task of choosing between two package holidays. The results indicated that 
those in the preference first condition were again more likely to make a purchase 
decision in domain 2 compared to participants in the decision-first condition. 
Furthermore, participants in the preference-first condition perceived the computer 
more favourably when the purchase decision was made to buy one of the computers. 
The results also indicated that participants in the preference first condition were more 
likely to buy the vacation in domain 2 when compared to participants in the decision 
first condition. These results suggest that making a purchase decision or simply 
expressing a preference between two products are both likely to increase future 
purchase intentions. The results extend the work of Dhar et al. (2007) by showing that 
an actual purchase is not necessary in order to induce increased purchasing behaviour. 
Study 4 demonstrated that the which-to-buy mindset influences actual buying 
behaviour. Participants in the experimental conditions were asked to express a 
preference between pairs of different products and services. Those in the control 
condition did not undertake this task. All participants were subsequently offered the 
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opportunity to purchase chocolate at half price. Those in the experimental conditions 
were found to be more likely to buy the chocolate (28%) than participants in the 
control condition (6%). Interestingly, later research by the authors suggests that 
simply comparing two products (without stating a preferred choice) is sufficient to 
reduce consumer resistance (Xu & Wyer, 2008). 
 
2.6.4. Comparative Mindsets 
Xu and Wyer (2008) demonstrated that asking participants to make 
comparative judgements induces a “comparative” mindset that increases purchase 
intentions. In one study participants were asked to review two vacation packages and 
then asked to choose the holiday they preferred or disliked more. Participants in the 
control condition did not partake in this first task. In an ostensibly unrelated study all 
participants were then asked to imagine a scenario in which they were planning to buy 
a computer. They were then shown adverts for two computers. Participants were told 
that they could indicate which computer they would purchase or alternatively, they 
could defer their decision. The results revealed that participants who had compared 
two products were more likely (73%) to make a purchase than participants in the 
control condition (50%). Similar results were found in a second study in which 
participants were either asked to compare the different physical attributes among pairs 
of animals (e.g. weight, eyesight etc.) or to simply to express a personal preference for 
one animal in each pair of animals they were shown. Those in the control condition 
did not undertake this task. All participants then completed the same computer 
decision task used in Study 1. Purchase intentions among participants who compared 
the attributes of pairs of animals (68%) and the purchase intentions among 
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participants who decided on their preferred animal (64%) were significantly higher 
than those observed among participants in the control condition (40%). This finding 
suggests that it is the act of comparison and not the act of expressing a preference that 
induced the comparative mindset and resulting reduced resistance. A third study 
employed the same design as Study 2 except in this instance participants were asked 
to choose between two potential dating partners rather than between two computers. 
Participants also had the option to refuse both potential dating partners. The results 
revealed that 75% of participants who were asked to express a preference (for one of 
the animals in each pair) later choose a dating partner. Similarly, 70% of participants 
who simply compared the physical attributes of the animals chose a dating partner. 
However, the number of participants willing to choose a dating partner in the second 
task was significantly lower among participants in the control condition (47%). In a 
final study, participants in the experimental conditions were asked to identify 
similarities between random pairs of objects in four different domains. The results 
again indicated that participants in the experimental conditions were subsequently 
more likely to express a willingness to buy a computer (85%) than participants in the 
control group (50%). 
 
2.6.5. Ego Depletion and Mindsets 
“The basic premise of resource depletion (also termed “ego depletion”) is that 
self-control processes such as actively responding to influence attempts, exercising 
self-control, or using willpower require resources that are finite: hence, the active self 
can become depleted” (Fennis & Janssen, 2010; p. 238). Muraven, Tice and 
Baumeister (1998) found that trying to ignore distractions draws from an individual’s 
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limited reserve of will power. Indeed, the research suggests that any action that 
necessitates the exertion of willpower is likely to drain self-control resources and 
induce “resource depletion”. The effects of resource depletion have long been 
indirectly acknowledged.  
 
“It is a profoundly erroneous truism, repeated by all copy-books and by eminent people when they are 
making speeches, that we should cultivate the habit of thinking of what we are doing. The precise 
opposite is the case. Civilization advances by extending the number of important operations which we 
can perform without thinking about them. Operations of thought are like cavalry charges in a battle--
they are strictly limited in number, they require fresh horses, and must only be made at decisive 
moments” (Whitehead, 1911; p. 61). 
 
The depletion of these reserves undermines an individual’s future self-control by 
making the individual differentially more (less) sensitive to affective (cognitive) 
decision criteria. For example, resource depletion reduces resistance and makes 
individuals more vulnerable to a wide variety of compliance gaining (Dolinski, 
Ciszek, Godlewski, & Zawadzki, 2002; Janssen, Fennis, Pruyn, & Vohs, 2008) and 
persuasive communications (Burkley, 2008; Wan, Rucker, Tormala, & Clarkson, 
2010; Wheeler, Briñol, & Hermann, 2007) by promoting a greater reliance on 
heuristics during message processing (Janssen et al., 2008). Interestingly, Burkley 
(2008) demonstrated that attempting to resist highly persuasive appeals can induce 
resource depletion. Burkley exposed student participants to a discrepant message 
(proposal to shorten the summer holidays to one month) which was either personally 
relevant (being introduced in two years’ time) or not personally relevant (being 
introduced in ten years’ time). Predictably, participants exposed to the personally 
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relevant message resisted the message more robustly and rated the proposition less 
favourability than participants exposed to the non-personally relevant proposition. 
More importantly, individuals who exhibited the greatest resistance also exhibited the 
greatest resource depletion effects. Specifically, participants who resisted the message 
were found to be less persistent in a subsequent puzzle solving task. Study 2 and 
Study 3 demonstrated that exerting self-control (Study 1: hand grip task, Study 2: 
thought suppression task) subsequently made individuals less resistant to a moderately 
discrepant message. Interestingly, a fourth study demonstrated that the resistance 
reducing effects of resource depletion were only evidenced when individuals resisted 
strong counter-attitudinal messages. Resource depletion had no effect on resistance 
levels when the counter-attitudinal messages contained weak arguments. However, 
Wheeler, Brinol, and Hermann (2007) suggest that depleted and non-depleted 
individuals are equally persuaded by strong arguments. Depleted participants were 
found to be significantly more persuaded by weak arguments than non-depleted 
participants. While non-depleted participants produce more (less) favourable thoughts 
when they read strong (weak) arguments, depleted participants did not distinguish 
between strong and weak arguments. The research showed that depleted and non-
depleted individuals generated a similar number of thoughts which suggests that the 
extent of message elaboration does not mediate this effect.  
In recent years, researchers have begun to investigate how mindsets regulate 
ego depletion and vice versa. For example, Bruyneel and Dewitte (2006) suggests that 
exercising self-control induces a “narrow” mindset. This mindset makes individuals 
less likely to attend to peripheral stimuli, more likely to arrange objects in narrow 
categorisations and predisposes individuals to using more concrete language. 
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Bruyneel and Dewitte (2012) replicated some of these results and demonstrated that 
resource depleted individuals are more likely to provide lower estimates of egocentric 
spatial distances (i.e. estimates of distances to known local locations). These studies 
provide converging evidence to suggest that self-regulation promotes the use of low 
level construal when making evaluative judgements. Other research has found that 
switching between mindsets (e.g. from an abstract mindset to concrete mindset) may 
also exhaust regulatory resources and induce resource depletion (Hamilton et al., 
2011). The authors hypothesised that switching between mindsets exhausts an 
executive function that relies upon the same psychological resources used in self-
regulation. Across five studies the researchers demonstrated that switching mindsets 
depleted cognitive resources and subsequently adversely influenced future decision 
making. Interestingly, research suggests that mindsets may influence how individuals 
allocate cognitive resources.  
Bosmans, Pieters and Baumgartner (2010) found that a “get ready mindset” is 
induced when individuals anticipate a demanding future task. The research suggests 
that simply thinking about a future task may activate additional cognitive resources 
that are subsequently misappropriated to the current unrelated task. Interestingly, the 
resource allocating abilities of this mindset are determined by the individual’s ability 
to mentally separate the current task from the future task. Specifically, when an 
individual’s ability to separate a task is low, the misappropriation of cognitive 
resources is higher and vice versa. The misappropriation of cognitive resources is an 
unhelpful consequence of the “get ready mindset”. Various studies have offered 
remedies for resource depletion; personal performance monitoring (Wan & Sternthal, 
2008), prayer (Friese & Wänke, 2014) or boosting energy levels by eating glucose 
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(Gailliot et al., 2007). However, recent research suggests that mindsets may also have 
a role to play in regulating the effects of resource depletion. While ego depletion may 
induce mindsets that compromise resistance, the opposite is also found to be true; 
mindsets can attenuate the effects of resource depletion. Walsh (2014) demonstrated 
that goal priming may be used to prime resistance which can offset the effects of ego 
depletion. Specifically, Walsh (2014) demonstrated that individuals who were primed 
with self-control goals were subsequently more likely to exhibit self-control and were 
also less likely to be adversely affected by an ego depletion task. Similarly, Fransen 
and Fennis (2014) found that implicit resistance strategies can outperform explicit 
resistance strategies because they offer the same resistive protection without the same 
outlay in cognitive resources. The following section discusses mindsets which 
increase consumer resistance rather than undermine it.  
 
2.7. The Defensive Consumer: Fortifying Consumer Resistance 
Marketing activities and advertising campaigns are designed to induce 
persuasion and reduce resistance (Knowles & Linn, 2004). However, over the last 70 
years marketing researchers have preoccupied themselves by measuring personality 
traits and cognitive processes that influence persuasion (for a review see Brinol & 
Petty, 2004). In contrast, measurably less research has explored how individuals resist 
persuasion. This research imbalance is perhaps indicative of the marketer’s vested 
interest in persuasion rather than resistance. However, from a consumer perspective, 
resistance is an especially important topic.  
Research suggests that individuals spontaneously accept the implications of a 
message in the course of comprehending it (Gilbert, 1991). Thus, it must follow that 
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resisting a persuasive message requires defensive motivation that allows individuals 
to contest the default position of message acceptance. Overcoming the hardwired 
response of message acceptance is of vital importance to consumers’ long term 
welfare. The ability to protect oneself from persuasive attacks becomes especially 
important when confronted by manipulative or deceptive marketing attempts. The 
four faces of resistance are: reactance, distrust, scrutiny and inertia (Knowles & Linn, 
2004; p.7 ). 
 
 “There’s a sucker born every minute” (Anon) 
 
This infamous quote is commonly attributed to businessman, P.T. Baranum. While 
the exact origins of the quote remain in doubt1 there is less doubt that the quote’s 
derogatory sentiment stirs unease among consumers. After all, consumers are “goal 
driven agents” that may pursue a wide variety of shopping related goals (Lee & 
Higgins 2009; p. 319). The overarching goal to avoid deception and deceit is a 
primary goal that is likely to influence the enactment of all other subordinate 
consumer goals (Vohs, Baumeister, & Chin, 2007).  
The pervasive consumer fear of being duped or “being a sucker” is known as 
“Sugrophobia” (Vohs et al., 2007). Sugrophobia activates self-protection instincts that 
allow consumers to defend their egos and their wallets against attack (Cohen, 
Aronson, & Steele, 2000; Vohs et al., 2007). This deeply engrained fear motivates 
consumers to assess the bona fides of persuasive messages. Avoiding deception and 
                                                 
1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/There%27s_a_sucker_born_every_minute, [25.10.14] 
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thwarting manipulative influences is an ongoing task that consumer’s undertake on a 
daily basis. In order for consumers to achieve this important goal they must consult 
their “persuasion knowledge” (Friestad & Wright, 1999).  
 
2.7.1. Persuasion Knowledge (PK)  
Persuasion Knowledge (PK) represents the set of core beliefs and intuitive 
theories which individuals use to “cope” with persuasion attempts (Friestad & Wright, 
2013). More formally defined, PK refers to “consumers theories about persuasion and 
includes beliefs about marketers’ motives, strategies, and tactics; effectiveness and 
appropriateness of persuasion tactics; psychological mediators of tactic effectiveness; 
and ways of coping with persuasion attempts” (Campbell & Kirmani, 2000; p. 69). 
PK arms individuals with an interpretive set of beliefs designed to protect them from 
the voluminous barrage of persuasive attacks they encounter each day. 
Wright (1986) dubbed PK the “schemer schema” because it allows consumers 
to detect manipulative or deceptive elements within persuasive appeals. It also 
informs consumers’ response strategies when they are the “target” of the persuasive 
attack. A consumer’s ever expanding catalogue of transactional encounters ensures 
that an individual’s PK is continually being updated and refined as they age. PK is 
also the product of folk knowledge that is constantly developing at a cultural/societal 
level.  
Informed by personal experience and societal inputs, an individual’s PK 
evolves over time (Friestad & Wright, 1994). An individual’s sensitivity to ulterior 
motives changes as a function of age (for a review see Xie & Boush, 2011). The “soft 
whispering of Mother Culture” starts at an earlier age and continues throughout 
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adolescence and adulthood (Friestad & Wright, 1999; p. 139). For example, children 
begin to develop the ability to critically analyse persuasiveness communications 
between the ages of seven and eleven years (John, 1999). While culture plays a large 
role in the knowledge diffusion process, PK remains a uniquely, person-specific 
resource. Indeed, PK is “one of the most valuable socioeconomic resources” available 
to individuals (Friestad & Wright, 1999; p. 185). Consequently, any cognitive 
phenomenon (e.g. mindset) that comprises the activation of PK poses a threat to 
consumers. Consumers who do not have recourse to their PK are less likely to be able 
to detect “manipulative intent”.  
 
2.7.2. Manipulative Intent 
In order to avoid “being a sucker”, customers need to be sensitive to 
“Manipulative Intent” (MI) within persuasive communications (Wentzel, Tomczak, & 
Herrmann, 2010). Inferences of Manipulative Intent are defined as “as consumer 
inferences that the advertiser is attempting to persuade by inappropriate, unfair, or 
manipulative means” (Campbell, 1995; p. 228). Various studies have demonstrated 
that PK activation aids in the detection of MI within marketing communications; e.g. 
negative comparisons (Jain & Posavac, 2004), biased endorsers (Kirmani & Zhu, 
2007), rhetorical questions (Ahluwalia & Burnkrant, 2004), flattery (Campbell & 
Kirmani, 2000), cause-related marketing (Szykman, Bloom, & Blazing, 2004), 
advocacy advertising (Menon & Kahn, 2003) and borrowed-interest creative devices 
(Campbell, 1995). The detection of MI induces message resistance (Kirmani & Zhu, 
2007). 
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Research has demonstrated that prevention (promotion) focused individuals do 
not exhibit any difference in their sensitivity of MI when an adverts MI salience is 
low or high (Kirmani & Zhu, 2007). Specifically, prevention-focused individuals are 
likely to detect (not detect) MI when MI is high (low). Similarly, promotion-focused 
individuals are likely to detect (not detect) MI when MI is high (low). However, MI 
detection rates differ between these groups when MI salience is made moderately 
salient. Under such conditions, prevention-focused individuals are more likely to 
detect the MI than promotion-focused individuals. These findings suggest that when 
the components of an advert are ambiguous, prevention (promotion) focused 
individuals are more (less) likely to perceive the advert as manipulative. To date, few 
studies have tested if motivational orientation moderates an individual’s ability to 
detect MI. What’s more, few studies have investigated the specific resistance 
strategies that individuals with different regulatory/motivational orientations employ.  
Ahluwalia (2000) demonstrated that individuals who are committed to their 
attitude are likely to use a wide variety of resistance strategies to protect their views. 
However, two particular strategies are especially important. Research suggests that 
counterarguing and bolstering are the most widely used and the most effective 
resistance strategies employed by consumers (Zuwerink Jacks & Cameron, 2003). 
Consequently, both defensive strategies are central to consumer welfare and 
autonomy. Importantly, recent research suggests that these defensive strategies can be 
activated outside of conscious awareness. Specifically, bolstering and counterarguing 
mindsets have been found to decrease (increase) resistance thereby increasing 
(decreasing) persuasion (Xu & Wyer, 2012). 
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2.8. Active Resistance: Counterarguing and Bolstering 
Counterarguing. An individual engages in counterarguing when they “refute 
the validity of the arguments presented” (Xu & Wyer, 2012; p. 921). This resistance 
strategy is particularly effective at boosting resistance. However, counterarguing is 
effortful and demands attentional focus. If attentional focus cannot be committed, 
then an individual’s ability to counterargue is compromised. For example, research 
has shown that distractions can inhibit the generation of counterarguments (Festinger 
& Maccoby, 1964; Keating & Brock, 1974; Osterhouse & Brock, 1970; Petty, Wells, 
& Brock, 1976). These studies showed that the resulting difficulty in generating 
counterarguments undermined resistance because individuals are forced to rely upon 
heuristics and peripheral cues during decision making. Osterhouse and Brock (1970) 
showed that increased “yielding” to the propaganda messages (counter-attitudinal 
messages on college policy) was due to the inhibition of counterarguing processes 
resulting from the distractions (flashing lights). In the study, student participants were 
asked to listen to a message advocating an increase in college tuition fees. However, 
those in the distraction condition were also asked to monitor a panel of light and to 
immediately call out the number of the light if it flashed. The results showed that 
distracted participants exhibited a decreased ability to generate counterarguments and 
were consequently less resistant to the discrepant message. The thought disruption 
hypothesis formulated by Petty et al. (1976) suggests that distraction inhibits an 
individual’s dominant cognitive response to a persuasive communication. Distractions 
were found to comprise an individual’s ability to discern strong arguments from weak 
arguments thereby increasing the persuasiveness of weak agreements and decreasing 
the persuasiveness of strong arguments (Harkins & Petty, 1981; Petty et al., 1976). 
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Research also suggests that distraction induces individuals to pursue hedonic goals by 
undermining their ability to consider the long term implications of their actions (Shiv 
& Fedorikhin, 1999). This is perhaps why advertisers so often use humour in adverts. 
It is estimated that between 30% - 42% of all adverts in the U.S. use humour 
(Markiewicz, 1974; Weinberger, Spotts, Harlan, Campbell, & Parsons, 1995). In 
2007, approximately $45 billion was spent on producing humorous ads in the U.S. 
(TNS Media Intelligence, 2008). Strick, van Baaren, Holland, & van Knippenberg, 
(2009) demonstrated that using humour in an advert can prevent the generation of 
negative brand associations while promoting the generation of positive brand 
associations. The authors found that the cognitively distractive properties of humour 
are more effective at reducing resistance than non-distracting neutral or positive 
stimuli.  
Bolstering. Bolstering occurs when individuals reaffirm their beliefs by 
generating supporting arguments for these beliefs when faced with counter-attitudinal 
information (Knowles & Linn, 2004). This may involve the selective attention and 
recall of information that supports their own position (Lewan & Stotland, 1961; 
Lydon, Zanna, & Ross, 1988). Consequently, a bolstering defensive strategy is likely 
to be employed when the individual’s knowledge deficit on the topic prevents the 
generation of strong counterarguments to defend their beliefs (Knowles & Linn, 
2004).  
Counterarguing and bolstering are the most potent defensive strategies in a 
consumer’s defensive arsenal but this superior defensive protection comes at a 
cognitive cost. Both counterarguing and bolstering strategies are more cognitively 
taxing than weaker defensive strategies such as source derogation (Knowles & Linn, 
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2004). However, recent research has discovered that individuals may be primed with 
bolstering and counterarguing mindsets which outsource the defensive duty to non-
conscious processes (Xu & Wyer, 2012). The focus of the current research is to 
explore how active resistance processes such as bolstering and counterarguing may 
occur at a non-conscious level. The recent discovery of bolstering and counterarguing 
mindsets poses intriguing questions regarding consumer resistance.  
 
2.9. Bolstering and Counterarguing Mindsets 
Recent research provides the first evidence of behavioural mindsets 
influencing persuasive communications (Xu & Wyer, 2012). A behavioural mindset 
occurs when a cognitive or motor response in one situation, increases the likelihood 
of this response being ‘carried over’ into a conceptually similar, yet unrelated future 
situation (Xu, 2010). Xu and Wyer (2012) found that inducing participants to generate 
bolstering (counterarguing) thoughts served to prime the enactment of these cognitive 
procedures which favourably (adversely) affected assessments of subsequently 
encountered adverts. Put simply, a “counterarguing” mindset was found to increase 
resistance while a “bolstering” mindset was found to reduce resistance. While 
bolstering may be used as a resistance strategy, in this series of studies the authors 
demonstrated that bolstering cognitive procedures can reduce resistance when they are 
carried over and applied to a target stimulus rather than mobilised as a defensive 
strategy. 
Xu and Wyer (2012) used a procedural priming procedure to activate 
counterarguing and bolstering mindsets (Study 1, Study 2 respectively). Specifically, 
participants in the bolstering, counterarguing and control conditions were induced to 
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write supporting, opposing or neutral statements in response to favourable, 
unfavourable and neutral propositions respectively. For example, participants in the 
counterarguing (bolstering) condition were asked to give their opinion on the 
proposition ‘_____________University should increase (decrease) college fees next 
year’. Participants were then asked to evaluate an advert in an ostensibly unrelated 
study. The research demonstrated that participants in the bolstering condition 
subsequently exhibited significantly more favourable attitudes towards an unrelated 
advert (i.e. advert persuasiveness and advert appeal) than participants in the control 
condition and participants in the counterarguing condition. Participants in the 
bolstering condition also rated the product featured in the advert more favourably (i.e. 
attractiveness of product) than participants in the other conditions. The opposite 
results were observed among participants in the counterarguing condition who 
exhibited less favourable attitudes towards the advert and the product being 
advertised. A thought listing task revealed that the valence of generated thoughts 
mediates these mindsets. Specifically, participants in the bolstering (counterarguing) 
conditions subsequently generated more positive (negative) thoughts compared to 
participants in the control condition when making subsequent evaluations of target 
stimuli. Interestingly, Xu and Wyer (2012) found that the bolstering and 
counterarguing mindsets only influence behaviours which would not normally occur 
in the absence of the mindset. For example, in Study 1, a counterarguing mindset 
adversely affected participants’ evaluations of an advert featuring a positive target 
stimulus (hotel). However, the counterarguing mindset did not adversely affect 
evaluations of the advert in Study 2 which featured a negative target stimulus 
(unappetising, exotic food). The reverse pattern was observed among participants 
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primed with a bolstering mindset in both studies. These results may be explained by 
the fact that individuals spontaneously accept the implications of a message in the 
course of comprehending it (Gilbert, 1991). When an individual encounters a message 
where little elaboration is required (because the person makes a quick initial 
judgement) then a mindset that is congruent with this message will have little effect. 
Hence, if a message spontaneously leads recipients to refute its implications, inducing 
a counterarguing mindset has little impact (and vice versa). Xu and Wyer (2012) 
suggest that bolstering and counterarguing mindsets only influence behaviours 
which would not normally occur in the absence of the mindset. For example, Xu and 
Wyer (2012; Study 1) found that a counterarguing mindset adversely affected 
participants’ evaluations of an advert featuring a positive target stimulus (hotel). 
However, the counterarguing mindset did not adversely affect evaluations of the 
advert in Study 2 which featured a negative target stimulus (unappetising, exotic 
food). The reverse pattern was observed among participants primed with a bolstering 
mindset in both studies. Specifically, the bolstering mindset positively affected 
participants’ evaluations of a negative target stimulus (unappetising, exotic food) but 
did not positively affect evaluations of a positive target stimulus (hotel). It appears 
the effects of these behavioural mindsets are only observable when the person’s 
initial reaction to the target stimulus is incongruous with the mindset.  
Xu and Wyer's  (2012) third study demonstrated that a counterarguing mindset 
may actually increase persuasion (i.e. decrease resistance) when an individual 
encounters a strong persuasive communication that is difficult to counterargue 
against. The researchers demonstrated that participants who were primed with a 
counterarguing mindset evaluated a highly persuasive charitable appeal more 
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favourably than those in the control condition and those in the bolstering condition. 
The results revealed a main effect of priming regardless of whether the charity was 
well known or unknown. Furthermore, participants in the counterarguing condition 
were more willing to donate to the charity than participants in the control condition 
and bolstering condition. In this study, participants in the counterarguing condition 
did not generate more negative thoughts than participants in the other conditions. 
These results suggest that participants who failed in their attempts to effectively 
counterargue the charity appeal were forced to evaluate it more favourably as a result.  
In their final study, Xu and Wyer (2012) demonstrated that bolstering and 
counterarguing mindsets may be induced incidentally. Simply watching a political 
speech (debate) was found to prime bolstering (counterarguing) mindsets 
respectively. Specifically, politically partisan participants who watched a speech of a 
politician they supported were primed with a bolstering mindset. Similarly, a 
bolstering mindset was induced when politically partisan participants watched a 
political debate involving the politician they supported. However, when politically 
partisan participants watched a speech of the politician they opposed, a 
counterarguing mindset was induced. The study also found that non-partisan 
participants were primed with a bolstering mindset when they watched a political 
speech but a counterarguing mindset when they watched a political debate. Having 
viewed the political speech or debate, participants watched a video of the President of 
the Toyota car company publically apologising for a recent product recall. The results 
indicated that participants in the counterarguing condition were more likely to give 
unfavourable evaluations of Toyota than participants in the bolstering and control 
conditions. In line with Study 1 and Study 2, the bolstering mindset did not increase 
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evaluations of Toyota since it was already perceived as a favourable brand. The study 
demonstrated that participants who had been incidentally primed with a 
counterarguing mindset expressed less confidence that Toyota could improve the 
safety of their cars when compared to participants in the control or bolstering 
condition.  
 
2.10. Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter is to highlight the malleable nature of consumer 
resistance. Resistance is both context-dependent and person specific. Importantly 
though, resistance is also regulated by mindsets that exert their influence outside of 
conscious awareness. While many studies have shown how mindsets can regulate 
persuasion, fewer studies have taken the consumer perspective and investigated how 
mindsets regulate resistance. Consequently, the recent discovery of bolstering and 
counterarguing mindsets by Xu and Wyer (2012) represents an important theoretical 
development. 
Resistance may be defined as the ability to withstand a persuasion attempt 
(McGuire, 1964). Resistance is the most important element in the persuasion process 
(Knowles & Linn, 2004). Accordingly, mindsets that regulate consumer resistance are 
especially important phenomena. Given that counterarguing and bolstering strategies 
may be universally enacted across all persuasion scenarios and compliance gaining 
contexts, mindsets which influence these cognitive procedures are especially 
important. The findings of Xu and Wyer (2012) are theoretically important for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, the research demonstrates that behavioural mindsets 
can influence persuasive communications and can be easily activated. Indeed, 
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these mindsets can be activated incidentally. These findings lead to the worrisome 
realisation that consumers’ self-protection goals may easily be compromised by 
forces outside of their conscious awareness. Importantly, the finding of Xu and 
Wyer (2012) may be distinguished from ‘inoculation effects’. Inoculation effects 
occur when an individual demonstrates high resistance to a strong persuasive appeal 
as a result of having been previously exposed to a weaker version of the appeal 
(McGuire, 1964). However, the recent discovery of the ‘counterarguing mindset’ by 
Xu and Wyer (2012) significantly broadens the theoretical horizons of consumer 
resistance within the persuasion literature. Unlike inoculation effects, a 
counterarguing mindset exerts covert influence across domains. Perhaps more 
worrying, a bolstering mindset reduces resistance and circumvents the defences of the 
consumer. Bolstering and counterarguing mindsets are mediated by the valence of the 
thoughts they make cognitively accessible. Specifically, individuals in a 
counterarguing (bolstering) mindset generate more negative (positive) thoughts which 
adversely (favourably) affect subsequent evaluations of a target stimulus (Xu & Wyer, 
2012). However, to the author’s knowledge, no other research has yet explored 
potential moderators for these mindsets. Thus, the boundary conditions of these newly 
discovered mindsets warrant investigation. 
Laran et al. (2011) suggest that “marketing needs a theory for priming effects” 
and calls for future research to investigate which marketing stimuli and tactics 
unconsciously influence consumer responses. Until recently, research that investigates 
how consumers resist marketing communications was relatively scarce. The 
voluminous literature on persuasion contrasts starkly with the comparatively modest 
number of studies that directly investigate resistance (Laran et al., 2011). This 
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knowledge deficit has provoked some academics to call for more research on non-
conscious consumer resistance since “there is no clear definition of the meaning of 
unconscious resistance” (Fransen & Fennis, 2014; p. 928). This doctoral research 
answers the call for further research on this important topic. Counterarguing and 
bolstering mindsets have potentially wide-ranging implications for consumer 
protection and consumer welfare. The current research seeks to replicate the 
bolstering and counterarguing mindsets and to extend the work of Xu and Wyer 
(2012) by exploring potential moderators of these mindsets. The primary aim of the 
current research will be to test the hypothesis that an individuals’ motivational 
orientation moderates the carryover effects of these behavioural mindsets. If found to 
be true, the research will help identify individuals who are especially sensitive to 
these mindsets. This would make a valuable contribution to the scarce literature on 
behavioural mindsets. It would also make a contribution to the larger body of work 
within the fields of persuasion and resistance.  
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CHAPTER  3:  MOTIVATIONAL ORIENTATION 
 
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure... it is 
for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do” (Bentham 
1781/1988; p. 1). 
 
3.1. Action Tendencies 
Motivation may be defined as “the energization and direction of behaviour” 
(Elliot & Covington, 2001; p. 73). Historically, motivation has been categorised into 
two broad types; approach motivation and avoidance motivation. Indeed, 
“distinguishing approach motivation from avoidance motivation may be considered 
one of the oldest ideas in the history of thought about the behaviour of organisms” 
(Elliot, 2008 p .4). From protozoan to homo sapiens, approach and avoidance 
behaviours are part of the evolutionary heritage of all lifeforms (Schneirla, 1959). 
Without exception, all organisms move (literally or figuratively) towards positively 
perceived stimuli and away from negatively perceived stimuli (Carver, 2006). Indeed, 
across all phyla, organisms “survive” (i.e. avoidance behaviour) or “thieve” (i.e. 
approach behaviour) as a function of their predominant motivational orientation 
(Elliot, 2006). Research suggests that the complexity of approach and avoidance 
behaviours increases in complexity in tandem with the complexity of the life form 
(Elliot, 2006). Correspondingly, human beings exhibit the widest range of approach 
and avoidance behaviours observable in nature. 
Ever since the Greek philosopher Democritus began to consider the merits of 
ethical hedonism, scholars have speculated on the fundamental driving forces behind 
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human behaviour. Indeed, “scholars have made use of the approach-avoidance 
distinction for well over 2000 years” (Elliot, 2008; p. 4). Pleasure and pain have 
remained central themes throughout the historical discourse on human motivation 
(Elliot, 2008). Indeed, pleasure and pain may be regarded as the “springs of action” 
that reinforce or inhibit behaviours which ultimately dictate evolutionary adaptive 
responses (James, 1890). As such, approach and avoidance motivation constitute the 
“building blocks of behaviour” (Carver, 2006; p. 105). Accordingly, motivational 
orientation provides the promise of a sturdy theoretical platform upon which to base 
psychological research. Indeed, it is particularly applicable to consumer domains 
which are characterised by positive and negative stimuli that dichotomise behavioural 
responses into approach and avoidance categories. Few other conceptual frameworks 
boast such widespread utility and theoretical reach. Motivation orientation lies at the 
very heart of our evolutionary lineage and directs our daily actions and interactions 
across the full gamut of consumer domains. It guides everyday consumer behaviours 
and presides over the perceptual processes that pre-empt them. The conceptual 
linkages between approach (avoidance) motivation and persuasion (resistance) are 
intuitive and have been substantiated by a large body of theoretical and empirical 
work. In the next sections I review studies on motivational orientation that provide the 
reader with clear evidence of these theoretical links. I also review the conceptually 
adjacent literature of self-regulation which provides compelling evidence in support 
of these links. Finally, I use Regulatory Fit Theory as an overarching theoretical 
framework to highlight the strong empirical evidence for “fit effects” or “congruency” 
effects. Fit effects are central to this research. The research hypothesises that are 
formalised in the next chapter are based on the principles that underpin fit effects.  
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3.2. Approach and Avoidance Behaviour 
Human behaviour is derived from two distinct kinds of action tendencies: 
approach and avoidance behaviours (Carver, 2006). Sometimes approach and 
avoidance action tendencies are discussed in terms of motivations; appetitive and 
aversive motivation respectively (Davidson, 1998). Regardless of the terminology 
used there is little doubt that motivational orientation is an important concept that 
remains central to a wide range of psychological phenomena. Indeed, there has been a 
dramatic increase in the number of studies exploring the effects of motivational 
orientation in recent years (Eder et al. 2013). The authors document some 7998 
studies published in 2010 which directly related to motivational orientation.  
The Approach-Avoidance model provides a conceptual lens through which 
both the structure and function of self-regulation can be understood (Elliot, 2006). 
This motivational model finds its origins in the work of Eysenck (1967) who first 
proposed a link between extraversion (neuroticism) and positive (negative) affect. 
This research was later extended by Gray (1981; 1987) who postulated two primary 
neurological systems to explain why extraverts (neurotics) are differentially sensitive 
to reward (punishment) cues. Importantly, both lines of research are founded on the 
principle that human behaviour is regulated by positive or negative reinforcement. 
Based on extensive animal research, Gray’s bi-dimensional model proposed two 
functionally independent, neurobiological systems; the Behavioural Activation 
System (BAS) and the Behavioural Inhibition System (BIS). Aversive motivation (i.e. 
avoidance motivation) is controlled by the behavioural inhibition system (Gray, 
1981). Conversely, appetitive motivation (approach behaviour) is controlled by the 
behavioural activation system (Cloninger, 1987; Fowles, 1980). Both systems are 
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characterised by three levels; a neural level, a cognitive level and a behavioural level. 
The model outlines how the neural structures and brain activation patterns influence 
the cognitive responses that inform behaviours associated with approach and 
avoidance (Gable, Reis, & Elliot, 2000). The Behavioural Activation System (BAS) 
controls “approach” or “appetitive” motivation (Carver & White, 1994). BAS is also 
known as the Behaviour Facilitation System (Depue & Collins, 1999) or the 
appetitive motivational system (Davidson, 1998). The activation of BAS promotes 
positive feelings such as hope and happiness. BAS activation also makes individuals 
more sensitive to reward and non-punishment stimuli (i.e. positive reinforcement) 
(Carver & White, 1994). Gomez and Gomez (2002) found that BAS and impulsivity 
are linked to a tendency to process pleasant information.  
In contrast, the Behavioural Inhibition System (BIS) controls “avoidance” or 
“aversive” motivation. The activation of the BIS promotes negative feelings such as 
anxiety and fear (Carver & White, 1994). BIS activation also makes individuals more 
sensitive to loss and punishment cues (Marrero, Gámez, & Díaz, 2008). Indeed, BIS 
and anxiety are both linked to a tendency to process unpleasant information (Gomez 
& Gomez, 2002). Individuals exhibiting high BIS scores also exhibit a stronger 
preference for familiality (Quilty, Oakman, & Farvolden, 2007). The positive 
(negative) feelings associated with approach (avoidance) behaviours regulate how 
individuals move toward (move away from) goals (anti-goals) (Carver & White, 
1994; Gray, 1990). Carver and White (1994) created the BAS/BIS scales to measure 
an individual’s dispositional sensitivity to BAS and BIS activation. The BAS/BIS 
measure is a 20 item, self-report questionnaire that consists of 4 subscales. BAS is 
measured by three separate subscales which measure Reward Responsiveness, Drive 
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and Fun Seeking. BIS is measured using a fourth subscale; BIS (Carver & White, 
1994). The concepts of BIS and BAS are critical to the present study. As previously 
discussed, mindsets result as a consequence of goal directed, cognitive procedures 
that carryover into unrelated domains. However, an individual’s receptivity to 
different goals is ultimately dictated by their motivational orientation. Motivational 
orientation provides “the building blocks of behaviours” because it guides both 
conscious and non-conscious goal pursuit processes (Carver, 2006). 
 
3.2.1. Motivational Orientation and Personality 
Motivational orientation has been linked to generic and cultural components 
that determine psychological traits (Carver 2006; Elliot & Thrash 2002). Indeed, 
extensive research has mapped the interdependencies between motivational 
orientation and personality traits. For example, research suggests that BIS and BAS 
are related to neuroticism and extraversion respectively (Corr, 2004). Indeed, some 
researchers have even operationalised approach and avoidance motivation as 
extraversion and neuroticism respectively (Pickering, Corr, & Gray, 1999; Rusting & 
Larsen, 1997). Individuals exhibiting high (low) avoidance motivation (as measured 
by neuroticism) are found to be more (less) sensitive to negative mood inductions 
(Larsen & Ketelaar, 1991). Conversely, participants with high (low) approach 
motivation (as measured by extraversion) are found to be more (less) sensitive to 
positive mood inductions and thus experience more (less) positive affect (Larsen & 
Ketelaar, 1991).  
Individuals exhibiting high BIS sensitivity are especially likely to dwell on 
negative experiences in the past (Gable et al., 2000). These avoidance orientated 
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individuals also spend more time and attention attending to negative stimuli in the 
present environment when compared to individuals exhibiting low BIS scores (Gable 
et al., 2000). Indeed, individuals with high BIS scores tend to exhibit greater levels of 
fear than individuals with low BIS scores (Dillard & Anderson, 2004). Specifically, 
Dillard and Anderson (2004) exposed participants to a fear appeal relating to flu 
vaccination. Participants were then asked to indicate how frightening they found the 
message and how likely they were to seek vaccination. As predicted, individuals 
exhibiting high BIS scores were found to be relatively more sensitive to the fear 
appeal (Dillard & Anderson, 2004). Similarly, Thake and Zelenski (2013) 
demonstrated that individuals exhibiting high levels of neuroticism and high BIS 
scores are also more susceptible to feelings of fear and sadness.  
In contrast, individuals exhibiting high BAS scores typically report more 
positive outlooks on life (Gray, 1990). Indeed, Dillard and Anderson (2004) found 
that, unlike BIS, BAS does not moderate the degree of fear that individuals 
experience. It should be noted however that using neuroticism and extraversion as 
proxy measures of approach and avoidance motivation is questionable considering 
that neuroticism and extraversion traits are not isomorphic (Pickering et al., 1999; 
Rusting & Larsen, 1997). The emotional susceptibility associated with different 
motivational orientations is due to the differential sensitivity to reward and 
punishment signals (Tellegen, 1985). Jorm et al. (1998) found that BIS was associated 
with negative affectivity and neuroticism while BAS was associated with positive 
affectivity and extroversion. Interestingly, the authors also found that BIS and BAS 
sensitivity changes over time and diminishes with age.  
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3.2.2. Motivational Orientation and Goal Pursuit 
In recent years, much research has explored (non)conscious goal activation 
(e.g. Chartrand et al. 2008; Dijksterhuis et al. 2005; Dijksterhuis 2010; Custers & 
Aarts 2010; Marien et al. 2012). Motivational orientation and goals are inextricably 
linked. “A goal is a cognitive representation of a future object” and is a “proximal 
predictor of behaviour” because it “represent(s) the ﬁnal component of the 
motivational process” (Elliot, 2006; p. 113). 
The Hierarchical model of Approach/Avoidance motivation suggests that 
goals provide a directional function that inform approach and avoidance behaviours 
(Elliot, 2006). Goal pursuit involves having a goal, assessing your position with 
respect to it, and then taking steps to reduce the discrepancy between the goal and the 
current situation (Carver, 2006). The resulting discrepancy between a goal and the 
current position (the “error”) is experienced as affect. If the rate is below the criterion, 
negative affect arises. If the rate is at the criterion, the person is affect-free. If the rate 
exceeds the criterion, positive affect arises. Both the BAS and the BIS are controlled 
by feedback loops that moderate goal pursuit activities (Carver & Scheier, 2004; 
Larsen & Augustine, 2008; Larsen, Augustine, Prizmic-Larsen, Larsen, & Augustine, 
2014). The behaviour activation system uses a discrepancy reducing feedback loop 
that works towards closing the gap between the goal and the current situation. 
Conversely, the behaviour inhibition system uses a discrepancy enlarging feedback 
loop to move away from anti-goals. In this situation goals are attained through 
avoidance, escape, or withdrawal (Carver, 2006). Interestingly, research suggests that 
approach motivation can induce feelings of anger and sadness when goal-directed 
behaviours fail to achieve the individual’s goals (Harmon-Jones, 2003).  
  
64 
 
Consumers are goal directed agents (Lee & Higgins, 2009). Accordingly, 
consumers are heavily influenced by their chronic motivational orientation which 
prescribes their shopping goals. Research suggests there are distinct differences in 
motivational orientation between male and female shoppers. Arnold and Reynolds 
(2012) found that 60% of the females (in their sample) exhibited high BIS scores. In 
contrast, 64% of men exhibited low BIS scores. Furthermore, while approximately 
30% of male participants exhibited a high BAS/low BIS profile, only 18% of women 
exhibited this motivational makeup (Arnold & Reynolds, 2012). Other researchers 
report similar patterns in motivational orientation between genders. For example, 
Jorm et al. (1998) found that females exhibited higher BIS scores than males. In 
contrast, male participants tended to exhibit stronger BAS drive scores than their 
female counterparts. Interestingly though, the results also revealed that female 
participants exhibited higher scores on the BAS reward responsiveness subscale than 
their male counterparts. Nevertheless, it is high avoidance motivation rather than high 
approach/reward motivation that Arnold and Reynolds (2012) use as a basis for 
explaining females shopping behaviours. Specifically, the researchers argue that 
women often use hedonic shopping as a means of avoiding stressful situations. The 
authors speculate that stress prone, female shoppers may use retail therapy as a means 
of reasserting control in a safe environment.  
Motivational orientation may be situationally primed by making associated 
goals salient (e.g. Friedman et al. 2001; Förster, Friedman, Özelsel, & Denzler, 2006). 
For example, Förster et al. (2006) asked participants to solve a maze puzzle in which 
a mouse is depicted at the centre of a maze. Participants being primed with approach 
motivation were asked to complete a maze puzzle in which the mouse is trying to 
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escape in order to gain the reward of cheese (i.e. approach motivation) pictured 
outside the maze. Participants being primed with avoidance motivation were 
presented with a similar maze puzzle. However, in this puzzle the mouse is attempting 
to flee the maze to escape death from an owl (i.e. avoidance motivation) depicted 
hovering over the maze. Those in the control condition were presented with the same 
maze and mouse scenario but in this condition neither approach (cheese) nor 
avoidance (owl) stimuli were present. Having completed the maze puzzle, participants 
then underwent a computer based test which assessed the speed at which they 
responded to a series of global (large) alphabetical letters that were constructed using 
smaller, local letters. The results suggest that participants in both the control group 
and the approach motivation group were faster to respond to global targets than local 
targets. An inverse result was found when participants were presented with local 
targets.  
Approach (avoidance) orientated individuals place a high (low) relative value 
on the attainment of positive goals (Derryberry & Reed, 1994). Correspondingly, 
approach orientated individuals typically employ eager strategies to pursue positive 
outcomes (Gray, 1990). In contrast, avoidance orientated individuals typically employ 
vigilant strategies to pursue the avoidance of negative outcomes (Gray, 1990). These 
findings broadly correspond with those of Friedman and Forster (2000) who found 
that risk aversion is characterised by an increased reliance on analytical processes. 
The authors used an arm flexion/extension task as a means of prime approach and 
avoidance motivation using motor actions as the priming mechanism. Participants in 
the arm flexion (approach prime) condition were found to be less risk averse and more 
likely to use heuristics than participants in the arm extension (avoidance prime) 
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condition. Conversely, participants in the arm flexion group (avoidance prime) 
condition were more risk adverse and were more likely to use systematic information 
processing strategies. Furthermore, Förster et al. (2006) demonstrated that arm flexion 
(arm extension) induced the broadening (narrowing) of attentional scope and 
prompted the activation of more global (narrow) mental representations. For example, 
participants primed with an approach (avoidance) motivation were more (less) likely 
to be find alternative solutions to anagrams and more (less) likely to focus on the 
global aspects of an image. Similarly, Gray (1990) demonstrated that individuals 
exhibiting high (low) BIS sensitivity were slower (faster) to shift their attention away 
from negative and unfamiliar stimuli. Conversely, individuals exhibiting high (low) 
BAS sensitivity are slower (faster) to shift their attention away from positive stimuli 
(Gray, 1990). Such attentional biases have also been evidenced in other studies. For 
example, Rusting and Larsen (1998) demonstrated that individuals with high BAS 
scores exhibited increased task performance when a stimulus was positive. However, 
no such increase in task performance was observed among these individuals when the 
stimuli were negative or neutral.  
Kuschel, Förster and Denzler (2010) suggest that motivational orientation can 
guide cognitive processes by regulating knowledge accessibility. The authors 
demonstrated that approach (avoidance) motivation promotes (impedes) access to 
higher order information (e.g. contextual information, meaning etc). Approach and 
avoidance tendencies influence thought accessibility and have direct repercussions for 
how individuals interpret persuasive communications (e.g. Kirmani & Zhu, 2007). 
The next section will review how approach and avoidance tendencies inform self-
regulation strategies and influence perceptual, behavioural and cognitive responses to 
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stimuli. As we shall see, not only does motivational orientation and regulatory 
orientation occupy much of the same theoretical ground, they both provide substantial 
evidence of “fit effects”.  
 
3.3. Regulatory Orientation 
Regulatory focus theory (RFT) provides an account of self-regulatory 
processes (Cesario & Higgins, 2008; Higgins, 1997; Idson, Liberman, & Higgins, 
2000). Specifically, the theory postulates two regulatory orientations which seek to 
gain pleasure or avoid pain; promotion focus (i.e. opportunity-seeking) and prevention 
focus (i.e. risk avoiding) respectively. Individuals who exhibit a promotion 
(prevention) focus are found to be more (less) sensitive to the presence of positive 
outcomes (Shah, Higgins, & Friedman, 1998; Zhu & Meyers-Levy, 2003). 
Conversely, individuals who exhibit a promotion (prevention) focus are found to be 
less (more) sensitive to the presence of negative outcomes (Love, Staton, Chapman, & 
Okada, 2010). Grounded in self-discrepancy theory, RFT postulates that self-
regulatory tendencies are instilled during childhood by cultural socialisation and 
parental influences (Higgins, Klein, & Strauman, 1985). 
RFT asserts that “self-guides” direct goal pursuit behaviours (Cesario, Higgins 
& Scholer, 2008). Specifically, promotion-focused individuals view goals as “ideals”. 
Ideals manifest themselves as hopes, accomplishments needs and advancement needs. 
They may be pursued by employing “eager strategies” to approach gains (the presence 
of positives) and avoid non-gains (the absence of positives). Eager strategies seek to 
maximise the chances of reward and attainment. In contrast, prevention-focused 
individuals view goals as “oughts”. Oughts manifest themselves as responsibilities, 
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safety needs, and security needs. They may be pursued by employing “vigilant 
strategies” to approach non-losses (the absence of negatives) and avoid losses (the 
presence of negatives). Vigilant strategies seek to minimise loses on avoid errors. 
Consequently, prevention-focused individuals are found to exhibit a “conservative 
bias” (Crowe & Higgins, 1997). Vigilant strategies rely heavily upon external (i.e. 
environmental) knowledge while eager strategies rely heavily upon on internal (i.e. 
person-specific) knowledge (Bless et al., 1992). Regardless, both promotion-focused 
individuals and prevention-focused individuals seek to satisfy approach and 
avoidance tendencies by approaching desired end states and avoiding undesirable end 
states (Higgins, 1997).  
Regulatory focus is a state which may vary between different people (chronic 
regulatory focus) and within different contexts (momentary regulatory focus). 
Regulatory focus (RF) may be momentarily primed using situational primes such as 
maze solving puzzles (e.g. Zhang & Mittal, 2007) or self-primes (e.g. Aaker & Lee, 
2001). Aaker and Lee (2001) demonstrated that simply asking individuals to imagine 
themselves in a winning (losing) scenario primes a promotion (prevention) regulatory 
orientation. However, while a RF orientation may be made temporarily accessible by 
priming manipulations, all individuals naturally exhibit one predominant regulatory 
orientation. This chronic regulatory orientation may be assessed using a variety of 
instruments (for a review see Haws et al. 2009). The Regulatory Focus Questionnaire 
(RFQ) remains the most commonly used measure (Higgins et al. 2001). Much 
research has investigated how regulatory orientation influences perceptual, cognitive 
and behavioural processes both inside and outside consumer domains (Avnet & 
Higgins, 2006).  
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3.3.1. Regulatory Orientation and Cognition 
RF predicts the cognitive strategy an individual is likely to employ during goal 
pursuit (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Friedman & Förster, 2001). For example, similar to 
avoidance orientated individuals, prevention-focused individuals exhibit strong risk 
aversion tendencies (Idson et al., 2000). Accordingly, prevention-focused individuals 
employ “vigilant strategies” to avoid errors and minimise potential loses. Vigilant 
strategies thus promote a “conservative bias” which predisposes prevention-focused 
individuals to making “errors of omission” (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Friedman & 
Förster, 2001). Conversely, promotion-focused participants are more likely to employ 
eager strategies that seek to approach goals and maximise rewards. Eager strategies 
predispose promotion-focused individuals to making “errors of commission” (Crowe 
& Higgins, 1997; Friedman & Förster, 2001). Consequently, prevention (promotion) 
focused individuals engage in more careful (risky) decision making (Crowe & 
Higgins, 1997; Friedman & Förster, 2001). Interestingly, promotion-focused 
individuals exhibit higher levels of creativity during decision-making (Friedman et al., 
2001) and employ more flexible problem-solving strategies (Liberman & Idson, 
1999). By contrast, prevention-focused individuals are more likely to adopt a less 
risky, “keep the status quo” approach to problem solving (Liberman & Idson, 1999). 
Research suggests that individuals tend to selectively process information that is 
congruent with their regulatory orientation when dealing with a high information load 
(Yoon, Sarial-Abi, & Gürhan-Canli, 2012). Specifically, the authors demonstrated 
that promotion (prevention) focused individuals assign a greater relative importance 
to positive (negative) product information under high information load. Consequently, 
promotion-focused individuals generate higher brand evaluations than prevention-
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focused individuals under high information load conditions. The opposite is also true. 
Prevention-focused individuals assign a greater relative importance to positive 
information under low load conditions. Consequently, prevention-focused individuals 
generate relatively higher brand evaluations under low load conditions than 
promotion-focused individuals (Yoon et al. 2012). There is also evidence to suggest 
that RF may differentially influence an individual’s ability to deal with distractions. 
Freitas and Higgins (2002) demonstrated that prevention-focused individuals 
outperformed promotion-focused individuals in cognitive tasks (i.e. maths puzzles) 
when distractions (i.e. distracting video clips) were present. No differences in task 
performance between regulatory foci were detected when distractions were removed. 
This suggests that prevention-focused individuals are better able to exert self-control 
over their cognitive resources in the presence of distractions. Indeed, prevention-
focused individuals reported greater enjoyment of the tasks when they had to resist 
distractions than prevention-focused individuals. The results suggest that prevention-
focused individuals have a cognitive advantage over promotion-focused individuals 
within distracting environments (Freitas, Liberman, & Higgins, 2002). However, 
recent research suggests that promotion-focused individuals may be better equipped to 
resist temptations. Dholakia et al. (2006) demonstrated that while promotion-focused 
individuals feel relatively more drawn to tempting stimuli than prevention-focused 
individuals, they were also more efficient at resisting temptations. The researchers 
concluded that the vigilant strategies utilised by prevention-focused individuals 
require significant cognitive resources and self-control. By contrast, the eager 
strategies utilised by promotion-focused individuals were found to be more 
economical and required less willpower to enact. Simply put, promotion-focused 
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individuals were less likely to become resource depleted than prevention-focused 
individuals. Consequently, promotion (prevention) focused individuals were less 
(more) vulnerable to tempting stimuli. However, other research suggests that it is 
regulatory fit rather than an individual’s regulatory orientation that ultimately 
determines their ability to deal with temptations (Hong & Lee, 2008). 
 
3.3.2. Regulatory Orientation and Perception 
Regulatory focus is found to influence how individuals perceive persuasive 
communications and product offerings. For example, prevention-focused individuals 
perceive loss framed messages to be more persuasive while promotion-focused 
individuals perceive gain framed messages to be more persuasive (Lee & Aaker, 
2004). Regulatory orientation also influences the effectiveness of marketing messages 
for different product types. For example, Micu and Chowdhury (2010) found that 
promotion-focused messages are more effective (generate more positive emotions, 
boost recall and increase persuasion) than prevention-focused messages when 
promoting hedonic products. Conversely, prevention-focused messages are more 
effective than promotion-focused messages when promoting utilitarian products. Lin 
and Shen (2012) also found that regulatory orientation, message framing (gain vs. 
loss) and product attributes (hedonic vs. utilitarian) are important considerations when 
trying to positively influence attitudes relating to adverts, brands and purchase 
intentions.  
Jain et al. (2006) investigated how regulatory orientation influences 
perceptions of different types of comparative advertising frames; maximal frames 
(brand A is superior to brand B) and minimal frames (brand A is equivalent or similar 
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to brand B). The studies revealed that promotion-focused individuals were more 
persuaded by maximal frames. Specifically, maximal frames induced more message 
elaboration than minimal frames among promotion-focused individuals. In contrast, 
prevention-focused individuals found minimal frames to be more persuasive or 
equally persuasive to maximal frames. These results provide support for fit effects 
between regulatory orientation and message framing. Promotion-focused individuals 
are especially sensitive to messages that promote goal maximisation (i.e. maximal 
frames). In contrast, prevention-focused individuals are less concerned with pursuing 
goal maximisation and are instead concerned with making careful assessments of the 
brands. Consequently, minimal frames “fit” a prevention-focused orientation because 
they provide a balanced approach that lends itself to closer message scrutiny. 
Florack and Scarabis (2006) demonstrated that individuals exhibited a 
preference for products that used advertising claims which were congruent with a 
primed regulatory orientation. The authors also noted that participants’ category brand 
associations were stronger when the advertising claim was congruent with the induced 
regulatory orientation. Furthermore, RF is found to moderate the effectiveness of 
different advertising argument styles (Florack, Ineichen, & Bieri, 2009). Adverts 
which highlight both the positive and negative features of a product are said to use 
“two-sided arguments”. Past research has found that adverts employing two sided 
arguments are perceived to be more honest (Golden & Alpert, 1987) and are more 
difficult to counterargue against (Kamins & Assael, 1987). Florack et al. (2009) 
demonstrated that chronic promotion (prevention) focused individuals generated 
relatively more (less) positive evaluations of adverts that used two sided arguments 
(Florack et al., 2009). Similar results were found in Study 2 and Study 3 where 
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regulatory focus was momentarily primed by the researchers. Prevention-focused 
individuals were again found to be relatively more attentive to a product’s 
shortcomings that were outlined in a message containing a two sided argument. While 
prevention-focused individuals attended to both the ad content and the adverts’ 
perceived credibility when evaluating the message. In contrast, promotion-focused 
individuals focused more on the advert’s perceived credibility and less on the actual 
content of the advert.  
Regulatory orientation not only influences how individuals perceive 
information, it also influences how they process it. Prevention-focused individuals are 
predisposed to employing systematic information processing strategies (Avnet & 
Higgins, 2006). In contrast, promotion-focused individuals are predisposed to 
employing heuristic information processing strategies (Avnet & Higgins, 2006). 
Correspondingly, Pham and Avnet (2004) demonstrated that the diagnostic relevance 
of affective (substantive) assessments is greater among promotion (prevention) 
focused individuals. These differences in information processing between regulatory 
foci have implications for decision making and problem solving. Zhu and Meyers-
Levy (2007) demonstrated that promotion-focused individuals are likely to use 
“relational message elaboration” when processing a message. In contrast, prevention-
focused individuals are more likely to use “item-specific elaboration” when 
processing a message (Zhu & Meyers-Levy, 2007). Similar trends have also been 
observed in product evaluation studies. Mourali and Pons (2009) demonstrated that 
prevention-focused individuals are likely to adopt an “attribute processing approach” 
(use a comparison table) when comparing products. In contrast, promotion-focused 
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individuals are more likely to rely on an “alternatives processing approach” in which 
product choices are appraised individually.  
To conclude, regulatory orientation is conceptually distinct from motivational 
orientation (Cesario et al., 2008). Motivational orientation relates to neurological 
predispositions while regulatory focus relates to self-regulation. Unlike approach 
motivation and avoidance motivation, both promotion-focused and prevention-
focused individuals may pursue the same goal (Cesario et al., 2008). However, both 
constructs are closely linked and some researchers argue that approach and avoidance 
measures such as BIS and BAS may be used as proxy measures for self-regulation 
(for a review see Haws et al. 2009). In any case, both motivational orientation and 
regulatory orientation are derived from the same underlying principle; the hedonic 
principle. The hedonic principle suggests that human behaviour seeks to maximise 
pleasure and avoid pain. As such, the hedonic principle is the bedrock upon which 
motivational orientation and regulatory orientation rests (Higgins, 1997). While 
motivational orientation is the main focus in the present research, both motivational 
orientation and self-regulation are easily accommodated by Regulatory Fit Theory. 
Indeed, the literatures of motivational orientation and regulatory orientation are 
replete with studies providing evidence of “fit effects”. 
 
3.4. Regulatory Fit Theory 
Regulatory fit theory is a broad, goal pursuit theory that posits “fit effects” 
between regulatory/motivational orientations and the strategic means of goal pursuit 
(Avnet & Higgins, 2003; Cesario et al, 2004; Florack & Scarabis, 2006; Kruglanski 
2006; Pham & Chang, 2010; Spiegel et al. 2004). Individuals experience regulatory 
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“fit” or feeling “just right” when they adopt goal pursuit strategies or engage in 
activities that sustain their motivational/regulatory orientation (Avnet & Higgins, 
2006). Conversely, individuals experience regulatory “non-fit” when they adopt goal 
pursuit strategies or engage in activities that disrupt their motivational/ regulatory 
orientation. The “feels right” sensation associated with regulatory fit does not enhance 
responses but rather magnifies the intensity (positive or negative) of the individual’s 
response (Avnet & Higgins, 2006). The influence of fit effects or “congruency 
effects” on persuasive communications is well documented within motivational and 
self-regulation (for a review see Lee & Higgins, 2009). Indeed, Motyka, Grewal and 
Puccinelli et al. (2014) undertook a meta-analytic synthesis of 213 regulatory fit 
studies involving 23,690 participants during a 16 year period (1998 - 2013). The study 
findings showed that the behavioural buying intentions of individuals who 
experienced a fit between the advert and their regulatory orientation increased by 1.86 
times when compared to individuals who experienced non-fit. 
 
3.4.1. Fit Effects for Regulatory Orientation 
Regulatory fit may be induced by either “sustaining” or “matching” an 
individual’s regulatory orientation. Regulatory fit can be produced using “integral 
methods” or “incidental methods” (Cesario et al., 2008). Integral regulatory fit is 
achieved when fit is induced by components that are “integrally” embedded within the 
persuasion situation; e.g. message framing (Avnet & Higgins, 2006), argument type 
(Pham & Avnet, 2004) or body language (Cesario & Higgins, 2008). For example, 
Cesario and Higgins (2008) found that prevention (promotion) focused individuals 
responded more favourably to messages from individuals who adopted a vigilant 
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(eager) body language. An eager, non-verbal, communication style is characterised by 
fast speech, fast movement and a forward leaning stance. In contrast, a vigilant, non-
verbal, communication style is characterised by slow speech, movement and a 
backward leaning stance.  
Cesario et al. (2004) showed that integral regulatory fit strengthens reactions 
to a message. Indeed, studies find that fit between regulatory orientation (e.g. 
promotion-focused) and message framing (e.g. gain-framing) increases advert 
persuasiveness (Cesario et al., 2004; Lee & Aaker, 2004), increases individuals 
sensitivity to argument strength (Aaker & Lee, 2001; Lee & Aaker, 2004), improves 
message processing fluency (Aaker & Lee, 2001) and promotes message recall (Aaker 
& Lee, 2001). Interestingly, Cesario et al. (2004) demonstrated that regulatory fit had 
no impact on how a message is perceived if individuals focus on the topic rather than 
the message quality. Evans and Petty (2003) also demonstrated that matching message 
framing to regulatory orientation led to an increase in message processing. Agrawal et 
al. (2005) showed that individuals experiencing regulatory fit are more likely to invest 
cognitive resources on processing emotional aversive information (i.e. cancer 
screening message). Conversely, Kahn and Luce (2003) demonstrated that non-fit 
conditions reduce the amount of cognitive resources an individual is willing to invest 
in processing a health message.  
Avnet and Higgins (2006) found that prevention (promotion) focused 
individuals were more likely to use reason-based (emotion based) strategies when 
making product evaluations. Interestingly, Cornelis, Adams and Cauberghe (2012) 
demonstrated that fit effects and non-fit effects only occur when an adverts’ 
persuasive argument (rational vs. emotional) is congruent with the individual’s 
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regulatory orientation. For example, prevention-focused individuals only exhibited fit 
and non-fit effects when they were exposed to reason-based adverts. Conversely, 
promotion-focused individuals only exhibited fit and non-fit effects when they were 
exposed to emotion-based adverts.  
Fit not only makes messages more appealing, it makes consumer products 
more attractive. Indeed, fit induces individuals to generate inflated valuations for 
products such as book lights and mugs (Avnet & Higgins, 2003; Higgins, Idson, 
Freitas, Spiegel, & Molden, 2003). Research suggests that regulatory fit promotes 
“value transfer” (Higgins, 2005). This value transfer is a consequence of the “feels 
right” sensation that characterises regulatory fit. Avnet and Higgins (2003) 
demonstrated that individuals are willing to pay 40% more for a product (mug) when 
experiencing regulatory fit. Later research by the authors found that promotion-
focused individuals were willing to pay 50% more for the product (correction fluid) if 
they used an emotion based strategy (rather than a reason based strategy) to access the 
product. Conversely, prevention-focused individuals were willing to pay 
approximately 40% extra for the correction fluid when they used a reason based 
strategy (rather than a feeling based strategy) to access the product. This value 
transfer is not confined to monetary judgements. Higgins et al. (2003) asked 
participants to rate pictures of dogs on their perceived “good naturedness”. 
Participants who experienced regulatory fit were found to rate the dogs more 
favourably than participants who experienced regulatory non-fit. Regulatory fit effects 
and value transfer are found to occur independently of mood (e.g. Higgins et al. 
2003).  
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Fit effects are powerful effects that may even counteract the effects of 
resource depletion (Hong & Lee, 2008). In a series of studies, the authors 
demonstrated that regulatory fit can attenuate the effects of resource depletion. 
Interestingly, findings by Lisjak, Molden and Lee (2012) indicate that chronically 
accessible motivational orientation requires less effort to exercise than temporarily 
primed motivational orientation. The research found that shifting from a habitual 
mindset (chronic regulatory orientation) to an alternative mindset (temporarily primed 
incongruent orientation) was effortful and required attentional resources. Furthermore, 
priming an (incongruent) motivational orientation served to deplete cognitive 
resources that were mobilised to rectify the conflicting state. In short, the studies 
revealed that cognitive resources are depleted as a result of the regulatory non-fit. 
Those in the non-fit group exhibited diminished performance in a stroop test (Study 
1), a lexical decision task (Study 2), and in a test on arithmetic (Study 5). Those in the 
non-fit group were also less resistant to temptation (Study 6) than those in the fit 
group. The authors proposed a primed interference hypothesis which suggests that 
incongruent motivational states negatively affect cognitive performance (e.g. mental 
arithmetic) and self-control capabilities (resisting temptations). Other research seems 
to support these findings. For example, Vaughn et al. (2006) found that adjusting 
initial impression formations was less (more) difficult for individuals experiencing 
regulatory fit (non-fit) effects. The authors suggest that individuals experiencing 
regulatory non-fit are forced to commit more resources during the initial impression 
formation. It thus follows that individuals in the non-fit condition find it more difficult 
to change the effortful impressions they previously derived. Kehr (2004) also suggests 
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that individuals use up resources when attempting to address internal conflicts that 
result from non-fit effects.  
As previously mentioned, fit effects may be created through integral or 
incidental means. Incidentally induced fit effects are of particular relevance in the 
present research due to the mindset priming approach employed in this research. 
Mindset priming paradigms employ a two study design in which participants are 
primed in the first study and then exposed to the target in the second, ostensibly 
unrelated study. Studies investigating incidental regulatory fit adopt the same design. 
Incidental regulatory fit occurs independently of the persuasion context and involves 
the use of a priming procedure that is enacted prior to the evaluation of a target 
stimulus (e.g. Freitas & Higgins, 2002). Freitas and Higgins (2002) were the first to 
incidentally induce regulatory (non)fit by asking individuals to list their hopes and 
aspirations (promotion-focused prime) or their duties and obligations (prevention-
focused prime). Participants were then asked to specify how they would achieve these 
goals by listing either eager strategies or vigilant strategies. The crossing of these two 
manipulations resulted in two fit conditions (promotion/eager and prevention/vigilant) 
and two non-fit conditions (promotion/vigilant and prevention/eager). Koenig, 
Cesario, Molden, Kosloff, and Higgins (2009) incidentally induced fit using this 
priming procedure developed by Freitas and Higgins (2002). In Study 1, participants 
read a fictitious newspaper article advocating a senior comprehensive exam written by 
either a high credibility or low credibility source. The results suggested that those in 
the non-fit group were less likely to rely on heuristic cues when assessing the article. 
In Study 2, two similar newspaper articles were presented to participants but on this 
occasion the argument strength was manipulated. The results indicated that those in 
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the regulatory fit group did not exhibit significant attitude change between low and 
high argument strength conditions. However, the non-fit group participants were 
found to be sensitive to argument strength. Study 3 investigated the effects of 
regulatory fit on “counterpersuasion” (a reversal of the effects of persuasion). 
Participants were shown one of two articles; one supporting an after school 
programme and one opposing it. Counterpersuasion was measured by subtracting 
participants’ attitude ratings obtained after exposure to the second article from the 
rating initially gathered after exposure to the first article. The first article was used to 
establish a baseline from which attitude change could be measured. This first article 
was designed to convey a highly agreeable argument supporting the programme 
which should minimise the effects of regulatory fit. As predicted, the results indicated 
that those in the regulatory fit and non-fit group formed equally positive attitudes 
towards the initial supporting article. However, after exposure to the second article 
which opposed the after school programme, those in the fit condition exhibited 
significantly less positive attitudes than those in the non-fit group. The findings 
suggest that those in the incidental fit condition did less thought processing relative to 
those in the incidental non-fit condition. As a consequence, the opinions of those in 
the fit condition were more influenced by the new information and therefore more 
susceptible to counterpersuasion. The authors concluded that incidental regulatory fit 
increased an individual’s reliance on source expertise while reducing their resistance 
to counter-persuasion. The results also indicated that incidentally induced non-fit 
increases an individual’s reliance on argument strength and strengthens resistance to 
counter-persuasion. Similar fit effects have been evidenced within motivational 
orientation literature as outlined in the next section. 
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3.4.2. Fit Effects for Motivational Orientation 
Research suggests that an individual’s chronic motivational orientation 
moderates perceptions of gain and loss (Elliot, 2008; Elliot 2006; Elliot & Thrash, 
2002; Gable et al. 2000). Furthermore, various studies have demonstrated a 
congruency effect between message framing and motivational orientation (Gerend & 
Shepherd, 2007; Mann et al. 2004; Sherman et al. 2006). Individuals with a strong 
avoidance orientation find loss-framed messages more persuasive than gain-framed 
messages (Gerend & Shepherd, 2007; Mann et al. 2004; Sherman et al. 2006). 
Interestingly, individuals with a weak avoidance orientation did not exhibit this 
tendency. Van ’t Riet, Ruiter and Vries (2012) showed that individuals with low 
(high) BIS scores are more persuaded by low (high) threat messages. Specifically, 
while a high threat message promoted behavioural intention change among 
individuals exhibiting high BIS scores, those exhibiting low BIS scores did not 
exhibit intention change. This result was found regardless of the level of threat 
employed. Similarly, Sherman et al. (2006) demonstrated congruency effects between 
motivational orientation and message framing. Fit effects between motivational 
orientation and message framing promoted higher self-efficacy with regard to future 
dental care. A similar congruency effect emerged for participants’ behavioural 
intentions. Approach (avoidance) orientated participants’ demonstrated stronger 
flossing intentions after reading gain-framed (loss-framed) articles. However, the 
study did not explicitly test the perceived persuasiveness of the article.  
An individual’s motivational orientation also has implications within other 
consumer contexts. Marrero et al. (2008) demonstrated that BIS and BAS could be 
linked to differences in perceptual bias between risk and reward during a betting task. 
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Interestingly, Schmeichel et al. (2010) found that exercising self-control activates 
approach motivation. The researchers used a low stakes gambling game to activate 
approach behaviours where little self-control was needed. The research found that 
exercising self-control increased participants’ detection rates of reward relevant 
symbols in a subsequent perceptual identification task. Motivational orientation is 
also found to influence hedonic shopping behaviours. Hedonic consumption can be 
characterised as a shopping experience in which there is a variety of positive stimuli 
or an absence on negative stimuli. Beatty and Ferrell (1998) have found that approach 
behaviours are associated with greater shopping spend, longer in-store stays and 
stronger store re-patronage intentions. Fit effects have also been found to influence 
persuasion within healthcare studies (Gerend & Shepherd, 2007). For example, 
Gerend and Shepherd (2007) investigated the role of motivational orientation in 
moderating participants’ behavioural intentions to get vaccinated against the Human 
Papilloma (HPV) virus. Participants were exposed to loss-framed and gain-framed 
messages. The results revealed that participants with a high BAS scores reported 
greater vaccination intentions following exposure to either message. Furthermore, 
there was a significant interaction between framing condition and BIS. The results 
indicated that loss-framed messages were more effective than gain-frame messages 
for promoting vaccination intentions among individuals exhibiting a high BIS score. 
However, among individuals exhibiting low BIS scores, no differences in behavioural 
intentions were found between loss and gain framed messages (Gerend & Shepherd, 
2007). The authors concluded that tailoring a message to “fit” an individual’s 
motivational orientation achieves greater persuasive power due to an increase in 
message scrutiny. In short, the authors found evidence to suggest that fit effects 
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increase systematic information processing. Correspondingly, individuals were more 
sensitive to the arguments put forward when they were congruent with the 
individual’s motivational orientation.  
Hevey and Dolan (2013) also provide evidence of fit between motivational 
orientation and message framing. Specifically, the authors demonstrated that approach 
(avoidance) orientated individuals found gain (loss) framed messages relating to skin 
cancer information more persuasive. The fit effects of matching the message to the 
individual’s motivational orientation also improved sun protection intentions among 
participants. The strong evidence for fit effects between motivation orientation and 
message frame provides advertisers with an important guiding principle for increasing 
persuasion. However, less research has been undertaken to understand the role of fit 
effects in regulating consumer resistance.  
 
3.5. Conclusion  
Xu and Wyer (2012) demonstrated that inducing individuals to counterargue 
(bolster) in one domain increases the likelihood of these thought processes being 
adopted when evaluating subsequently encountered adverts. Indeed, their research 
provides the first demonstration of a behavioural mindset influencing persuasive 
communications. However, many questions remain unanswered. While Xu and Wyer 
(2012) demonstrated that the valence of thoughts generated by participants mediated 
these mindsets, they did not investigate moderating variables. The identification of 
moderating factors is critical to further our understanding of these mindsets. As this 
chapter has illustrated, approach and avoidance tendencies exert a powerful influence 
on the cognitive, behavioural and perceptual processes that regulate resistance. 
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Considering that mindsets are cognitive phenomena it seems logical that an 
individual’s motivational orientation would moderate their influence. Indeed, fit 
effects between bolstering/counterarguing mindsets and motivational orientation 
seems very plausible. As we have seen, approach and avoidance tendencies strongly 
affect cognitive processes and thought accessibility. Accordingly, motivational 
orientation should influence the strength of counterarguing and bolstering mindsets. 
Evidence of such fit effects would add to the scant literature on these new mindsets. 
Such evidence would also provide a basis for identifying individuals who are 
particularly susceptible to these cognitive states. Considering the importance of 
counterarguing and bolstering across all consumer contexts this conspicuously 
theoretical gap in the literature warrants investigation. 
It should be noted that while fit effects can be powerful phenomena they are 
fragile. This is due to the fact that they are based on the misattribution of the “feels 
right” sensation that characterises fit effects. Indeed, all priming effects are inherently 
fragile phenomena and are often difficult to replicate (e.g. Yong, 2012). In recent 
years researchers have come to the realisation that greater replication efforts are 
needed within psychology (Chambers & Sumner, 2012; Francis, 2012; Simons, 2014). 
However, the renewed interest in replication has highlighted many of the challenges 
and difficulties researchers face when attempting to replicate priming results (Cesario, 
2014; Dijksterhuis, 2014). Nevertheless, these much needed replication efforts help to 
narrow effect sizes and add to the growing debate about the generalizability of 
priming effects. To the authors knowledge this research is the first attempt to replicate 
bolstering and counterarguing mindsets. The current research also attempts to extend 
the original research of Xu and Wyer (2012) by testing if motivational orientation and 
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persuasion knowledge moderate the effects of these counterarguing and bolstering 
mindsets. The research also tests if bolstering and counterarguing mindsets regulate 
the activation of PK thoughts. Finally, the research tests if these mindsets can be 
reactivated by recalling past bolstering and counterarguing episodes. 
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CHAPTER  4:  OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH 
 
The term “persuasive appeal” (e.g. Koenig et al. 2009) and “persuasive attack” (e.g. 
Tormala, Clarkson, & Petty, 2006) are often used interchangeably in persuasion 
literature. Presumably, the only distinction between these two terms is a matter of 
perspective; i.e. a persuasion agent (e.g. advertiser or salesperson) makes a persuasive 
appeal while an unwilling recipient repels an unsolicited, persuasive attack. 
Individuals may employ seven main strategies to resist persuasive attacks; attitude 
“bolstering”, counterarguing, negative affect, selective exposure, social validation, 
source derogation and asserting a belief that nothing will change their minds 
(Zuwerink Jacks & Cameron, 2003). This research will investigate the two most 
important resistance strategies; counterarguing and bolstering.  
Counterarguing refers to the generation of opposing arguments in response to 
a persuasive appeal (Xu & Wyer, 2012). In contrast; bolstering refers to the 
generation of supporting arguments in response to a persuasive appeal (Knowles & 
Linn, 2004). Counterarguing and bolstering are the most widely used strategies for 
resisting persuasion attempts (Zuwerink Jacks & Cameron, 2003). Bolstering and 
counterarguing are also the most potent defensive strategies available to consumers 
(Zuwerink Jacks & Cameron, 2003). However, counterarguing and bolstering 
strategies tax cognitive resources and require high levels of motivation and 
engagement to enact (Briñol et al., 2004). Compared to other resistance strategies 
(e.g. source derogation, negative affect, and selective exposure) bolstering and 
counterarguing are reflexive, argument-based approaches that require conscious, 
effortful resistance. Interestingly though, recent research suggests that counterarguing 
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and bolstering behaviours may be activated outside of conscious awareness (Xu & 
Wyer, 2012). 
Xu and Wyer (2012) demonstrated that inducing individuals to counterargue 
(bolster) increases the likelihood of them employing these cognitive procedures when 
evaluating adverts in an ostensibly unrelated study. The researchers demonstrated that 
bolstering and counterarguing mindsets may be procedurally primed or incidentally 
induced. To the author’s knowledge, no study has yet replicated these newly 
discovered mindsets.  
This research seeks to test both the robustness and generalisability of 
bolstering and counterarguing mindsets. Across 6 studies the researcher will attempt 
to replicate the carryover effects reported by Xu and Wyer (2012) in their study (see 
H1 - H3). The research also aims to extend the work of Xu and Wyer (2012) by 
testing the hypothesis that motivational orientation moderates the effects of these 
mindsets (see H4). Motivational orientation is considered to be a building block of 
human behaviour (Carver, 2006). Accordingly, it seems plausible that motivational 
orientation may moderate the non-conscious approach and avoidance behaviours 
activated by these mindsets. A number of secondary hypotheses will also be tested. 
For example, Persuasion Knowledge (PK) will also be tested as a potential mindset 
moderator (see H5). The research will investigate the implications of these mindsets 
for consumer welfare. Specifically, it will explore the possibility that bolstering and 
counterarguing mindsets affect individuals’ defensive responses to persuasive appeals 
(see H5). The research will also explore the possibility that reactivating past 
bolstering and counterarguing thoughts may activate these mindsets (see H6). The 
hypotheses for all studies are outlined in the next section.  
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4.1. Hypotheses  
 
4.1.1. Hypotheses for Perceptual Variables 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Participants in the bolstering (counterarguing) condition will 
generate more (less) favourable overall evaluations of persuasive appeals 
(composite measure of persuasiveness and appeal) than participants in the 
control condition and participants in the counterarguing (bolstering) 
condition.  
 
Hypothesis 1b: Participants in the bolstering (counterarguing) condition will 
generate more (less) favourable product/proposition evaluations (i.e. 
product/proposition attractiveness) than participants in the control condition 
and participants in the counterarguing (bolstering) condition.  
 
4.1.2. Hypotheses for Behavioural Variables 
 
Hypotheses 2a-d: Participants in the bolstering (counterarguing) condition 
will be more (less) willing to pay for a product/proposition (H2a), be more 
(less) willing to volunteer for future research (H2b), be more (less) willing to 
volunteer their time (i.e. minutes) for future research (H2c), and be more 
(less) willing to sign a petition (H2d) than participants in the control 
condition and participants in the counterarguing (bolstering) condition. 
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4.1.3. Hypotheses for Cognitive Variables 
 
Hypotheses 3a-b: Participants in the bolstering (counterarguing) condition 
will generate more (less) positive thoughts (H3a) and generate less (more) 
negative thoughts (H3b) in response to the persuasive appeal than 
participants in the control condition and participants in the counterarguing 
(bolstering) condition. 
 
Hypotheses 3c-d: Participants in the bolstering (counterarguing) condition 
will generate less (more) PK thoughts (H3c) and exhibit greater (lesser) 
attitude certainty (H3d) than participants in the control condition and 
participants in the counterarguing (bolstering) condition. 
 
Xu and Wyer (2012) did not test for moderators of bolstering and counterarguing 
mindsets. Thus, the boundary conditions of these mindsets await testing. Individual 
difference traits that moderate advertising effectiveness have long interested 
academics and persuasion practitioners alike. Indeed, a large body of research has 
been undertaken to investigate how individual difference traits affect perceptions of 
persuasive communications (for a review see Brinol & Petty, 2004). Motivational 
orientation is a building block of human behaviour and is thus a particularly important 
individual difference trait (Carver, 2006). Chapter 3 demonstrates that approach and 
avoidance tendencies can predict how individuals feel (e.g. Cesario et al., 2004), think 
(e.g. Mann et al., 2004) and behave (e.g. Hevey & Dolan, 2014) when interacting with 
persuasive communications. Given that motivational orientation can dictate whether 
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an individual approaches or avoids a stimulus, this construct is particularly well suited 
to investigating consumer resistance.  
Consumer mindset can compromise consumers’ defences and induce them to 
spend more (Dhar et al., 2007; Xu & Wyer, 2007, 2008). Indeed, simply switching 
between mindsets may weaken consumer resistance by inducing resource depletion 
(Hamilton et al. 2011). Resource depletion has been linked to a wide range of societal 
ills including overeating, overspending, crime, violence, drug abuse and smoking 
(Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Vohs & Faber, 2007). Despite overwhelming 
evidence to the contrary, consumers still happily entertain the “illusion of 
invulnerability” (Sagarin, Cialdini, Rice, & Serna, 2002). These researchers note the 
dearth of studies specifically focused on consumer resistance and call on scholars to 
work towards alleviating this knowledge deficit. Investigating consumer resistance 
would be of “considerable theoretical worth” and be of “substantial practical value” to 
society (Sagarin et al. 2002; p. 526). Answering this call, the current research seeks to 
make an important theoretical contribution to the scarce literature on consumer 
resistance by identifying individuals exhibiting a heightened sensitivity to bolstering 
and counterarguing mindsets.  
 
4.2. Behavioural Mindsets and Motivational Orientation 
As outlined in Chapter 3, there is strong evidence to suggest that motivational 
orientation (e.g. Gerend & Shepherd, 2007; Mann et al. 2004; Sherman et al. 2006) 
and regulatory orientation (e.g. Aaker & Lee, 2001; Higgins, 1997; Hong & Lee, 
2008; Lisjakn et al; 2012; Pham & Avnet, 2004) influence information processing 
strategies. Specifically, approach/promotion-focused individuals are more likely to 
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use eager strategies during information processing (Cesario et al., 2008). Conversely, 
avoidance/prevention-focused individuals are more likely to use vigilant strategies 
during information processing (Freitas & Higgins, 2002). Accordingly, it is 
hypothesised that individuals exhibiting high approach (avoidance) motivation will 
find bolstering (counterarguing) thoughts more accessible. If true, this heightened 
accessibility to these respective cognitive procedures should make these individuals 
differentially susceptible to these mindsets. Fit (non-fit) effects are found to 
accentuate (attenuate) an individual’s natural response to persuasive messages 
(Florack et al. 2009; Freitas & Higgins 2002; Jain et al. 2006; Lee et al. 2000; Lee & 
Aaker, 2004). Thus, it is postulated that individuals exhibiting high approach 
(avoidance) motivation will be more sensitive to bolstering (counterarguing) mindsets 
and, consequently, will exhibit stronger carryover effects as a result. Accordingly, the 
following hypothesised fit effects between mindset and motivational orientation are 
derived:  
 
4.2.1. Hypotheses for Motivational Orientation 
 
Hypotheses 4a-b: The carryover effects of a bolstering (counterarguing) 
mindset on participants’ evaluations of persuasive appeals (composite of 
persuasiveness and appeal) (H4a) and participants’ evaluations of 
products/propositions attractiveness (H4b), will be particularly pronounced 
among participants exhibiting high approach (avoidance) motivation. 
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Hypotheses 4c-f: The carryover effects of a bolstering (counterarguing) 
mindset on behavioural variables; willingness to pay (H4c), willingness to  
volunteer for future studies (H4d); number of minutes volunteered for future 
studies (H4e) and willingness to sign a petition (H4f) will be particularly 
pronounced among participants exhibiting high approach (avoidance) 
motivation. 
 
4.3. Behavioural Mindsets and Persuasion Knowledge 
Deceptive and manipulative practices are widespread in the marketplace (for a 
review see Boush, Friestad, & Wright, 2009). Persuasion Knowledge allows 
individuals to “cope” with persuasion attempts (Friestad & Wright, 1994). This 
knowledge is activated in order to assess the bona fides of a persuasive appeal and to 
determine the appropriate response. As such, PK represents an indispensable resource 
that offers a protective shield to consumers who must resist numerous persuasive 
attacks each day (Xie, Boush, & Liu, 2013). 
Avoidance motivation bestows upon the individual a defensive posture which 
predisposes them to enacting vigilant strategies. Vigilant strategies serve to protect 
consumers and are thus especially important when accessing potentially deceptive or 
manipulative communications (Friestad & Wright, 2013). An individual’s ability to 
detect and deflect deceptive persuasive attacks is likely to be reliant upon “vigilant 
strategies” that are strongly associated with avoidance tendencies. Accordingly, it 
seems that the goals associated with avoidance motivation are congruent with the 
activation of persuasion knowledge. Indeed, it seems logical to assume that avoidance 
motivation might facilitate the activation of persuasion knowledge. The activation of 
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PK would complement any vigilant strategies being applied and lend itself to the self-
defensive goals being pursued. According to Knowles and Linn, (2004; p.7) “the four 
faces of resistance are: reactance, distrust, scrutiny and inertia. Distrust and message 
scrutiny are likely to be especially important defensive responses when evaluating 
manipulative persuasion appeals. 
In contrast, the hedonic goals associated with approach motivation appear 
incongruent with the activation of PK. The eager strategies that characterise approach 
tendencies are concerned with reward attainment and goal maximisation rather than 
pain avoidance or loss prevention. Above, Hypothesis 6 posits that bolstering 
(counterarguing) mindsets are moderated by approach (avoidance) motivation. Using 
the hypothesis as a theoretical platform, the author extrapolates the hypotheses with 
regard to fit effects between PK and mindset: These hypotheses are outlined in the 
section below. 
 
4.3.1. Hypotheses for Persuasion Knowledge 
 
Hypothesis 5a: Participants in the bolstering (counterarguing) condition will 
rate a persuasive appeal as less (more) manipulative than participants in the 
control condition and participants in the counterarguing (bolstering) 
condition. 
 
Hypothesis 5b: The carryover effects of bolstering (counterarguing) mindset 
will be particularly pronounced among participants exhibiting low (high) 
Persuasion Knowledge. 
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4.4. Behavioural Mindsets and Episodic Recall 
As previously discussed, Fransen and Fennis (2014) demonstrated that an 
episodic recall task can activate resistance. Specifically, the authors primed 
“persuasive intent”. The priming procedure involved an episodic recall task in which 
participants were asked to recall a past situation where someone tried to influence 
them. This persuasion intent prime activated resistance to future adverts by implicitly 
forewarning participants of an imminent persuasion attempt. Indeed, priming 
persuasive intent induced comparable levels of resistance to explicit forewarnings of 
upcoming persuasive attempts. However, the authors did not prime participants with a 
specific resistance strategy. Consequently, there is no way to know what type of 
resistance strategies were activated as a result of this episodic priming task. The 
current research seeks to address this problem by testing if activating memories of 
specific resistance strategies (counterarguing or bolstering) can prime the future 
deployment of these cognitive procedures when evaluating adverts. Accordingly, the 
following hypothesis is postulated:  
 
4.4.1. Hypothesis for Episodic Priming 
 
Hypothesis 6: An episodic recall task will induce a bolstering 
(counterarguing) mindset.  
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4.5. Overview of studies 
Across 6 studies, the current research sought to replicate and extend the work 
of Xu and Wyer (2012) by exploring the effects of a counterarguing mindset (Study 1, 
Study 4 and Study 6) and those of the bolstering mindset (Study 2, Study 3 and Study 
6).  
Study 1 attempted a direct replication of the counterarguing mindset (Xu and 
Wyer, Study 1). The study employed a 3 (mind-set: bolstering vs. counterarguing vs. 
control) x 2 (favourableness of vacation spot: high vs. moderate) between-subjects 
design to test H1 to H4.  In Study 1, participants were exposed to one of two hotel 
adverts featuring either a highly attractive hotel or a moderately attractive hotel. The 
study tested the impact of bolstering and counterarguing mindsets on perceptual 
variables relating to advert evaluations (H1a) and product attractiveness (i.e. hotel 
attractiveness (H1b). It also tested the impact of bolstering and counterarguing 
mindsets on behavioural variables: participants’ willingness to pay (H2a), 
participants’ willingness to volunteer for future studies (H2b), and the number of 
minutes that participants were willing to volunteer for future studies (H2c). The study 
also tested the impact of bolstering and counterarguing mindsets on the cognitive 
variables: the number of positive thought generated by participants (H3a) and the 
number of negative thoughts generated by participants (H3b). The primary aim of 
Study 1 was to test the hypothesis that avoidance motivation (BIS) moderates the 
carry over effects of a counterarguing mindset (H4a-f) Specifically, it was 
hypothesised that individuals exhibiting strong avoidance motivation (high BIS 
scores) would exhibit stronger carryover effects of a counterarguing mindset than 
participants exhibiting weak avoidance motivation (low BIS scores). 
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Study 2 employed a 3 (mindset: bolstering vs. counterarguing vs. control) x 2 
(MI of article: high vs. low) between-subjects design to test H1 – H5a. In this study 
participants were procedurally primed before being exposed to one of two newspaper 
articles which advocated the introduction of a “web-tax”. In addition to the 
hypotheses tested in Study 1, this study also tested the impact of counterarguing and 
bolstering mindsets on participants’ willingness to sign a petition (H2d), participants’ 
attitude certainty (H3d), and participants’ ability to generate PK related thoughts 
(H3c). The study further tested the hypothesis that bolstering and counterarguing 
mindsets influence participant’s ability to detect manipulative intent (H5a). The 
primary aim of Study 2 was to test the hypothesis that approach motivation (BAS) 
moderates the carry over effects of a bolstering mindset (H4a-f). 
Study 3 employed a 3 (mindset: bolstering vs. counterarguing vs. control) x 2 
(manipulative intent of article: high vs. low) x 2 (priming types: procedural vs. 
episodic) between-subjects design to test H1 – H6. Participants were exposed to one 
of two newspaper articles advocating the introduction of a mandatory pension 
scheme. Participants in the episodic priming conditions were asked to recall a time 
when they engaged in bolstering or counterarguing behaviours. In addition to the 
hypotheses tested in Study 2, the study tested the hypothesis that a participant’s 
chronic PK would moderate the effects of the bolstering mindset (H5b) and the 
hypothesis that a bolstering mindset could be activated via an episodic priming 
procedure (H6). The inclusion of both types of priming procedures allowed the 
researcher to assess the differential strength of each priming procedure. However, the 
primary aim of Study 3 was to test the hypothesis that approach motivation (BAS) 
moderates the carry over effects of a bolstering mindset (H4a-f).  
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Study 4 employed a 3 (mindset: bolstering vs. counterarguing vs. control) x 2 
(favourableness of hotel: high vs. moderate) between-subjects design to test H1 – H4 
and H6. Using the same experimental design and materials used in Study 1 
participants were exposed to one of the two hotel adverts. However, unlike Study 1 
participants were primed using an episodic priming procedure rather than the 
procedural priming.  
Study 5 employed a 3 (mindset: bolstering vs. counterarguing vs. control) x 
Advert between-subjects design. Participants were procedurally primed and then 
exposed to the same (exotic snack food) advert used by Xu and Wyer (Study 2). Study 
5 tested H1 – H4. 
Finally, study 6 employed a 3 (mindset: bolstering vs. counterarguing vs. 
control) x 2 (favourableness of hotel: high vs. moderate) x 2 (priming types: 
procedural vs. episodic) between-subjects design. Participants were primed using a 
procedural priming procedure or an episodic priming procedure and then exposed to 
one of two hotels adverts (Xu and Wyer, Study 1). Study 6 tested H1 – H4 and H6. 
 
4.6. Methodological Issues in Priming Research 
This section discusses a number of contemporary issues that dominate the 
current discourse among academics within the field of priming research. The 
importance of replication efforts within the field are outlined and some of the 
challenges relating to replication efforts are explicated.  
Priming research is still in its infancy and remains at an early stage of 
evolution (Cesario, 2014). The conceptually fuzzy boundaries between different types 
of priming effects and the lack of a unifying theory within the field are issues of 
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concern (Ferguson & Mann, 2014). However, recent public denouncements of 
priming research are both unwarranted and unhelpful (Ferguson & Mann, 2014). 
Priming effects are well established within psychology literature and are supported by 
decades of research (e.g. Janiszewski & Wyer, 2014). Within cognitive psychology, 
semantic, lexical and associative priming paradigms are routinely used and provide 
robust and replicable results (Ferguson & Mann, 2014). In such studies participants 
are typically exposed to a prime before undertaking a lexical decision task. In a 
lexical decision task participants are asked to indicate as quickly as possible if a letter 
string represents a word or a non-word. Research finds that when the prime is 
associated with the target word (e.g. when the prime is “doctor” and the target word is 
“nurse”) participants respond faster than when the prime and target word are not 
conceptually linked. The millisecond differences in response time that manifest 
themselves as priming effects have been replicated many times and typically appear 
within statistically powerful designs (Ferguson & Mann, 2014). Ferguson and Mann 
(2014) suggest that the controversy surrounding priming studies is due to “definitional 
imprecision”. These researchers also note that most of the controversies surrounding 
priming effects relate to a narrow subgroup of priming studies that have emerged in 
the last 20 years, namely “goal priming”, “behaviour priming” or “social priming”. 
Ferguson and Mann (2014 p. 34) rightly point out that “the recent publicity frenzy 
surrounding priming” is driven by critics who refer to different types of priming as if 
they are distinct categories; e.g. priming (Yong, 2012), social priming (Kahneman, 
2012), goal priming (Pashler, Coburn, & Harris, 2012) or behavioural priming 
(Doyen, Klein, Pichon, & Cleeremans, 2012).  
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Priming effects are complex phenomena and categorising these effects is often 
problematic since primes exert influence across overlapping areas. In an attempt to 
provide some clarity on goal priming effects Förster et al. (2007) specifies criteria that 
may be used to identify goal priming effects. The authors assert that “goal-priming 
effects (a) involve value, (b) involve post-attainment decrements in motivation, (c) 
involve gradients as a function of distance to the goal, (d) are proportional to the 
product of expectancy and value, (e) involve inhibition of conflicting goals, (f) 
involve self-control, and (g) are moderated by equifinality and multifinality” (Förster 
et al. (2007 p. 211). However, while these characteristics of goals may provide helpful 
guidelines there are few hard and fast rules for categorising priming effects. Despite 
the best efforts of researchers the conceptual lines of demarcation for priming effects 
remain blurry and imprecise (Ferguson & Mann, 2014). To illustrate this point the 
authors ask readers to consider the classical priming study by Bargh, Chen, and 
Burrows (1996) which demonstrated that rudeness/politeness could be primed. Is this 
a goal prime or a social prime or a behavioural prime? The problem is that all priming 
effects are social in some sense. While the term social priming is unhelpful and 
ambiguous it typically relates to priming effects that change social behaviour 
(Ferguson & Mann, 2014). For example, studies that prime stereotype activation (e.g. 
DeMarree, Wheeler, & Petty, 2005) or social behaviours (e.g. Bargh, Chen, & 
Burrows, 1996) may be considered social priming. The distinction between behaviour 
priming and goal priming is less clear (Förster, Liberman, & Friedman, 2007). 
However, since not all goals are behavioural in nature we can deduce that behavioural 
priming is a subset of goal priming.  
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Murky definitional distinctions aside, the primary reason for the controversy 
surrounding social, behavioural, or goal priming studies is due to the large effect sizes 
they tend to report (Ferguson & Mann 2014). The strength of the effect sizes reported 
in goal priming studies has raised doubts among some researchers who find the results 
counterintuitive and improbable (e.g. Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012). Pashler et al. 
(2012) examined the effect sizes of well cited goal priming studies. They found a 
large effect sizes ranging from d=0.5 to d=1 which eclipsed the much smaller effects 
they found in a typical perceptual priming study (d= .06). Pashler et al. (2012) argue 
that goal primes are relatively abstract in nature when compared to the more concrete 
semantic primes that operate via a more direct mechanism (i.e. spreading activation). 
Thus the large effects found in goal priming studies seem counterintuitive. Pashler et 
al. (2012) also suggest that the relatively small number of underpowered 
goal/behavioural priming studies may be indicative of a large body of unsuccessful 
studies that have been consigned to the file drawer. The file drawer problem 
“systematically increases the proportion of false-positives in the published literature 
and distorts perceptions of the robustness and size of an effect” (Finkel, Eastwick, & 
Reis, 2015 p. 281). The file drawer problem also results in “information leakage” 
within the scientific community (Dijksterhuis et al., 2014). Information leakage is a 
term used to describe the leakage of scientific information (“failed studies”) that never 
sees the light of day. Rather than broadening the knowledge base of science this 
information is lost to the system, confined to the dusty recesses of an actual or 
metaphorical file drawer. This data is conceptually similar to the mysterious 
astronomically concept of dark matter which scientists concede is ubiquitous yet 
remains tantalizingly out of scientist’s reach. However, not all scholars are concerned 
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about the theoretical ramifications of the file drawer problem. Dalton, Aguinis, 
Dalton, Bosco, and Pierce (2012) suggest that the problem can be overcome by meta-
analyses. Indeed, the authors concluded that the file drawer problem does not produce 
an inflation bias and therefore does not pose a serious threat to the validity of meta-
analytically derived conclusions. Nevertheless, many researchers remain unconvinced 
that meta-analysis can mitigate the threat posed by the file drawer problem. The 
information asymmetry caused by the file drawer problem not only prevents the 
growth of science, it actively impedes scientific progress (Dijksterhuis et al., 2014). 
The counter-productive, duplication of fruitless research could be avoided by greater 
levels of transparency. Dijksterhuis et al. (2014) note that the file drawer problem is 
especially problematic for aspiring researchers, many of whom are doomed to 
squander the time, money and resources making the same mistakes of their peers. 
This is especially true of priming studies which present a high level of risk and 
speculative endeavour (Dijksterhuis et al., 2014). In the words of prominent, 
mathematical psychologist Eric-Jan Wagenmakers; “I’ve seen students spending their 
entire PhD period trying to replicate a phenomenon, failing, and quitting academia 
because they had nothing to show for their time” (Yong, 2012; p. 299). 
Replicating the priming effects of conceptually abstract primes such as 
stereotypes is often problematic due the numerous downstream dependent variables 
that the concept could activate (Shanks et al., 2013). Indeed, Shanks et al. (2013) 
argue that such studies provide a researcher with too much discretion to cherry pick 
from a wide variety of eclectic dependent variables. The researchers also suggest that 
it seems unfeasible that behavioural priming effects should produce such strong 
effects, particularly when the conceptual link between the prime and the target 
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behaviour may be indirect. However, proponents of priming research dismiss these 
objections as a “disregard of theory in combination with premature or faulty logic” 
(Dijksterhuis, 2014 p. 72).  
Dijksterhuis (2014) asserts that behavioural priming paradigms are likely to 
produce strong priming effects because they tend to use stronger primes. The author 
argues that human behaviour is a more natural and ecologically valid measure of 
construct accessibility and consequently it is logical that these priming effects should 
be larger. Arguably, behavioural priming effects should be most robust when a 
procedural priming paradigm is used. Procedural priming procedures like those 
employed by Xu and Wyer (2012) should theoretically provide a strong conceptual 
link between the prime and the target. The low construal level of the prime should 
also facilitate strong priming effects. However, as this doctoral research will 
demonstrate, procedurally priming paradigms are not without their challenges. Indeed, 
the research suggests that episodic priming procedures may provide more robust 
results than procedurally induced primes.  
Some researchers have questioned the reason behind the relatively low number 
of behavioural priming studies published within the literature (e.g. Pashler & 
Wagenmakers, 2012). They suggest that this may be an artefact of the file drawer 
problem where a potentially high number of failed replications may reside. However, 
Dijksterhuis (2014) dismiss the claims that there is a lack of evidence for behavioural 
priming research. Dijksterhuis (2014) estimates there are between 200 - 400 empirical 
papers which have reported some behaviour priming effect in their results. While this 
represents a small subset of the estimated 12,000 priming studies conducted within 
the social sciences (Janiszewski & Wyer, 2014) it nevertheless represents a significant 
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body of evidence in support of behavioural priming effects. Dijksterhuis et al. (2014) 
contend that critics of priming studies are ignorant of the subtleties that characterise 
the research. They also make the point that “research on issues such as free will, 
unconscious processes, and automaticity is sometimes, unavoidably so it seems, 
ideological”. Furthermore, “not trusting an effect because it is counterintuitive is often 
essentially a form of circular reasoning” (Dijksterhuis et al. 2014 p. 200).  
Dijksterhuis (2014) notes that behaviour priming effects are now being applied 
to a variety of pro-social scenarios (e.g. fund raising, addiction and anti-smoking 
initiatives) and argue that an overly sceptical response from academics might hamper 
these laudable lines of research. The present research also takes a strong ethical 
stance. The research adopts a consumer-centric perspective to the concepts of 
resistance and self-defence. Rather than bow to the insatiable appetite of marketers to 
finds ways to sell more product, the current research aims to increase our 
understanding of how consumers may resist their advances. The current research also 
aims to investigate potential moderators and boundary conditions of bolstering and 
counterarguing mindsets that have been found to regulate consumer resistance. 
Dijksterhuis et al (2014) assert that future research must systematically investigate 
moderators of priming effects to aid theory building within the field of consumer 
behaviour. In undertaking this research two other important calls in the priming 
literature are being addressed: (1) to undertake much needed replication research 
(Chambers, & Sumner, 2012; Francis, 2012; Koole & Lakens, 2012; Simons, 2014; 
Yong, 2012) and (2) to investigate how priming influences consumer resistance 
(Laran et al., 2011).  
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4.6.1. Replication 
“The ability to replicate effects across laboratories is arguably the sine qua non 
of science” (Finkel et al., 2015 p. 287). Indeed, the demarcation of science from non-
science can be judged by invoking this criterion (Popper, 1959). “Replication is our 
(scientists) best friend because it keeps us honest” (Chambers & Sumner, 2012 p. 14). 
However, replication attempts within the sciences are proving problematic. Prinz, 
Schlange, and Asadullah (2011) found that only 25% of dozens of prominent medical 
studies could be replicated. Worse still, Begley and Ellis (2012) found only 11% of 
replicated drug trials were successful. Similar, coordinated replication efforts have 
recently commenced within the field of psychology (Open Science Collaboration, 
2012). The Reproducibility Project is a collaborative effort by researchers to 
“systematically examine the rate and predictors of reproducibility in psychological 
science”. The project aims to replicate studies published during 2008 in three high 
ranking psychological journals; Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology and 
Psychological Science (Open Science Collaboration, 2012). As of August 2012, the 
project boasted 72 volunteer researchers from 41 institutions. Preliminary results in 
May 2015 suggest that the scientists were only able to replicate 39% of the 100 
studies they selected for replication2. However, the results revealed that 24 of the 
remaining 61 studies did produce “moderately similar” findings (marginally 
significant results) in line with the original studies.  
                                                 
2 http://www.nature.com/news/first-results-from-psychology-s-largest-reproducibility-test-1.17433, [27/06/15] 
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It is worth noting a certain topological eccentricity with regard to the lay of the 
land within priming literature. Specifically, certain landmark studies enjoy a vaulted 
position within the literature despite very limited evidence that these effects are 
replicable. For example, as of September 2016, Google Scholar indicates that 
Dijksterhuis and Knippenberg (1998) and Bargh et al. (1996) have been cited 756 
times and 3729 times respectively. Bargh et al. (1996) demonstrated that priming 
personality traits such as rudeness or politeness could influence participants’ social 
behaviours. The authors also demonstrated that priming the concept of being old 
could influence participants’ motor behaviours (i.e. walking speed). Furthermore, 
Dijksterhuis and Knippenberg (1998) demonstrated that activating a stereotype 
associated with intelligence (i.e. a professor) could improve test performance in a 
game of trivial pursuit. Conversely, activating a stereotype associated with stupidity 
(i.e. a soccer hooligan) has the opposite effect. However, despite the rational 
arguments for the existence of these priming effects, precious few studies have been 
able to replicate these eye-catching results. Indeed, recent well-published failures to 
replicate these highly cited priming studies have thrust priming research into the 
limelight. Some commentators suggest that priming effects now need to be “exciting, 
eye-catching, even implausible” in order to find their way through a review process 
and into a publication (see Yong, 2012). For example, Shanks et al. (2013) failed to 
replicate the priming effect reported by Dijksterhuis and Knippenberg (1998). 
Similarly, across nine studies Doyen et al., (2012) failed to replicate the highly 
influential studies of Bargh et al. (1996). Overall, the lack of replications within 
psychology is worrying. These “non-replications have functioned as a welcome, 
though rather loud, wake-up call” (Dijksterhuis 2014 p. 72). 
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The publication bias within top ranked journals has discouraged replication 
studies. However, replication is the only solution for academic fraud. Indeed, the lack 
of replication efforts is one reason why high profile academic frauds went unchecked 
for so long (Crocker & Cooper, 2011; Roediger, 2012). As so few replication studies 
are published, non-replications do not currently serve as a diagnostic tool for fraud 
(Crocker & Cooper, 2011; Roediger, 2012). After analysing 40 fraud cases, Stroebe, 
Postmes, and Spears (2012) concluded that neither replications or meta-analyses 
played a significant role in fraud detection. Frauds are typically uncovered as the 
result of a whistleblowing colleague or graduate students (e.g. Deidrick Stapel). A 
review by DeCoster and Claypool (2004) found that studies originating from outside 
the U.S. and Canada tend to report larger priming effects and effect sizes. However, 
the authors suggest that the disparity in effect size is likely to be due to innocent and 
“idiosyncratic differences between U.S./Canadian labs and those (found) elsewhere” 
(DeCoster & Carpool (2004 p. 10). 
 
4.6.2. Conceptual Replication 
Historically, there has been little appetite for replications within the social 
sciences. Until recently, “scholars had virtually no career-related incentives to 
conduct close replications” (Finkel et al., 2015; p. 287). The prospects of replications 
being published in high ranking journals are low and consequently many researchers 
view replication efforts as a waste of both time and resources that could be profitably 
employed elsewhere (Finkel et al., 2015). 
Within psychology, conceptual replications are more common than direct 
replications or “close replications” since they are deemed more theoretically 
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informative (Finkel et al., 2015). Stroebe and Strack (2014; p. 61) argue that “the true 
purpose of replications is a (repeated) test of a theoretical hypothesis rather than an 
assessment of the reliability of a particular experimental procedure”. Similarly, Bargh 
(2012) argues in favour of conceptual replications because they provide additional 
evidence of the psychological processes at work. In contrast, direct replications are 
theoretically impoverished by definition. However, the relaxed criteria for conceptual 
replications make them problematic. Simply put, the degrees of freedom afforded to a 
researcher are much larger and thus the potential for questionable research practices is 
increased.  
 
4.6.3. Direct Replication 
According to Stroebe and Strack (2014; p. 59) the recent frenzy around 
priming effects is due to “an epistemological misunderstanding that emphasizes the 
phenomenon instead of its underlying mechanisms”. They differentiate between the 
benefits of direct replication as a function of the type of research being undertaken. In 
applied research such as medical research there are obvious benefits to direct 
replication. However, when conducting basic research, the benefits of direct 
replication are lessened somewhat because here the goal is theory building (Cesario, 
2014).  
Many researchers consider direct replications to be outside the scope of the 
human sciences; “exact replication is an illusion” (Dijksterhuis, 2014; p. 73). The 
environmental, temporal, cultural and situational cues that preside over every 
experimental setting means that an exact replication of results is nigh on impossible 
(Brandt et al., 2014). This is especially evident in priming studies where a host of 
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extraneous variables can impinge on the replication effort. Unlike the gravitational 
pull of the earth, the gravitational pull of a prime is variable and context dependent 
(Stroebe & Strack, 2014). Simply put, social objects are variable and do not lend 
themselves to precise measurement in the same way that inanimate objects do 
(Loersch & Payne, 2014; Molden, 2014). Priming effects are nested within individual, 
cultural and contextual variables (Oyserman & Lee, 2007; Smeesters, Wheeler, & 
Kay, 2010; Wheeler, DeMarree, & Petty, 2014; Wyer, 2008). Consequently, some 
argue that the search for invariant priming effects is an unreasonable if not impossible 
task (Cesario, 2014). Indeed, the author argues that direct replication attempts should 
be confined to the lab that originally reported the priming effects. The author contends 
that such an approach would promote theory building by helping to systematically 
explore the boundary effects of the prime. Furthermore, the author asserts that efforts 
to replicate results in other labs are often premature and overly ambitious. However, 
for researchers interested in the phenomenon (including the present author) this is not 
always feasible. Consequently, most researchers are forced to use the facilities at their 
own institutions to carry out this priming research. In the current study large sample 
sizes were used to maximise the statistical power and chances of uncovering the 
priming effects and boundary conditions of these mindsets. The researcher contacted 
the author of the original study in order to obtain the same materials. Every effort was 
also made to control the environment. Studies were conducted either in small 
classrooms or large lecture halls. Xu and Wyer (2012) did not explicitly state the 
environment in which the study took place. For the offline studies (Studies 1, 2 and 3) 
the authors mention that “undergraduate students at the University of _________ 
participated to fulfil a course requirement”. However, the authors did not provide any 
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information regarding the environment in which the experiment took place. This is an 
example of the detail and transparency that replicators require but which is often 
found lacking within academic papers.  
Cesario (2014) argues that unrealistically high replication expectations are 
misguided and need to be tempered by an understanding of the brain as a 
computational organ. Failed replications are uninformative and often create division 
between groups of researchers; “the believers will keep on believing, pointing at the 
successful replications and derogating the unsuccessful ones, whereas the 
nonbelievers will maintain their belief system drawing on the failed replications for 
support of their rejection of the original hypothesis” (Stroebe & Strack, 2014 p. 64). 
Failed replications also fuel the debate that many priming effects are Type 1 errors or 
are a fluke convergence of (un)known factors that result in highly capricious 
phenomena. Cesario (2014) contends that researchers (replicators) should exercise 
more restraint when framing the generalisability of the priming effects they have 
found. However, Xu and Wyer (2012) did not outline any potential limiting factors 
with regard to the effects they observed.  
While Cesario (2014) acknowledges that multi-lab replications are necessary 
to establish generalisability he counsels that this is only advisable after the original 
researchers have had adequate time to test potential moderators and different 
boundary conditions. Such replication efforts would help to determine the range of 
effect size before replications are conducted elsewhere. He charges researchers with 
the responsibility of replicating their own studies and suggests that until now, many 
have been “deficient in meeting this responsibility” (Cesario, 2014; p. 40). This 
dereliction of duty has contributed to the current state of confusion regarding priming 
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effects (Cesario, 2014). The author argues that non-replications in other labs are the 
result of inappropriate expectations by researchers. These replicators have essentially 
skipped the queue and forged ahead without the proper theoretical development by the 
original researchers. However, not all researchers share Cesario’s conservative views 
on direct replication. Simons (2014) calls for the widespread adoption of direct 
replication throughout the social sciences. The author reaffirms the positivist position 
that reproducibility is the cornerstone of science. Researchers must “Trust but Verify” 
via replication (Simons, 2014; p. 77). The author asserts that direct replication across 
independent labs is the only means of uncovering useful and generalizable effects that 
carry any theoretical weight or warrant any public interest. Direct replications across 
multiple labs allow researchers to isolate the signal from the noise and thus average 
the effects across different scenarios. Indeed, the primary task of a replication is to 
narrow effect sizes. The principle of daisy chaining effects using independent labs 
allows researchers to identify real and robust priming effects (Simons, 2014). The 
author cautions against the danger of explaining failed replications using the 
“assumed moderators” argument.  
Brandt et al. (2014) note that a pure replication of any priming study is a 
theoretical impossibility given the huge number of extraneous variables that can 
influence typically fragile priming effects. This fact notwithstanding, researchers must 
aspire to this theoretical gold standard and use it as a starting point from which 
deviations from the original study are grudgingly conceded. Such replication efforts 
are known as “close replications”.  
The resurgence of the evidentiary value movement since 2011 has meant that 
close replications are now considered central to the future of social science. High 
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powered, close replications are deemed the best approach to test if priming effects are 
robust and reliable (Brandt et al., 2014). Indeed, some authors have busied themselves 
developing protocols or “recipes” for replication (Brandt et al., 2014). Brandt et al. 
(2014)'s “replication receipt” provides researchers with an instructive framework of 
questions that must be satisfactorily answered before a study may be deemed a close 
replication. The replication recipe also provides replicators with a prescriptive 
methodological framework for data collection and data analysis. The five core 
ingredients for a “replication recipe” are as follows: (1) carefully deﬁne the effects 
and methods that the researcher intends to replicate; (2) follow as exactly as possible 
the methods of the original study (including participant recruitment, instructions, 
stimuli, measures, procedures, and analyses); (3) have high statistical power; (4) make 
complete details about the replication available, so that interested experts can fully 
evaluate the replication attempt (or attempt another replication themselves) and (5) 
evaluate replication results and compare them critically to the results of the original 
study (Brandt et al. 2014).  
The current research adopted a number of the important recommendations 
outlined by the replication recipe. For example, the authors of the original study were 
contacted so that access to the original materials could be gained. This research also 
used the same priming procedure as the original study. However, certain elements of 
the study were different. For example, while Xu and Wyer used a convenience sample 
of American participants, the current studies primarily used a convenience sample of 
Irish participants. Thus, the current research tests if bolstering and counterarguing 
mindsets can be replicated in a non-American consumer culture. Past research has 
shown that culture has powerful effects on a wide range of psychology phenomena 
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(for a review see Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010) including mindset priming 
studies (Oyserman & Lee, 2007). In order to remove some of these confounds the 
author also ran two studies on Amazon Mturk. In one study an exclusively American 
sample was recruited. One of the notable strengths of the current research is the 
comparatively large sample sizes ranging from Study 1 (n =134), Study 2 (n = 233), 
Study 3 (n =344), Study 4 (n = 268), Study 5 (n = 138) and Study 6 (n = 290) provide 
sample sizes that often twice in size than those used by Xu and Wyer (2012). 
Relatively few close replications are reported within the field of psychology (Makel et 
al., 2012). Close replications serve as a tool for unearthing false positive results and 
also allow researchers to estimate a general effect size for a priming phenomenon. 
The (dis)confirming results that accrue provide valuable theoretical building blocks 
for researchers. Brandt et al. (2014) suggests that replications of priming studies are 
worthwhile if (i) the effect has a significant theoretical importance to the field or (ii) 
the phenomena has a direct or indirect impact on society. The authors also note that 
replications that extend the original study are valuable as they help with the 
identification of boundary conditions.  
Brandt et al. (2014) recommend that all materials, data and syntax files are 
made available to journal editors and reviewers. Such transparency permits reviewers 
to assess exactly how close the replication really was. It also allows readers to 
confidently identify boundary conditions that might become evident when multiple 
replication studies are attempted.  
Convincing replications should boast sufficient statistical power in order to 
convince reviewers (Simonsohn, 2015). Brandt et al. (2014) advise that researchers 
should err on the side of caution (high statistical power) since past research has found 
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that published studies frequently over-estimate the true effect size (Greenwald, 1975). 
Cohen (1992) recommends that statistical power should be at least .80. However, 
Brandt et al (2014) make the point that a successful replication is not necessarily 
defined by the production of statistically significant results. Indeed, in juxtaposition to 
the editorial preferences of many psychology journals, the recent statement by the 
American Psychology Association (APA) has highlighted the limited utility of p 
values and their over-reliance in psychological science (Wasserstein & Lazar, 2016). 
A second issue relates to the estimated likelihood of replication. Some argue that the 
considerable theoretical and methodological difficulties that surround replication 
studies necessitate new statistical approaches that depart from null hypothesis testing 
(Killeen, 2005). Although some authors have challenged the validity of these 
techniques (e.g. Maraun & Gabriel, 2010) there is a growing consensus for the 
appropiateness of new statistical approaches and the merits of new stastical tools 
(Cumming, 2005; Lecoutre, Lecoutre, & Poitevineau, 2010).  
Researchers who replicate a study should be cognizant of the limitations of 
their study and report any methodological issues that may have affected the results. 
Brandt et al. (2014) recommend the application of more stringent criteria for 
replications compared to those applied in the original study. They however 
acknowledge that shortcomings in the design of the original study (weak measures, 
the presence of confounds etc.) will also be transferred to the replication study by 
virtue of the definitional requirements of a close replication. The authors suggest that 
replicators should anticipate differences in both the size and direction of the priming 
effects prior to the replication taking place.  
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Priming effects are fickle and often challenging to successfully replicate. 
Daniel Kahneman suggests that conducting a successful priming study is a skill akin 
to directing a “theatre performance” and requires “having a knack that not all of us 
have” (Yong, 2012; p. 299). Priming research is a field of research where skill, 
intuition and “craft” are required to successfully operationalise a priming study. This 
craft is gained from years of experience and passed down from mentor to student 
(Dijsterhuis et al. 2014). The craft associated with conducting successful priming 
research places high demands upon junior researchers starting into the field. Unlike 
other areas of research, a solid knowledge base and theoretical appreciation for 
experimental design may not be sufficient. Compared to researchers working in a 
psychology lab, those who work independently do so at a distinct disadvantage. The 
under-developed literature on priming methodologies adds additional gradient to the 
steep learning curve faced by fledgling social scientists required to work outside the 
cloistered environs of a research group. Even with lab facilities and easy access to 
expertise, priming effects are still not assured. Priming effects are often a fortuitous 
combination of variables; “more often than not, a researcher is accidentally hitting on 
the right level of an important moderating variable...to obtain a priming effect” 
(Cesario, 2014 p. 44). Replicators must be mindful of potentially confounding factors 
such as mood (e.g. Schwarz & Clore, 1983) and of the numerous moderating factors 
that need to be considered. However, the identification of new moderators remains 
central to future theory building efforts and is critical to the future of priming research 
(Dijsterhuis et al. 2014). Table 4.1 at the end of this chapter provides a list of 
moderators that have already been found to influence the strength and direction of 
priming effects.  
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This chapter has addressed a number of important issues and prepares the 
ground for the upcoming empirical chapter. First, the chapter has provided an 
overview and rationale for the current research project. It has achieved this by 
discussing the pressing need for greater replication efforts within psychology and by 
highlighting the need for greater theory building and moderator testing within 
consumer psychology. Second, the chapter has discussed the broad institutional 
barriers that continue to impede the pursuit of both these types of research. Third, in 
addition to proving a broad rationale for the current research project the chapter has 
also outlined the rationale for the overarching research hypotheses in the studies. 
Finally, the chapter has discussed the specific methodological challenges associated 
with priming research. These studies are now reported in Chapter 5.  
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Table 4.1 
Moderators of Priming Effects 
Moderator Authors Finding 
Awareness  Dijksterhuis, Bargh and Miedema, 
(2000); Higgins et al., 1977) 
Awareness of prime inhibits priming 
effects 
Perceived 
closeness to 
target 
Ledgerwood and Chaiken (2007) Feelings close (distant) to the target 
(elderly people) induces assimilative 
(contrasts) effects 
Forewarning Demarree et al. (2012); Verwijmeren et 
al. (2013) 
Forewarning inhibits priming effects 
Internal State 
Awareness  
Anderson, Bohon and Berrigan (1996); 
Mittal and Balasubramanian (1987)  
Low internal state awareness strengthens 
priming effects 
Ironic effects Macrae, Bodenhausen and Milne (1998) Instructions to suppress stereotypes 
primes stereotypical behaviours 
Motivation / 
Distraction 
Martin, Seta and Crelia (1990) Blatant priming produces contrast effects. 
However, distraction promoted priming 
effects 
Need for 
Cognition 
Martin, Seta and Crelia (1990) Low (high) need for cognition increases 
(decreases) priming effects 
Perspective 
taking  
Galinsky, Wang and Ku (2008) 
Wheeler, Jarvis and Petty (2001) 
Low (high) perspective taking weakens 
(strengthens) priming effects 
Power Demarree et al.(2012) Low (high) power weakens (strengthens) 
priming effects 
Prime 
extremity: 
(stereotype 
vs. exemplar) 
Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg 
(1998); Herr (1986) 
 
Stereotypes produce assimilative effects. 
Extreme exemplars induce contrast 
effects 
Prime 
relevance 
Bargh et al. (1996) Prime must be applicable to the situation 
Private self-
consciousness  
Dijksterhuis and  van Knippenberg 
(2000); Wheeler, Morrison, DeMarree, 
and Petty, 2007); Hull, Slone, Meteyer, 
and Matthews (2002) 
High private self-consciousness 
strengthens priming effects (Dijksterhuis 
& van Knippenberg, 2000) or may 
weaken priming effects (Hull et al., 
2002). 
Self-
monitoring 
Demarree et al.(2012); Wheeler, 
DeMarree and Petty (2008) 
Low (high) self-monitoring strengthens 
(weakens) priming effects  
Self-
reflectiveness 
Anderson, Bohon and Berrigan (1996); 
Mittal and Balasubramanian (1987) 
High self-reflectiveness strengthens 
priming effects  
Self-concept 
consistency  
Kaplan (1972) Low (high) Self-concept consistency 
strengthens (weakens) priming effects 
Self-focus Dijksterhuis, Bargh and Miedema, 
(2000); DeMarree and Loersch (2009) 
Focusing on self (others) induces priming 
effects on relating to self (others).  
Situational 
disincentives 
/ goal conflict 
Macrae and Johnston (1998) Situational disincentives or completing 
goals inhibit priming effects 
Social value 
orientation  
Liebrand (1984) High (low) social value orientation 
decreases (increases) priming effects 
Internal stare 
awareness 
Wheeler, Morrison et al., (2007) Low (high) state awareness induces 
(inhibits) priming effects 
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CHAPTER  5:  BOLSTERING AND COUNTERARGUING MINDSETS 
 
5.1. Study 1 
 
5.1.1. Introduction to Study  
Study 1 aimed to replicate the “carryover effects” of a counterarguing mindset. 
The carryover effects of a mindset represent the temporary retention of cognitive 
procedures in conceptually similar, yet unrelated future domains (Xu & Wyer, 2012). 
The counterarguing mindset has been found to adversely affect individuals’ evaluative 
judgements of persuasive appeals (advert persuasiveness, advert appeal) and the 
products featured within them (hotel attractiveness) (see Xu & Wyer, 2012, Study 1).  
To the author’s knowledge, no study has replicated the carryover effects of a 
counterarguing mindset. In accordance with the original study, it was hypothesised 
that the activation of a counterarguing mindset would predispose participants to refute 
the implications of the persuasive appeal. Specifically, it was hypothesised that the 
counterarguing mindset would decrease participants’ overall evaluation of an advert 
(advert persuasiveness and advert appeal) and the attractiveness of the product (i.e. 
hotel) featured within it. This study also aimed to extend the work of Xu and Wyer by 
testing the hypothesis that a counterarguing mindset has the power to adversely affect 
individuals’ behavioural responsiveness (i.e. their willingness to pay for a one-night 
hotel stay, their willingness to volunteer for future studies, the number of minutes 
volunteered for future studies). It was hypothesised that a counterarguing mindset 
would negatively affect participants’ cognitive responses to the advert by increasing 
the number of negative thoughts generated and decreasing the number of positive 
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thoughts generated. Importantly, the study also aimed to test whether the carryover 
effects of a counterarguing mindset are moderated by an individual’s chronic 
avoidance motivation (BIS). Past research has demonstrated that avoidance tendencies 
are associated with high levels of message scrutiny and defensive message processing 
(Gerend & Shepherd, 2007). It thus follows that counterarguing thoughts are likely to 
be highly cognitively accessible among individuals exhibiting a strong avoidance 
orientation. Accordingly, it was hypothesised that individuals exhibiting strong 
avoidance motivation would exhibit particularly strong carryover effects when primed 
with a counterarguing mindset3  
It has been proposed that bolstering and counterarguing mindsets only 
influence behaviours which would not occur in the absence of the mindset (Xu & 
Wyer, 2012). For example, Xu and Wyer (2012) found that counterarguing 
(bolstering) mindsets only exerted their deflating (inflating) effects on evaluative 
judgements when the target stimulus is positive (i.e. hotel; Study 1) or negative (i.e. 
unappetising, exotic food; Study 2). Since the target stimulus in this study is positive 
(i.e. hotel advert), it is anticipated that there will be no differences between 
participants’ evaluative judgements in the control condition and participants’ 
                                                 
3The study also tested if an individual’s natural proclivity to counterargue or bolster moderates the 
carryover effects of these mindsets. The Bolster Counterargue Scale (BCS) by Briñol, Rucker, 
Tormala, and Petty (2004) was included for exploratory purposes to test this assumption. It was 
assumed that individuals who exhibit a strong preference towards counterarguing persuasive 
information would exhibit particularly strong carryover effects when primed with a counterarguing 
mindset. Individuals who exhibit high scores on either subscale are less likely to demonstrate attitude 
change after encountering a persuasive communication (Briñol et al., 2004). The BCS consists of two 
6-item subscales; a bolstering subscale and a counterarguing subscale. An example item for bolstering 
is “When someone challenges my beliefs, I remind myself why my beliefs are important to me”; an 
example item for counterarguing “When someone challenges my beliefs, I enjoy disputing what they 
have to say” respectively. Participants’ responses on both subscales were measured using a 4-point 
rating scale ranging from 1, extremely unlike me to 4, extremely like me. The BCS demonstrated 
satisfactory internal reliability in the current study with a Cronbach alpha coefficient of .79.  
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evaluative judgements in the bolstering condition. However, for the sake of 
completeness and consistency, the full design from Xu and Wyer (2012 Study 1) was 
employed. Participants were randomly assigned to counterarguing, bolstering and 
control conditions. The hypotheses relating to participants’ perceptual, behavioural 
and cognitive responses are formalised below:  
 
Hypotheses 1a-b: Compared to participants in the control and bolstering 
conditions, participants in the counterarguing condition will generate less 
favourable overall evaluations (i.e. as a composite measure of persuasiveness 
and appeal) of the hotel advert (H1a) and generate less favourable product 
evaluations of the hotel (i.e. hotel attractiveness) (H1b).  
 
Hypotheses 2a-d: Compared to participants in control and bolstering 
conditions, participants in the counterarguing condition will be less willing to 
pay for a one-night hotel stay (H2a), be less willing to volunteer for future 
research (H2b) and be less willing to volunteer their time (i.e. minutes) for 
future studies (H2c). 
 
Hypotheses 3a-b: Compared to participants in control and counterarguing 
conditions, participants in the bolstering condition will generate more 
positive thoughts (H3a) and fewer negative thoughts (H3b) in response to the 
advert. 
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Hypotheses 4a-b: The carryover effects of a counterarguing mindset on 
participants’ overall evaluations of the hotel advert (i.e. as a composite 
measure of persuasiveness and appeal) (H4a) and participants’ evaluations of 
the product (i.e. hotel attractiveness) (H4b), will be particularly pronounced 
among participants exhibiting strong avoidance motivation (high BIS 
scores). 
 
Hypotheses 4c-f: The carryover effects of a counterarguing mindset on 
behavioural variables; willingness to pay for a one-night hotel stay (H4c), 
willingness to volunteer for future studies (H4d) and the number of minutes 
volunteered for future studies (H4e) will be particularly pronounced among 
participants exhibiting strong avoidance motivation (high BIS scores). 
 
5.1.2. Sample and Study Design 
The present study employed the same experimental design employed by Xu 
and Wyer (2012). Specifically, the study employed a 3 (mindset priming: bolstering 
vs. counterarguing vs. control) x 2 (favourableness of vacation spot: high vs. 
moderate) between-subjects design. In total, 134 Masters students from Dublin City 
University (male = 72, female = 62, unspecified = 1) participated in the study as a 
partial fulfilment of a Personal Opportunity for Development (POD) module. The 
mean age of participants was 23.57 years (SD = 3.34).  
Procedure. The data was collected over multiple sessions during the course of 
one evening in a small lecture room in Dublin City University Business School. The 
group sizes ranged between 10 and 30 participants in these data collection sessions. 
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Participants were asked to partake in two ostensibly different studies. The first study 
involved a writing task (priming procedure) in which participants were randomly 
assigned to one of three conditions; control, bolstering or counterarguing conditions.  
Participants in the experimental conditions were asked to write three short 
essays discussing their views on three propositions. These popular (unpopular) 
propositions were designed to activate bolstering (counterarguing) cognitive 
procedures by inducing participants to generate supporting (opposing) arguments. For 
example, participants in the counterarguing condition wrote about their views on the 
proposition “Dublin City University should increase tuition fees in 2013”. In contrast, 
participants in the bolstering condition encountered the same proposition albeit with a 
reversed polarity (i.e. “Dublin City University should not increase tuition fees in 
2013”). This priming procedure was almost identical to the priming procedure used in 
the original study by Xu and Wyer (2012, Study 1) which  referenced the University 
of Illinois in the priming proposition. In the current study, the University of Illinois 
was replaced with Dublin City University (DCU) in order to increase the personal 
relevance of the priming proposition for the DCU student sample. Participants in the 
control condition were asked to write about neutral topics (i.e. trees, Italy, computers). 
Following the 15-minute priming procedure, participants were then asked to evaluate 
one of two adverts in a second, ostensibly unrelated study. Once they had completed 
both studies they were asked to put all materials back into the envelope and return it 
to the researcher. Participants were thanked for their time. Once the data collection for 
the study was completed all participants were sent a debrief letter that informed 
students of the true nature of the research and the aims of the study. This letter 
provided the contact details of the Principal Investigator to ensure that participants 
  
122 
 
could discuss any concerns they may have. The letter also contained the contact 
details of the Research Ethics Committee within Dublin City University.  
 
Independent Variables 
Advert type. Participants were exposed to one of two adverts. Advert 1 
promoted a highly attractive vacation spot. The advert featured an Igloo hotel in 
Switzerland. This advert was used in the original Xu and Wyer (2012) study. Advert 2 
promoted a moderately attractive, Scottish hotel. In the original study (Xu & Wyer, 
Study 1), the authors used an advert of Milwaukee as the moderately attractive 
vacation spot. However, Irish participants were not familiar with Milwaukee, so an 
advert was designed to depict a moderately attractive hotel. Advert 1 and Advert 2 
were designed to share similar structural, design and layout characteristics. Both 
adverts provided information relating to the accommodation options, service 
experience, dining options and local amenities on offer. Each advert included two 
photos of the hotel; a photo of the hotel’s exterior and a photo of a bedroom within 
the hotel (see Appendix H). 
Prior to the main experiments, 50 students from Dublin City University were 
asked to evaluate either the Igloo hotel advert (Advert 1) or the Scottish “Star” hotel 
advert (Advert 2). Participants rated the advert on a 10-point rating scale ranging from 
1 “not at all” (persuasive, appealing) to 10, “very” (persuasive, appealing). 
Independent-sample t-tests were conducted to compare the differences in advert 
persuasiveness, advert appeal and hotel attractiveness. The results confirmed that the 
manipulation of the adverts was successful. As expected, Advert 1 was rated as more 
persuasive than the Advert 2 (M = 6.32, SD = 2.30) vs. (M = 4.40, SD =1.89); t (48) = 
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3.22, p = .002, two-tailed. Advert 1 (M = 6.64, SD = 2.20) was also rated as more 
appealing than Advert 2 (M = 4.40, SD = 1.80); t (48) = 3.94, p = .000, two-tailed. As 
expected, Advert 1 also received higher ratings of vacation spot attractiveness than 
Advert 2, (M = 6.92, SD = 2.22) vs. (M = 4.36, SD =2.12); t (48) = 4.17, p = .000, 
two-tailed. Finally, respondents were willing to pay significantly more for a one night 
stay in the Igloo hotel (M = 108.48, SD = 45.43) than for a one night stay in the Star 
hotel (M = 44.66, SD = 16.01), t (46) = 6.60, p = .000 two-tailed.  
In summary, the results of the pilot study demonstrate that both advert 
evaluations and perceptions of vacation spots were successfully manipulated by the 
adverts. Xu and Wyer (2012) did not find any differential effects of mindset between 
moderate and highly attractive persuasive appeals. However, for the sake of 
consistency, the same experimental design (featuring both advert types) was adopted 
in the current study. 
Priming. The mindset priming procedure employed by Xu and Wyer (2012) 
was used in the study. Participants were asked to undertake a writing task in which 
they were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: a bolstering, a 
counterarguing or a control condition. Participants in the bolstering (counterarguing) 
condition were asked to write 3 short essays relating to their views on three popular 
(unpopular) propositions. Those in the counterarguing condition were asked to 
respond to the following three propositions; “Reading does not enrich the mind”, 
“The academic year should be extended by one month” and “Dublin City University 
should increase tuition fees in 2013”. Those in the bolstering group encountered 
propositions with a reversed polarity to those items above (e.g. “The academic year 
should not be extended by one month”). Participants in the control group were asked 
  
124 
 
to write about three neutral subjects (i.e. apple, Italy, trees). Participants were again 
given 15 minutes to complete the task. Once participants completed the priming task 
they then began a second, ostensibly unrelated advertising study in which they 
evaluated the target stimulus (i.e. hotel advert).  
 
Dependent Variables 
Perceptual variables 
Advert evaluation. Participants rated advert persuasiveness and advert appeal 
on a 10-point Likert scale ranging from 1, not at all, to 10, very. The two variables 
showed a strong correlation, r = .86 and therefore an advert evaluation composite 
measure was computed by combining advert persuasiveness and advert appeal scores 
provided by participants. Importantly, this combined measure for advert evaluation 
was also used in the original study by Xu and Wyer (2012).  
Product attractiveness. Participants’ perceptions of hotel attractiveness were 
assessed using a 10-point Likert scale ranging from 1, not at all, to 10, very.  
 
Behavioural Variables 
Three questions were used to assess participants’ behavioural responses 
relating to volunteerism and willingness to pay. Two of the three questions used an 
open question format whereby participants were free to provide unprompted 
responses. 
Willingness to volunteer. Participants were asked to indicate (Yes/No) if they 
were willing to volunteer for future research studies. Specifically, the question read as 
follows: “Would you be willing to participate in future research studies”? 
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Participants were asked to indicate the number of minutes they would be willing to 
volunteer for future research studies; “If yes (to the above question), please specify the 
amount of time you are willing to volunteer for future studies.  
Willingness to pay. Participants were asked to indicate the amount of money 
they would be willing to pay for a one night stay in the hotel; “How much would you 
be willing to pay for a one night stay in this hotel”. 
 
Cognitive Variables  
Number of Positive/Negative thoughts generated. A thought listing task was 
used to assess participants’ responses to the advert. Positive thoughts and negative 
thoughts were subsequently coded by two independent coders who were blind to the 
experimental hypotheses. Specifically, the valence of participants’ evaluative 
judgement regarding the advertised product (i.e. hotel) determined how the thoughts 
were coded. For example, a participant who wrote “the hotel looks charming” was 
deemed to have made a positive evaluative judgement. Conversely, a participant who 
wrote “the interior looks bleak” was deemed to have made a negative evaluative 
judgement. Each positive (conversely negative) evaluative judgement was coded as 
one positive (conversely negative) thought.  
 
Measuring Instruments 
Behavioural Inhibition System/Behavioural Activation System (BIS/BAS). 
All participants were asked to complete a 20-item, self-report measure that assessed 
individual differences in approach and avoidance motivation (Carver & White, 1994; 
Elliot & Thrash, 2002). The BIS controls avoidance or “aversive” motivation. This 
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system is sensitive to negative reinforcement arising from threats or negative stimuli 
such as punishment cues. The BIS is measured using a 7-item subscale within the 20- 
item measure. An example item from this scale is “I worry about making mistakes”. 
In contrast, BAS controls approach or “appetitive” motivation. This system is 
sensitive to stimuli associated with reward and non-punishment. BAS is measured 
using the remaining 13 items that constitute three subscales; BAS Reward 
Responsiveness, BAS Drive and BAS Fun Seeking (Carver & White, 1994). Example 
items from each of these respective scales are “It would excite me to win a contest”, “I 
go out of my way to get things I want” and “I crave excitement and new sensations”, 
respectively. Participants’ responses were measured on a 4-point rating scale ranging 
from 1 strongly disagree to 4, strong agree for all items. The BIS/BAS demonstrated 
satisfactory internal reliability in the current study with a Cronbach alpha 
coefficient of .71. 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS). Mindsets are cognitive 
phenomena that exert influence independently of mood (Wyer & Xu, 2010). 
However, strong theoretical linkages exist between approach (avoidance) 
motivational orientation and positive (negative) affect (see Chapter 3). To control for 
mood in the present study, all participants completed a Positive and Negative Affect 
Schedule (PANAS). The PANAS is a reliable and valid 20-item, self-report measure 
that assesses an individual’s positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA) (Crawford 
& Henry 2004; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). PA and NA were assessed using 10 
separate items to measure positive and negative affect. For example, participants were 
asked to indicate their mood by assigning values to descriptors that reflected their 
response to the following question “to what extent have they felt this way during the 
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past week”. Descriptors such as “interested” and “proud” are used to measure PA. 
Descriptors such as “hostile” or “nervous” are used to measure NA. Responses are 
measured on a 5-point rating scale ranging from 1, very slightly, not at all to 5, 
extremely. The PANAS demonstrated reasonable internal reliability in the current 
study with a Cronbach alpha coefficient of .69. The subscales measuring positive 
affect (PA) and negative affect (NA) both demonstrated high internal reliability with 
a Cronbach alpha coefficient of .84 and .78 respectively.  
Bolster Counterargue Scale (BCS). Participants were asked to complete a 
Bolster Counterargue scale (BCS) in order to assess their natural tendency to bolster 
or counterargue. This measure was included for explorative purposes.4  
Thought listing. Participants were also asked to complete a thought listing 
exercise5 immediately after exposure to the advert. Research has demonstrated that 
thought listing is a valuable instrument when assessing cognitive processes and 
cognitions (Cacioppo, von Hippel, & Ernst, 1997). 
 
5.1.3. Results 
A series of full factorial, Analyses of Covariance (ANCOVA) were conducted 
to test for the effect of mindset on the perceptual, behavioural and cognitive 
                                                 
4
 Individuals who exhibit high scores on either subscale are less likely to demonstrate attitude change 
after encountering a persuasive communication (Briñol et al., 2004). The BCS consists of two 6-item 
subscales; a bolstering subscale and a counterarguing subscale. An example item for bolstering is 
“When someone challenges my beliefs, I remind myself why my beliefs are important to me”; an 
example item for counterarguing “When someone challenges my beliefs, I enjoy disputing what they 
have to say” respectively. Participants’ responses on both subscales were measured using a 4-point 
rating scale ranging from 1, extremely unlike me to 4, extremely like me. The BCS demonstrated 
satisfactory internal reliability in the current study with a Cronbach alpha coefficient of .79.  
5 “I am interested in ﬁnding out about the thoughts that went through your mind as you read the 
information about the hotel. Please share any thoughts you had while you were reading the advert of 
the hotel. Please write your thoughts in the section below. Do not worry about spelling or grammar. 
Just make sure you express the main idea of each thought.” 
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dependent variables. A series of simple, one-sided contrasts were also conducted for 
each set of analysis. Perceptual variables relating to advert evaluation6 and product 
attractiveness (i.e. hotel attractiveness) were treated as dependent variables. 
Behavioural variables (i.e. willingness to pay for a one-night hotel stay, willingness to 
volunteer for future studies (Y/N) and number of minutes volunteered for future 
research) and cognitive variables (positive thoughts, negative thoughts) were also 
treated as dependent variables. Measures of positive affect and negative affect were 
included as covariates in the analyses to control for mood effects (see Schwarz & 
Clore, 1983). A correlation matrix for the focal variables is provided in Table 7.1. The 
means and standard deviations for the perceptual, behavioural and cognitive variables 
appear in Table 7.2, Table 7.3, and Table 7.4 respectively (see Appendix B).  
Advert evaluation.7 There was main effect of advert type, F(1, 86) = 54.74, p 
= 000, 
2
p  = .389 on participant’s overall evaluation of the advert. Participants 
                                                 
6 In the interest of full transparency, the results of the priming on persuasiveness and appeal will be 
reported in footnotes in all studies. However, in the interest of parsimony and to mirror the approach 
adopted by Xu and Wyer (2012) both measures will be combined to form a composite measure of 
participants’ overall evaluative judgement of the persuasive appeal and reported. The effects of priming 
on this measure will be reported in the main text henceforth. 
7
 Advert persuasiveness. There was a main effect of advert type on participants ratings of advert 
persuasiveness, F(1,86) = 30.46, p = .000, partial eta squared = .262. Participants exposed to Advert 1 
(M = 6.24, SD = 2.06) rated the hotel advert as more persuasive than participants exposed to the 
Advert 2 (M = 3.89, SD = 1.77). However, there was no main effect of priming on ratings of advert 
persuasiveness F(2, 86) = 1.28, p = .283. Participants in the counterarguing condition (M = 5.15, SD = 
2.11), control condition (M = 4.68, SD = 2.27) and bolstering condition (M = 5.44, SD = 2.37) rated 
the adverts as similarly persuasive, all ps ≥ .11.  
Advert appeal. There was a main effect of advert type on participant’s ratings of advert appeal, 
F(1,86) = 74.28, p = .000, partial eta squared = .463. Participants exposed to Advert 1 (M = 6.90, SD = 
1.98) rated the hotel advert as more appealing than participants exposed to the Advert 2 (M = 3.54, SD 
= 1.84). However, there was no main effect of priming on ratings of advert appeal, F(2, 86) = .40, p = 
.673. Participants in the counterarguing condition (M = 5.36, SD = 2.46), control condition (M = 5.00, 
SD = 2.57) and bolstering condition (M = 5.44, SD = 2.64) rated the adverts as similarly appealing, all 
ps ≥ .41. 
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exposed to the Igloo Hotel advert (M = 6.56, SD = 1.91) rated the advert as 
significantly more favourably than participants exposed to the Star Hotel advert (M = 
3.71, SD = 1.71). However, there was no main effect of priming on participants 
evaluations of the adverts, F(2, 86) = .74, p = .480. Participants in the counterarguing 
condition (M = 5.26, SD = 2.21), control condition (M = 4.83, SD = 2.30) and 
bolstering condition (M = 5.43, SD = 2.43) generated similar evaluations of the advert. 
One-sided contrasts were not significant, all ps ≥ .23. Thus H1a was not supported. 
Product attractiveness. There was a main effect of advert type on participants 
rating of hotel attractiveness, F(1, 86) = 63.50, p = .000, 
2
p
 
= .425. Participants 
exposed to the Igloo Hotel in Advert 1 (M = 6.59, SD = 2.06) rated the hotel as being 
significantly more attractive than participants exposed to the Star Hotel in Advert 2 
(M = 3.50, SD = 1.80). However, there was no main effect of priming on participants 
ratings of hotel attractiveness, F(2, 86) = 4.37, p = .648. Participants in the 
counterarguing condition (M = 5.49, SD = 2.50), control condition (M = 4.76, SD = 
2.17) and bolstering condition (M = 5.00, SD = 2.69) rated the hotel as similarly 
attractive, all ps ≥.35. Thus H1b was not supported. 
Willingness to pay. There was a main effect of advert type on participants’ 
willingness to pay for a one night hotel stay, F(1, 79) = 48.23, p = .000, 
2
p  = .379. 
Participants exposed to Advert 1 (M = 9.84, SD = 48.26) were willing to pay 
significantly more for a one-night hotel stay than participants exposed to the Advert 2 
(M = 42.19, SD = 15.33). However, there was a no main effect of priming F(2, 79) = 
.49, p = .615. Participants in the counterarguing condition (M = 74.65, SD = 45.81), 
control condition (M = 71.03, SD = 55.68) and bolstering condition (M = 61.77, SD 
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= 30.79) did not exhibit any difference in their willingness to pay for a one-night 
hotel stay, all ps = ≥ .33. Thus H2a was not supported. 
Volunteerism. Analysis revealed that participants in the counterarguing 
condition (96%), control condition (95%) and bolstering condition (93%) were 
equally willing to volunteer for future research. A Pearson Chi-Square test of 
independence indicated there was no significant association between priming 
condition and volunteerism, X2 (2, n = 132) = .26, p = .883, Cramer’s V = .26. The 
results of the logistical regression predicting participant’s willingness to volunteer for 
future studies are reported in Table 7.5 (see Appendix B). Thus H2b was not 
supported. 
Number of minutes volunteered. There was no main effect of advert type F(1, 
76) = .71, p = .402. However, there was a marginally significant effect of priming on 
the number of minutes that participants were willing to volunteer for future studies, 
F(2, 76) = 3.08, p = .052, 
2
p  = .075. Surprising, participants in the bolstering 
condition (M = 38.08, SD = 20.21) were significantly less willing to volunteer time 
for future studies when compared to participants in the control condition (M = 49.67, 
SD = 22.43), p = .054, and participants in the counterarguing condition (M = 50.50, 
SD = 29.57), p = .029. Thus H2c was not supported. 
Positive thoughts. There was a main effect of advert type on the number of 
positive thoughts generated by participants, F(1, 116) = 9.88, p = .002, 
2
p  = .080. 
Participants exposed to Advert 1 (M = 2.02, SD = 1.77) generated more positive 
thoughts than participants who were exposed to Advert 2 (M = 1.09, SD = 1.34). 
However, there was no main effect of priming on the number of positive thoughts 
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generated by participants, F(2, 116) = .01, p = .993. Participants in the counterarguing 
condition (M = 1.58, SD = 1.73) generated a similar number of positive thoughts 
compared to participants in the control condition (M = 1.53, SD = 1.63) and 
compared to participants in the bolstering condition (M = 1.60, SD = 1.59). Thus H3a 
was not supported. 
Negative thoughts. There was a main effect of advert type on the number of 
negative thoughts generated by participants, F(1, 116) = 33.97, p = .000, 
2
p  = .230. 
Participants exposed to Advert 2 (M = 2.79, SD = 1.81) generated more negative 
thoughts than participants who were exposed to Advert 1 (M = 1.17, SD = 1.20). 
However, there was no main effect of priming on the number of negative thoughts 
generated by participants, F(2, 116) = 0.65, p = .523. Participants in the 
counterarguing condition (M = 1.98, SD = 1.79) generated a similar number of 
negative thoughts to participants in the control condition (M = 2.11, SD = 1.70) and 
participants in the bolstering condition (M = 1.77, SD = 1.69). Thus H3b was not 
supported.  
 
Moderation and Simple Slopes Analysis 
It was hypothesised that the carryover effects of a counterarguing mindset on 
perceptual variables (see H4a-b) and behavioural variables (H4c-f) would be 
moderated by an individual’s avoidance motivation. Specifically, it was expected that 
individuals exhibiting strong avoidance motivation (high BIS scores) would exhibit 
more pronounced carryover effects than individuals exhibiting weak avoidance 
motivation (low BIS scores). However, these two-way interactions were not significant 
for any of the dependent variables. The results of the moderated regression analysis 
  
132 
 
assessing the influence of avoidance motivation on priming effects appear in Table 
7.6 (see Appendix B). Thus H4a-f were not supported. 
 
5.1.4. Discussion 
The current study attempted to (a) replicate the carryover effects of a 
counterarguing mindset and (b) test the moderating effect of BIS on these carryover 
effects. Specifically, the present study aimed to investigate the impact of a 
counterarguing mindset on perceptual measures: advert evaluations (composite 
measure of advert persuasiveness and advert appeal), product evaluations (i.e. hotel 
attractiveness), behavioural measures (willingness to pay for a hotel stay (€), 
willingness to volunteer for future studies (Yes/No), number of minutes volunteered 
for future studies) and cognitive measures (number of positive thoughts generated, 
number of negative thoughts generated). The study employed the same priming 
procedure used by Xu and Wyer (2012). Furthermore, identical (Advert 1: highly 
attractive hotel) or similarly attractive (Advert 2: moderately attractive hotel) target 
materials were used in the current study. However, the study failed to replicate the 
mindset priming effects reported by Xu and Wyer (2012). As expected, and in 
accordance with pre-test results, participants generally rated Advert 1 as being more 
favourable than Advert 2. However, analysis revealed no differences in participants’ 
overall advert evaluations (composite measure of advert persuasiveness and advert 
appeal), product evaluations (hotel attractiveness) or behavioural responses (willing to 
pay for a one night stay in the hotel). Interestingly, the bolstering mindset appears to 
have influenced behavioural compliance. Participants in the bolstering condition were 
less willing to volunteer their time for future research when compared to participants 
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in the control and counterarguing conditions. This result conflicts with the 
expectations of the researcher because it conflicts with the results of Xu and Wyer on 
two grounds. Firstly, Xu and Wyer (2012) suggest that a bolstering mindset only 
influences evaluative judgements of a negative target stimulus (i.e. not positive target 
stimulus such as a hotel advert). Second, the deflatory effect of the bolstering mindset 
in this study suggests a contrast effect or “boomerang effect”. Xu and Wyer suggested 
that such an effect was improbable given the mechanics of the bolstering mindset. 
According to Xu and Wyer a bolstering mindset is only believed to influence 
evaluations of unattractive stimuli and have no effect on evaluations of attractive 
stimuli such as the hotel adverts used in this study. This result is difficult to explain 
when taken in isolation. The failure of the priming procedure in general raises 
concerns regarding the robustness of the mindset priming procedure more generally. 
However, there is a possible explanation for the non-replication. 
The failure of the current study to reproduce the priming effects reported by 
Xu and Wyer (2012) might be traced back to the questions used in the procedural 
priming procedure. A manipulation check revealed that the priming procedure was 
unsuccessful because it did not uniformly induce counterarguing or bolstering 
responses. For example, in the bolstering condition only 14 of the 45 participants 
(37%) agreed with all three propositions. Similarly, in the counterarguing condition 
only 18 of the 48 participants (37%) disagreed with all three propositions. These 
figures compare unfavourably with those of Xu and Wyer (2012) who found that 79% 
of participants in the bolstering condition and 76% of participants in the 
counterarguing condition provided the expected bolstering or counterarguing 
responses for all three propositions. A subsequent examination of the thought listing 
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data and demographic composition of the sample revealed some insights that help to 
explain the failure of the priming procedure.  
The participants in the current study were Masters students. These participants 
were most likely older (M = 24 years old) and perhaps more mature than the 
undergraduate students (M = unknown) sampled in the Xu and Wyer study. It is 
therefore not altogether surprising that the master’s students offered more considered 
opinions and nuanced views in response to the priming propositions. For example, 
upon reviewing the participants’ essays it became clear that the master students placed 
a high value on education. This served to reduce participants’ price sensitivity 
towards college fees and thus undermined the priming potential of the proposition 
designed to induce counterarguing (i.e. DCU should increase tuition fees). Rather than 
counterarguing the proposition, participants often adopted a neutral perspective and 
acknowledged that the proposition “has advantages and disadvantages”. Other 
participants were even amenable to increased tuition fees if additional services were 
provided: “the extra fee should only be applied if we the students gain by at least the 
amount of the added cost”. Participants’ appetite for education, while laudable, would 
have hampered the formation of a counterarguing mindset because the anticipated 
counterarguing response was not forthcoming. Conversely, some participants in the 
bolstering condition went so far as to counterargue the proposition that was designed 
to promote bolstering (i.e. “DCU should not increase tuition fees”): “I disagree with 
this proposal… Irish universities are falling behind in the world rankings 
consecutively every year”. Such examples of unbiased or measured responses were 
not anticipated and served to undermine the effectiveness of the priming procedure. 
This unexpected response pattern was not confined to just one priming proposition.  
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Contrary to expectation, participants were also quite receptive to the counter 
attitudinal proposition of an additional month of college. Indeed, many of the 
participants believed that an additional month of college would improve their ability 
to revise their coursework: “If the academic year were increased by one month I think 
that this would allow more revision time before exams”. Similar sentiments were 
expressed by other participants who also believed an additional month of college 
would alleviate exam pressures: “I would say that the academic year should be 
extended…students often find themselves under tremendous peruse due to the short 
academic year”. In short, the failed procedural priming procedure in the current study 
was due, in part, to the lack of bias expressed by participants. It was anticipated that 
participants in the bolstering (counterarguing) conditions would be induced to provide 
strong, one-sided arguments in favour (opposition) to the ostensibly popular 
(unpopular) propositions. Instead, many participants provided balanced, two-sided 
arguments which considering both the pros and cons of the proposition. This seems to 
suggest that higher education may well fulfil its lofty aim of developing critical 
thinking skills. However, the generation of balanced, two-sided arguments is likely to 
have undermined the procedural priming procedure which was designed to induce 
unidirectional argumentation. The reasoned and reasonable approach adopted by the 
participants was simply not conducive to the mindset priming goals of the study. It is 
also possible that the potentially problematic title of the priming procedure in the 
current study may have hampered the onset of priming effects. Entitled “critical 
writing task”, this ambiguously titled task may well have promoted the critical (i.e. 
balanced) information processing that was exhibited rather than the critical (i.e. 
negatively biased) information processing that was anticipated. Only the later mode of 
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information processing is conducive to counterarguing mindset activation. Future 
studies could address this issue by changing the name of the first “study” (i.e. priming 
procedure). In Studies 2, 3 and 4 the priming task was renamed to “opinion 
assessment study” to militate against this potential problem. An attention check was 
also included in all subsequent studies (Studies 2, 3 and 4) as a precautionary 
measure. The inclusion of an attention check would allow the researcher to reduce 
noise in the dataset by identify individuals who may not have paid full attention 
during the study.  
 
 
5.2. Study 2 
 
5.2.1. Introduction to Study  
Study 2 aimed to replicate and extend the work of Xu and Wyer (2012) by 
testing both the strength and scope of the carryover effects for a bolstering mindset. It 
was hypothesised that the activation of a bolstering mindset would predispose 
participants to support the implications of counter-attitudinal, persuasive appeals. 
Specifically, it was hypothesised that a bolstering mindset would increase 
participants’ overall evaluations of a persuasive appeal (composite measure of article 
persuasiveness and article appeal), increase the perceived attractiveness of the 
counter-attitudinal proposition (i.e. web-tax) and decrease participants’ ability to 
detect deceptive/manipulative advertising tactics (perceived manipulative intent). It 
was also postulated that the bolstering mindset would accentuate participants’ 
behavioural responsiveness (willingness to pay the web-tax, willingness to volunteer 
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for future research, number of minutes volunteered for future studies, willingness to 
sign a petition supporting the web-tax). Furthermore, it was expected that a bolstering 
mindset would affect participants’ cognitive responses to the advert. Specifically, it 
was hypothesised that a bolstering mindset would induce participants to generate 
more (less) positive (negative) thoughts while also inhibiting persuasion knowledge 
activation (i.e. the number of PK thoughts generated). Finally, it was hypothesised 
that the carryover effects of the bolstering mindset would be particularly strong 
among participants exhibiting high approach motivation (high BAS). 
Participants in this study were exposed to one of two newspaper articles. Both 
counter-attitudinal articles advocated the introduction of a “web-tax” in Ireland. The 
salience of manipulative intent was varied between the newspaper articles. Article 1 
was a highly manipulative article which featured arguments made by a biased media 
investor. In contrast, Article 2 was a non-manipulative article which featured 
arguments made by a neutral academic researcher. Xu and Wyer (2012) did not find 
any interaction effect between mindset and different persuasive appeals. However, in 
order to retain the experimental design employed by the researchers and to leave this 
question open for exploration, two adverts with varying manipulative intent were 
included in the study.  
As in Study 1, participants were procedurally primed using a writing task. 
Subsequently, participants were exposed to one of two newspaper articles advocating 
a web-tax. Participants were asked to make evaluative judgements on the web-tax 
article and the web-tax proposition. In addition to the dependent variables used in 
Study 1, three additional dependent variables were included in the current study; 
petition-signing, attitude certainty, and number of PK thoughts generated by 
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participants. It is expected that participant in the bolstering condition will be more 
likely to sign a petition (in support of the web-tax), exhibit greater attitude certainty 
(i.e. meta-cognition) and generate fewer PK thoughts than participants in the control 
and counterarguing conditions. Taken together the hypotheses for Study 2 read as 
follows:  
 
Hypotheses 1a-b: Compared to participants in control and counterarguing 
conditions, participants in the bolstering condition will generate more 
favourable overall evaluations (i.e. as a composite measure of persuasiveness 
and appeal) of the web-tax article (H1a) and more favourable evaluations of 
the web-tax proposal (i.e. web-tax attractiveness) (H1b).  
 
Hypotheses 2a-d: Compared to participants in control and counterarguing 
conditions, participants in the bolstering condition will be more willing to 
pay the web-tax (H2a), be more willing to volunteer for future research 
(H2b), be more willing to volunteer their time (i.e. minutes) for future studies 
(H2c) and be more willing to sign a petition supporting the web-tax (H2d).  
 
Hypotheses 3a-b: Compared to participants in control and counterarguing 
conditions, participants in the bolstering condition will generate more 
positive thoughts (H3a) and fewer negative thoughts (H3b) in response to the 
web-tax article. 
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Hypotheses 3c-d: Compared to participants in control and counterarguing 
conditions, participants in the bolstering condition will generate fewer PK 
thoughts (H3c) and exhibit greater attitude certainty (H3d) in response to the 
web-tax article. 
 
Hypotheses 4a-b: The carryover effects of a bolstering mindset on 
participants’ overall evaluation of the web-tax article (composite measure of 
persuasiveness and appeal) (H4a) and participants’ evaluations of the web-
tax proposal (i.e. web-tax attractiveness) (H4b), will be particularly 
pronounced among participants exhibiting strong approach motivation (high 
BAS scores). 
 
Hypotheses 4c-f: The carryover effects of a bolstering mindset on 
behavioural variables; willingness to pay the web-tax (H4c), volunteering for 
future studies (H4d); number of minutes volunteered for future studies (H4e) 
and willingness to sign a petition supporting the web-tax proposal (H4f) will 
be particularly pronounced among participants exhibiting strong approach 
motivation (high BAS scores). 
 
Hypothesis 5a: Participants in the bolstering condition will rate the web-tax 
article as less deceptive/manipulative than participants in the control 
condition and participants in the counterarguing condition. 
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Hypothesis 5b: The carryover effects of bolstering mindset will be 
particularly pronounced among participants exhibiting low Persuasion 
Knowledge. 
 
5.2.2. Sample and Study Design 
The study employed a 3 (mindset priming: bolstering vs. counterarguing vs. 
control) x 2 (MI of article: high vs. low) between-subjects design. The study took 
place in a large lecture hall in Dublin City University. The study was conducted prior 
to the commencement of a lecture. A three-minute PowerPoint presentation briefed 
participants on the aims of the two ostensibly unrelated studies. Three hundred and 
fifty-six students participated in the study. However, 30 cases had to be excluded 
from the dataset; these included 13 extreme outliers, 7 incomplete cases and 9 
participants who omitted information needed to identify which priming condition they 
belonged to. Finally, one individual was excluded because s/he had seen the materials 
during a pretesting session. Following a manipulation check to identify primed 
participants the final sample consisted of 233 participants (92 males, 111 females, and 
30 participants with an unspecified gender) aged between 17 - 29 years. The mean age 
of participants was 18.70 years (SD = 1.53).  
Considering the problems encountered in Study 1 it was deemed prudent to 
use a manipulation check to identify participants who had successfully completed the 
priming procedure. Two alternative approaches were tested to assess the impact of 
imposing inclusion/exclusion criteria upon participants: 1) an instructional 
manipulation check and 2) a manipulation check of priming strength. Both approaches 
are outlined below.  
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Instructional manipulation check (IMC). An IMC developed by 
Oppenheimer, Meyvis, and Davidenko (2009) was included in the questionnaire in 
order to identify participants who were not paying full attention during the study. The 
IMC increases the reliability of data by reducing the noise within it (Alter, 
Oppenheimer, & Zemla, 2010). Thus, the IMC increases both the validity and 
statistical power of the dataset (Oppenheimer et al., 2009). Consistent with previous 
research (e.g. Alter et al., 2010), it was envisaged that only participants who satisfied 
the IMC would be included in the analysis.  
The IMC consists of a long paragraph of text8. The title “Sports 
participation” appeared over the paragraph of text. Under the paragraph of text a 
number of sporting activities (e.g. running, basketball, other) were listed as potential 
response options (e.g. running, basketball, other). Only participants who read the 
full paragraph of text would have complied with the request to refrain from 
indicating the sport they played and instead simply circle the paragraph heading. 
The IMC appeared at the end of the questionnaire and was therefore a strict test of 
attention levels. Of the 356 participants sampled, the IMC identified 164 participants 
(50%) who failed the manipulation check. Another 46 (14%) failed to answer the 
question at all. Only 120 participants (36%) successfully completed the IMC. Given 
the high dropout rate and the fact that attention levels are not necessarily indicative 
                                                 
8 Most modern theories recognise the fact that decisions do not take place in a vacuum. Individuals 
preferences and knowledge, along with situation variables can greatly impact the decision making 
process. In order to facilitate my research on decision making I am interested in knowing certain 
factors about you, the decision maker. Specially, I am interested in whether you actually take the time 
to read the directions; if not, then some of the results of this survey may be invalid. So, in order to 
demonstrate that you have read the instructions, please ignore the question on sports participation 
below. Instead, simply circle the heading “Sports participation” at the top of this paragraph.  
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of a successful priming procedure, a more appropriate manipulation check was 
considered. 
Priming strength manipulation check. Priming strength is determined by the 
recency, frequency and amount of time processing the priming task (Wyer, 2008). 
Consequently, a theoretically valid manipulation check for procedural priming should 
identify individuals who have sufficiently elaborated upon the priming proposals in 
the expected direction. A participant who provided two-sided arguments when 
evaluating a proposition or a participant who did not respond uniformly (e.g. used a 
counterarguing strategy to respond to one proposition and a bolstering strategy to 
respond to another proposition) are unlikely to have been primed with a mindset due 
to “interference” (Hamilton et al. 2011). Using this rationale, it was decided to only 
include participants who sufficiently elaborated (wrote at least five sentences) and 
argued in the expected direction for each of the three priming propositions. Past 
priming research has used this approach as a inclusion criterion (e.g. Dholakia et al. 
2006). This approach resulted in the removal of 93 participants. The final sample 
consisted of 233 participants which is almost double the number of participants (120) 
that the IMC would have permitted. In order to maintain a consistent approach 
between studies this method was employed in all subsequent studies.  
Procedure. Participants were given a three-minute PowerPoint presentation in 
which the aims of two ostensibly unrelated studies were explained. Participants were 
then randomly assigned to one of three conditions i.e. bolstering, counterarguing or 
control conditions. The same procedural priming procedure used in Study 1 was used 
in this study. However, in order to promote biased elaboration the name of the writing 
task was entitled “opinion assessment questionnaire” in the current study. Participants 
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in the bolstering (counterarguing) condition received a booklet which contained three 
popular (unpopular) propositions. As in Study 1, participants were asked to write a 
short essay providing their thoughts on three propositions. For example, participants 
in the bolstering condition wrote a short essay supporting the proposition that 
“Reading enriches the mind”. Participants in the control condition received a booklet 
which contained the three neutral topics (i.e. trees, Italy, apples). Participants were 
told that the purpose of the study was to assess their ability to write and express their 
opinions clearly. Consistent with the priming procedure used by Xu and Wyer (2012) 
participants were again given 15 minutes to complete the task. Participants were 
informed that once they had completed this first “study” they may then begin the 
second, seemingly unrelated study entitled “perceptions of media”. Participants 
subsequently read one of two newspaper articles before completing the accompanying 
questionnaire. Once participants had completed both “studies” they were debriefed 
and thanked for their time. Participants were encouraged to contact the researcher if 
they had any questions regarding the study or if they required further information. No 
participants requested any further information or made contact with the researcher 
after the study was completed.  
 
Independent Variables 
Article type. Participants were exposed to one of two editorial newspaper 
articles in which the author proposes the implementation of a web-tax (see Appendix 
K). The source credibility/vested interest of the author (biased media investor vs. 
impartial academic researcher) was varied between articles. The level of ambiguity of 
the evidential claims by the authors (vague vs. concrete) was also varied between the 
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articles. Specifically, four creative devices were used to vary MI between the articles: 
First, the source credibility of the presented information was varied between 
conditions. For example, in the “high MI article” MI was made highly salient when 
the author references “a recent in-house report produced by my shareholders and I”. 
In contrast, within the “low MI article”, MI was less salient by referencing “a recent 
independent report by leading academics Hays et al. (2013)”. Second, the level of 
ambiguity of evidential claims made by the authors was varied between conditions. 
Specifically, in the high MI article the author used the ambiguous phrase “according 
to our research virtually all of general public would support the introduction of the 
web-tax in principle”. In contrast, the author of the low MI article provides more 
concrete evidence; “30% of the general public would support the introduction of a 
web-tax in principle”. Third, MI was manipulated between conditions using 
(un)ambiguous claims regarding Ireland’s progress in tackling cybercrime. These 
claims were used as a justification for the introduction of the web-tax. Specifically, in 
the high MI article the author ambiguously claimed that “compared to other countries, 
Ireland is lagging behind in tackling cybercrime”. In contrast, in the low MI article the 
author unambiguously specifies which countries Ireland was being compared to; 
“compared to other EU countries such as Germany, France and Spain Ireland is 
lagging behind in tackling cybercrime”. Finally, the vested interest and motives of the 
author were varied between conditions. Specifically, in the high MI article, the author 
revealed his persuasive intentions by stating that he is submitting the report “in order 
to lobby government”. In contrast, the author of the low MI article states that he has 
submitted a report to the government “in order for them to consider the web-tax 
proposal”.  
  
145 
 
Priming. Consistent with Study 1, this study employed a procedural priming 
procedure. A minor change was made by changing one of the priming propositions in 
the priming task. Specifically, the proposition that “tuition fees should be increased 
(decreased)” was replaced with the monetary neutral proposition. Instead, the 
proposition “Recycling is a good (bad) idea” was used to induce bolstering 
(counterarguing). It was feared that the former proposition might activate money 
concepts that would confound the results given the monetary nature of the target 
(web-tax article). Furthermore, the name of the first task (i.e. the priming procedure) 
was renamed from ‘critical writing task’ (Study 1) to “opinion assessment 
questionnaire” in this study. This change was implemented to rule out the possibility 
that the task name rather than the priming propositions were influencing participants’ 
thought processes.  
 
Dependent Variables 
Perceptual Measures 
Article evaluation. Participants rated article persuasiveness and article appeal 
on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1, not at all, to 7, very. An article evaluation 
composite measure was computed by combining article persuasiveness and article 
appeal scores. 
Proposition attractiveness. Participants were also asked to evaluate the 
argument strength of the newspaper article using a well-established composite 
measure (e.g. Tormala et al. 2002; Tormala et al. 2006; Wheeler et al. 2007). 
Specifically, six 9-point semantic differential attitude scales were used to assess the 
argument strength of the article; (1) unfavourable - (a) favourable, (2) unpleasant – (b) 
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pleasant, (3) foolish – (c) wise, (4) bad – (d) good, (5) harmful – (e) beneficial, and 
(6) negative – (f) positive. These six scores were computed to create a composite 
measure for the perceived attractiveness of the proposition being proposed. This 
measure for proposition attractiveness was found to demonstrate satisfactory internal 
reliability with a Cronbach alpha coefficient of .91. 
Perceived Manipulative Intent. The level of PK activation was assessed using 
two measures adopted from Kirmani and Zhu (2007). The first measure used three 7 
point Likert-type scales to assess perceptions of the article’s believability, truthfulness 
and deceptiveness. The three scales were anchored from 1, unbelievable to 7, 
believable, from 1, not deceptive to 7, deceptive, and from 1, not truthful to 7, truthful. 
The question relating to deceptiveness was reverse coded and the scores from all three 
measures were computed to form a single measure for PK activation. A second 
measure used a thought listing task. PK activation was assessed by counting the 
number of deception, disbelief or dishonesty related thoughts that participants 
generated when evaluating the article (see cognitive measures).  
 
Behavioural Variables 
Willingness to volunteer. The same two questions that were used in Study 1 
were again used to assess participants’ willingness to volunteer (Yes/No) for future 
studies and their willingness to volunteer their time (i.e. minutes) to partake in future 
studies. 
Willingness to pay. Participants were asked to indicate the amount of web-tax 
they would be willing to pay: “If you were legally compelled to pay the tax how much 
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would you be willing to pay for a one-year license? Please indicate the amount in 
Euros”.  
Willingness to sign a petition. Participants were asked to indicate their 
willingness to support the web-tax proposal. Specifically, participants were asked, 
“How likely would you be to sign the petition supporting the web-tax?” Participants 
indicated their likelihood to support the petition on a 7-point Likert scale ranging 
from 1, not at all likely, to7, very likely. 
 
Cognitive Measures 
A thought listing task was used to assess participants’ reactions to the articles. 
Positive thoughts, Negative thoughts, and PK thoughts (thoughts relating to disbelief, 
deception or dishonesty) were coded. Participants’ thoughts were coded by two 
independent coders who were blind to the experimental hypothesis.  
Attitude certainty is a measure which is predictive of behavioural intentions 
(Rucker & Petty, 2004). Participants were also asked to indicate how certain they felt 
about their evaluations of the web-tax proposition; “How certain are you of your 
attitudes regarding the proposed tax?” Attitude certainty was measured using a nine 
point Likert-type scale ranging from 1, not at all to 9, very. Participants were also 
asked to indicate how involved, interested and engaged they felt when evaluating the 
article. Participants’ involvement levels were measured using a seven point Likert-
type scale ranging from, 1 not at all, to 7 very. These three measures were computed 
to form a composite measure for participant involvement as used by Xu and Wyer 
(2012). 
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Measuring Instruments 
Motivational orientation and mood. As in Study 1, participants’ motivational 
orientation was measured using the BAS/BIS scale.  A measure to assess participants’ 
mood (PANAS) was also included in the questionnaire so that mood effects could be 
controlled for in the subsequent data analysis (for a detailed description of the 
measures please see Study 1). The BIS/BAS demonstrated satisfactory internal 
reliability in the current study with a Cronbach alpha coefficient of .76. The 
PANAS demonstrated satisfactory internal reliability in the current study with a 
Cronbach alpha coefficient of .72.  
 
5.2.3. Results 
A series of full factorial, Analyses of Covariance (ANCOVA) were conducted 
to test for the effects of mindset on the perceptual, behavioural and cognitive 
dependent variables. A correlation matrix for the focal variables is provided in Table 
7.7. The means and standard deviations for the perceptual, behavioural and cognitive 
variables appear in Table 7.8, Table 7.9, and Table 7.10, respectively (see Appendix 
C). 
Perceptual Variables 
Article evaluation.9 There were no main effect of manipulative intent F(1, 158) 
= .00, p = .952 or priming, F(2, 158) = 1.79, p = .170, on participants’ overall 
                                                 
9
 Article persuasiveness. There was no main effect of manipulative intent on ratings of article 
persuasiveness, F(1, 159) = .03, p = .863. However, there was a marginally significant main effect of 
priming on ratings of article persuasiveness, F(2, 159) = 2.67, p = .072, partial eta squared = .032. 
Furthermore, the patterns of means were in the expected direction. One-sided contrasts revealed that 
participants in the bolstering condition (M = 2.89, SD = 1.62) rated the articles as slightly more 
persuasive than participants in the control condition (M = 2.69, SD = 1.52; p = .203) and significantly 
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evaluation of the article. Nevertheless, the pattern of means were in the expected 
direction and consistent with (H1a). Participants in the bolstering condition (M = 2.67, 
SD = 1.35) gave slightly more favourable article evaluations than participants in the 
control condition (M = 2.51, SD = 1.34), p = .230, and much more favourable article 
evaluations than participants in the counterarguing condition (M = 2.24, SD = 1.23), p 
= .061. However, since only the later contrast was marginally significant, H1a was not 
supported.  
Proposition attractiveness. There were no main effect of manipulative intent, 
F(1, 159) = .01, p = .921 or priming F(2, 159) = 1.06, p = .350 on participants’ 
ratings of web-tax attractiveness. Despite not reaching statistical significance, the 
pattern of means were in the expected direction and consistent with (H1b). Participants 
in the bolstering condition (M = 3.42, SD = 1.77) rated the web-tax as slightly more 
attractive than participants in the control condition (M = 2.94, SD = 1.68) and 
participants in the counterarguing condition (M = 3.07, SD = 1.79). However, the 
one-sided contrasts did not reach statistical significance, all ps ≥ .15. Thus, H1b was 
not supported. 
Perceived manipulative intent. There was no main effect of manipulative 
intent, F(1, 158) = .326, p = .569 or priming F(2, 158) = 1.48, p = .231 on 
participants’ ability to detect manipulative intent. However, the pattern of means were 
                                                                                                                                            
more than participants in the counterarguing condition (M = 2.31, SD = 1.22), p = .022. The later one-
sided contrast reached statistical significance.  
Article appeal. There were no main effects of manipulative intent, F(1, 158) = .07, p = .788 or priming, 
F(2, 158) = .60, p = .549, on ratings of article appeal. Despite not reaching statistical significance, the 
pattern of means were in the expected direction. Participants in the bolstering condition (M = 2.46, SD = 
1.56) rated the articles as slightly more appealing than participants in the control condition (M = 2.32, 
SD = 1.50) and participants in the counterarguing condition (M = 2.18, SD = 1.45). However, the one-
sided contrasts did not reach statistical significance, all ps ≥ .30.  
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in the expected direction and consistent with (H5a). Participants in the bolstering 
condition (M = 4.30, SD = 1.24) rated the article as slightly less manipulative than 
participants in the control condition (M = 4.54, SD = 1.21), p = .208, and much less 
manipulative than participants in the counterarguing condition (M = 4.56, SD = 1.07), 
p = .095. However, since only the later contrast was marginally significant, H5a was 
not supported. 
 
Behavioural Variables 
Willingness to pay. There was no main effect of manipulative intent on 
participants’ willingness to pay web-tax, F(1, 94) = .98, p = .325. Participants 
exposed to the low manipulative intent article (M = 25.00, SD = 25.09) and 
participants exposed to the high manipulative intent article (M = 19.44, SD = 21.19) 
were equally willing to pay the web-tax. However, there was a main effect of priming 
on participants’ willingness to pay the web-tax, F(2, 94) = 6.47, p = .002, 
2
p = .121. 
Participants in the bolstering condition (M = 32.31, SD = 28.78) were willing to pay 
more web-tax than participants in the control condition (M = 21.42, SD = 22.98), p = 
.036, and participants in the counterarguing condition, (M = 14.26, SD = 13.26) p = 
.001. Thus, H2a was supported. 
Volunteerism. Analysis revealed that participants in the bolstering condition 
(65%) and counterarguing condition (61%) were generally more willing to volunteer 
for future research than participants in the control condition (49%). However, a 
Pearson Chi-square test for independence indicated no significant association between 
priming condition and volunteerism, X2 (2, n = 197) = .14, p = .125, Cramer’s V = .14. 
Thus, H2b was not supported. The results of the logistical regression predicting 
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participants’ willingness to volunteer for future studies are reported in Table 7.11 (see 
Appendix C). 
Number of minutes volunteered. There were no main effect of manipulative 
intent, F(1, 143) = .35, p = .552, or priming, F(2, 143) = .49, p = .610 on the number 
of minutes participants volunteered for future studies. Despite not reaching statistical 
significance, the patterns of means were in the expected direction and consistent with 
(H2c). Participants in the bolstering condition (M = 14.39, SD = 16.29) volunteered a 
slightly greater number of minutes for future studies than participants in the control 
condition (M = 12.87, SD = 18.01) and participants in the counterarguing condition 
(M = 11.55, SD = 14.84). However, the one-sided contrasts did not reach statistical 
significance, all ps ≥.36. Thus, H2c was not supported. 
Petition. There were no main effect of manipulative intent, F(1, 159) = .35, p 
= .557 or priming F(2, 159) = 0.47, p = .625 on participants’ willingness to sign a 
petition advocating the web-tax. Inconsistent with (H2d), planned contrasts revealed 
that participants in the bolstering condition (M = 1.54, SD = 1.00), control condition 
(M = 1.70, SD = 1.31) and counterarguing condition (M = 1.55, SD = 1.01) were 
equally likely to sign the petition, all ps ≥.35. Thus, H2d was not supported. 
 
Cognitive Variables 
Number of positive thoughts. There was a main effect of manipulative intent 
on the number of positive thoughts generated by participants, F(1,32) = 4.61, p = 
.039, 
2
p = .126. Participants exposed to the high manipulative intent article (M = 1.25, 
SD = 0.44) generated more positive thoughts than participants exposed to the low 
manipulative intent article (M = 1.10, SD = 0.30). There was no main effect of 
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priming on the number of positive thoughts generated by participants, F(2, 32) = 1.44, 
p = .252. Participants in the bolstering condition (M = 1.13, SD = 0.34) generated a 
similar number of positive thoughts to participants in the counterarguing condition (M 
= 1.19, SD = 0.40), p = .125. However, more consistent with (H3a), participants in 
the bolstering condition generated more positive thoughts than participants in the 
control condition (M = 1.19, SD = 0.40), p = .099. However, since only the later 
contrast was (marginally) significant, H3a was not supported.  
Number of negative thoughts. There was a marginally significant main effect 
of manipulative intent on the number of negative thoughts generated by participants, 
F(1, 106) = 3.35, p = .070, 
2
p  = .031. Participants exposed to the high manipulative 
intent article (M = 1.16, SD = 0.44) generated more negative thoughts than 
participants exposed to the low manipulative intent article (M = 1.07, SD = 0.26). 
More importantly, there was a marginally significant main effect of priming on the 
number of negative thoughts generated by participants, F(2, 106) = 2.66, p = .074, 
2
p  
= .048. Participants in the bolstering condition (M = 1.06, SD = 0.24) generated 
slightly fewer negative thoughts than participants in the control condition (M = 
1.12, SD = 0.37), p = .478, and significantly fewer negative thoughts than 
participants in the counterarguing condition (M = 1.15, SD = 0.43), p = .030. These 
results suggest that bolstering (counterarguing) mindsets tend to decrease (increase) 
the production of negative thoughts. (H3b). However, since only the later contrast was 
statistically significant, H3b was not supported. Unlike Xu and Wyer, the current 
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study found no difference in the overall valence of thoughts generated between 
conditions.10 
PK thoughts. There were no main effect of manipulative intent, F(1, 59) = 
.41, p = .523 or priming F(2, 59) = .21, p = .811 on the number of PK thoughts 
generated by participants. Participants in the bolstering condition (M = 1.67, SD = 
0.80) generated the same number of PK thoughts as participants in the control 
condition (M = 1.59, SD = 0.74) and participants in the counterarguing condition (M = 
1.61, SD = 0.72). One-sided contrasts did not reach statistical significance, all ps >.55.  
Thus, H3c was not supported. 
Attitude certainty. There was no main effect of manipulative intent, F(1, 158) 
= .51, p = .475 or priming F(2, 158) = .88, p = .416 on participants’ attitude certainty 
regarding their evaluative judgements. Contrary to (H3d), participants in the 
bolstering condition (M = 5.93, SD = 2.43) were slightly less certain of their attitude 
towards the article than participants in the control condition (M = 6.26, SD = 2.55), p 
= .430, and participants in the counterarguing condition (M = 6.41, SD = 2.49), p = 
.186).11 Thus, H3d was not supported. 
 
                                                 
10
Thought Index. There was a no main effect of manipulative intent on the overall valence of thoughts 
generated, F(1, 159) = .01, p = .914. Similarly, there was no main effect of priming on overall valence 
of thoughts generated by participants, F(2, 159) = .27, p = .761. The overall valence of thoughts 
generated among participants in the bolstering condition (M = -0.37, SD = 0.90.) was similar to that of 
participants in the control condition (M = -0.40, SD = 0.99) and participants in the counterarguing 
condition (M = -0.53, SD = 0.94), all ps ≥ .46. 
 
 
11 In line with the findings of Xu and Wyer (2012) no difference in involvement levels were found 
between priming conditions F(2, 158) = 1.17, p = .312. 
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Moderation and Simple Slopes Analysis 
A series of hierarchical regression analyses were employed to test the impact of the 
focal variables (priming, BAS, and the priming x BAS interaction) on dependent 
variables. In the first step, the control variable (mood) was entered. In the second step 
the predictors (priming and BAS) were entered. In the third step, the interaction term 
(priming x BAS) was entered. In order to avoid the problem of multicollinearity when 
testing interaction effects, the predictors were centered around the grand mean (Hox, 
2002). Reported below are hierarchical regression analyses that provide evidence of 
moderation. The results of the moderated regression analysis assessing the influence 
of approach motivation on priming effects are reported in Table 7.12 (see Appendix 
3).  
Willingness to pay. The total variance explained by the model for willingness 
to pay was 11%, F(6, 119) = 2.33, p = .037. The interaction term BAS x priming was 
significant and explained an additional 3% of the model after controlling for the 
effects of BAS, Positive Mood, Negative Mood and priming, R squared change = 
.03, F change (1, 113) = 3.75, p = .055. The final step of the regression analysis 
which included the BAS x priming interaction terms showed that BAS x priming was 
associated with participants’ willingness to pay, B = .18.53, p = .050. The interaction 
is plotted in Figure 3. Simple slope analysis (Aiken & West, 1991) revealed a positive 
effect of priming (0 = control, 1 = bolstering) on willingness to pay among 
participants exhibiting high BAS (one standard deviation above the mean), beta = 
22.64, p = .001, t(120) = 3.30 but not for participants exhibiting low BAS (one 
standard deviation below the mean), β = 6.12, p = .328, t(120) = 0.98. Thus, H4c was 
supported. The interaction is plotted in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3  
The Effect of Priming on Willingness to Pay Web-tax for High (+1SD) versus Low (-
1SD) Low Levels of BAS 
 
 
5.2.4. Discussion 
The current study attempted to (a) replicate the carryover effects of a 
bolstering mindset and (b) to test the moderating effect of BAS on these carryover 
effects. Specifically, the present study aimed to investigate the impact of a bolstering 
mindset on perceptual variables: article evaluations (composite measure for 
persuasiveness and appeal) and proposition attractiveness (i.e. web-tax attractiveness). 
The study also aimed to investigate the impact of a bolstering mindset on behavioural 
variables (willingness to pay a web-tax (€), willingness to volunteer for future studies, 
number of minutes volunteered for future studies, willingness to sign a petition 
supporting the web-tax). The impact of a bolstering mindset on cognitive variables 
(positive thoughts, negative thoughts, PK thoughts) was also assessed. Finally, the 
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study investigated if motivational orientation moderated the effects of the bolstering 
mindset.  
The first observation that may be made relates to the general strength of the 
mindset priming effects observed. Mindset priming effects are considered by some 
(e.g. Bargh & Chartrand, 2000) to be among the strongest and most robust of priming 
effects. However, the results reported here are weak and are dwarfed by those 
reported by Xu and Wyer (2012). While Xu and Wyer (2012) generally reported 
statistically significant results between the control condition and the experimental 
condition of interest (i.e. the bolstering condition in this study) such eye-catching 
results have not been forth-coming in the current study. Indeed, in many instances, it 
was only when the experimental conditions were contrasted against each other that the 
subtle mindset priming effects were observed. However, in the present set of studies 
the control condition was retained in order to match the study design employed by Xu 
and Wyer (2012) and provide a comprehensive framework for testing these mindset 
priming effects. The current study provides a much needed contribution to the scarce 
literature on bolstering and counterarguing mindsets by attempting the first known 
replication of a bolstering mindset.  
The results of Study 2 indicate that participants in the bolstering condition 
found the web-tax article to be significantly more persuasive than participants in the 
counterarguing condition. No significant differences in ratings of article appeal, 
proposition attractiveness or participants’ attitude certainty were detected between 
conditions. However, participants in the bolstering condition did provide more 
favourable overall evaluations of the newspaper articles than participants in the 
counterarguing condition. This pattern of results suggests a rather weak mindset 
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priming effect for perceptual variables. However, the bolstering mindset was found to 
exert a stronger effect on the amount of web-tax that participants were willing to pay. 
Xu and Wyer (2012) did not specifically test whether a bolstering mindset exerted an 
inflatatory effect on an individual’s willingness to pay for an aversive product. The 
effect of a bolstering mindset on behavioural intentions is striking. In the present 
study, the strength of this effect is incongruent with the subtle and comparatively 
weaker priming effects on perceptual variables. 
Unlike Xu and Wyer (2012), the overall valence of thoughts generated by 
participants (i.e. thought index) was not found to mediate the priming effects of the 
bolstering mindset. Nevertheless, consistent with the findings of the original study, 
participants in the bolstering condition generated more positive thoughts than 
participants in the control condition. Perhaps more interestingly, participants in the 
bolstering condition produced significantly fewer negative thoughts than those in the 
counterarguing condition. This result was not hypothesised but does appear to be 
theoretically congruent with the thought generation mechanism postulated by Xu and 
Wyer (2010). This finding suggests the bolstering mindset can inhibit the generation 
of negative thoughts in addition to simply promoting the generation of positive 
thoughts. This novel finding suggests that the bolstering mindset is more complex that 
originally conceptualised. It also makes a theoretical contribution to the broader 
literature on mindset priming by demonstrating that mindsets may suppress thought 
activation. Other mindset priming studies have also demonstrated that mindsets can 
inhibit thought production. For example, an implemental mindset has been found to 
promote goal-focused thoughts while inhibiting the production of negative thoughts. 
Indeed an implemental mindset makes individuals five times more likely to consider 
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the merits of a situation rather than the pitfalls (Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995). This 
mindset also induces an “illusion of control” (Fujita et al., 2007).  
There was no difference in the attitude certainty exhibited between 
participants in the different conditions. Nevertheless, the pattern of the means is 
interesting because it is contrary to expectation. Specifically, the means show that 
participants in the bolstering condition were slightly less certain of their attitudes than 
participants in the control condition. Participants in the counterarguing condition 
exhibited the most attitude certainty. The means suggest that perhaps another equally 
plausible hypothesis is likely. Specifically, it suggests that attitude certainty solidifies 
when individuals counterargue which is in keeping with the findings of Tormala & 
Petty (2004) who found that increased message elaboration increases attitude 
certainty.  
A methodological explanation may be offered to account for the pronounced 
effects of a bolstering mindset on participants’ willingness to pay. The relatively 
stronger priming effect observed on participants’ willingness to pay may well be an 
artefact of the question used to measure participants’ responses. In short, the stronger 
effects observed may be due to the format of the question asked. Typically, 
participants’ perceptual responses were measured using a semantic differentiation 
scales. However, participants’ willingness to pay in the current study was assessed 
using an open question format; “If you were legally compelled to pay the tax how 
much would you be willing to pay for a one-year license? Please indicate the amount.  
€________”. Past research has found that allowing greater interpretative scope during 
the assessment of the target facilitates priming effects (Higgins, 1996). Open 
questions do not constrain an individual’s interpretative freedom and thus facilitates 
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the manifestation of stronger priming effects. Furthermore, asking participants to 
make an evaluative judgement on a notional contribution is unlikely to weigh heavily 
upon participants’ decision-making faculties. In contrast, asking participants to 
engage in behaviours that directly contravenes their strongly held views (i.e. signing a 
petition supporting web-tax) is likely to be more carefully considered and therefore 
less malleable. The absence of priming effects on participants’ willingness to sign the 
petition seems to support this argument. However, the pattern of results for petition 
signing is nevertheless noteworthy. It was found that participants in both the 
bolstering and counterarguing conditions were less likely to sign a petition supporting 
the web-tax compared to participants in the control condition. This pattern of results, 
although not significant, is indicative of a contrast effect that occurs when the target 
stimulus is too negative. In this instance, it appears the web-tax proposition was so 
utterly repugnant to this cohort that the prospect of paying a web-tax could simply not 
be countenanced. Modern day students are highly web-dependent (Bassiouni & 
Hackley, 2014). It may well be the case that a bolstering mindset has a limited sphere 
of influence. In line with other studies (e.g. Bargh, 2006; Macrae & Johnston, 1998) 
strong motivation towards a certain stimulus often overrules priming effects that 
oppose more salient goals. For example, Macrae and Johnston (1998) demonstrated 
that priming “helpfulness” did not induce helping behaviours (i.e. helping a person to 
pick up pens they had dropped) if the primed participants were in a hurry. Similarly, 
participants primed with helpfulness were unlikely to offer assistance if the pens were 
leaky. The researchers concluded that when more salient goals are present (i.e. the 
goal to hurry to another appointment) or when strong disincentives conflict with the 
primed goal (leaky pens), then primed behaviours (relating to helpfulness) are less 
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likely to be enacted. The same principle may apply here. The cost of signing a petition 
in support of this counter-attitudinal proposition places a much higher cost on 
participants than merely making them cost-free, evaluative judgements regarding its 
merit. The results suggest that the web-tax was such an irredeemably negative 
proposition that behavioural change lay beyond the gravitational pull of the bolstering 
prime. Xu and Wyer (2012) suggested that boomerang effects for bolstering mindsets 
were possible. However, the authors did not produce evidence to support this claim.  
Interestingly, participants in the bolstering condition were more likely to 
volunteer for future research than participants in the control condition. This result is in 
line with expectation. However, participants in the counterarguing condition were also 
more likely to volunteer for future research studies than those in the control condition. 
This result corresponds to the boomerang effect reported by Xu and Wyer (2012). The 
authors found that a counterarguing mindset could induce greater charitable donations 
when participants failed to effectively refute the merits of a strong persuasive appeal. 
The same logic may be used to explain this unexpected influence of the 
counterarguing mindset in the current study. For example, the prospect of eroding 
future class-time with research studies may well appeal to the sampled student 
participants. If this is true, then a counterarguing mindset would likely induce this 
observed boomerang effect because students seeking respite from long lectures may 
find it difficult to generate counterarguments against participation in studies that act 
as exciting deviations from the norm. The fact that the study took place during a large 
lecture may well have caused this interesting result.  
Xu and Wyer (2012) postulated that the spheres of influence staked out by 
bolstering and counterarguing mindsets are mutually exclusively. Specifically, the 
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authors assert that the territorial boundaries of the bolstering (counterarguing) 
mindsets are limited to influencing negative (positive) target stimuli. However, the 
authors do not explicate a strong theoretical argument for this stipulation. It is worth 
also noting that contrary to Xu and Wyer (2012) conceptualization, both bolstering 
and counterarguing mindsets appear to be able to exert an influence on a target (web-
tax article). The priming effects are weak and only tend to be observed when the 
experimental conditions are contrasted against each other. However, this study 
demonstrates that both counterarguing and bolstering mindsets can exert an influence 
on a shared target although admittedly the bolstering mindset is responsible for the 
majority of the effects found.  
The hypothesised fit effect between the bolstering mindset and approach 
motivation (i.e. BAS) was found. Specifically, the results indicated that participants in 
the bolstering condition were willing to pay more web-tax than participants in the 
control condition. However, this effect was only observed among individuals 
exhibiting strong approach motivation (high BAS scores). This trend is interesting 
because the effect is found even when the target stimulus did not engender approach 
responses. Tax is not hedonic in nature and consequently individuals exhibiting strong 
approach motivation are unlikely to be attracted to it. However, it appears that 
individuals with strong approach motivation are likely to be disproportionately 
influenced by a bolstering mindset, irrespective of the character of the target stimulus. 
This is interesting since much motivational research finds that individuals exhibiting 
approach (avoidance) tendencies often exhibit a strong preference for hedonic 
(utilitarian) products and are more persuaded by gain framed (loss framed) messages 
(e.g. Lin & Shen, 2012). The current study suggests that a bolstering mindset induces 
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individuals to evaluate utilitarian products more positively even when gains are not 
emphasised.  
In sum, Study 2 succeeded in replicating some of the priming effects 
associated with a bolstering mindset. The bolstering mindset boosted the perceived 
persuasiveness of a persuasive appeal and promoted more overall favourable 
evaluations. The bolstering mindset also increased the amount that individuals were 
willing to pay. However, these effects are less significant than those reported by Xu 
and Wyer (2012) and tend only to appear between the experimental conditions. 
Unfortunately, Xu and Wyer (2012) do not provide the effect sizes in their paper. This 
limits the researcher’s ability to fully interpret their results. 
Importantly, the present study demonstrates that approach motivation does 
moderate the effect of a bolstering mindset as hypothesised. Participants in the 
bolstering condition who exhibited high BAS were significantly more willing to pay 
for an aversive, utilitarian product (web-tax) than participants exhibiting low BAS. 
Xu and Wyer (2012) reported strong mindset priming effects that provided no 
evidence of boundary conditions impinging upon the mindset. The current study has 
thus sketched out new theoretical boundary conditions for the bolstering mindset. The 
current study also provides qualifications with regard to the strength and applicability 
of these mindsets. In doing so this study makes a valuable contribution to the existing 
literature on mindset priming and consumer resistance. Nevertheless, it is interesting 
to speculate if perhaps a change in target stimulus might change the priming effects 
observed. A less offensive target stimulus might provide a bolstering mindset with 
more interpretative scope, thus boosting its inflationary effects. If the sphere of 
influence of a bolstering mindset is localised it should exert a stronger influence on a 
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moderately objectionable stimulus (rather than a highly objectionable stimulus). Study 
3 will employ the same experimental design as the current style in order to test this 
proposition.  
 
 
5.3. Study 3 
 
5.3.1. Introduction to Study  
Study 3 aimed to test if a bolstering mindset would exert a greater influence on 
a moderately aversive target stimulus (rather than highly aversive target stimulus used 
in Study 2). In Study 2, participants were exposed to a newspaper article advocating a 
highly objectionable web-tax proposal. The web-tax proposal offered no tangible 
rewards or incentives. In the current study, participants were exposed to a similar 
newspaper article. However, this counter-attitudinal, persuasive appeal was designed 
to be moderately aversive in nature. Specifically, the newspaper article proposed the 
introduction of a mandatory pension scheme for all Irish citizens over the age of 18 
years. Unlike the web-tax proposal, the pension proposal is not without its rewards, 
albeit distant ones. Nevertheless, being forced to pay a pension levy is likely to be an 
off-putting prospect for the students sampled. In order to assess willingness to pay the 
pension levy, participants were asked; “If you were legally compelled to pay into a 
mandatory pension scheme what percentage of your salary would you be willing to 
contribute? Please indicate the percentage”. Unlike previous studies which asked 
participants a specific amount, here participants were asked to estimate the % of their 
earnings they would willingly contribute. This is arguably a safer measure of 
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willingness to pay than a monetary amount that is heavily dependent on the student’s 
future earning potential.  
The current study adopts a similar experimental design to Study 2 and 
formalises the same hypotheses. However, a number of additional hypotheses are 
tested in the current study. First, the study tested the hypothesis that an individual’s 
chronic PK would moderate the effects of a bolstering mindset. Study 2 demonstrated 
that a bolstering mindset blinds individuals to the manipulative intent embedded 
within a persuasive appeal. However, perhaps some individuals are particularly 
susceptible to this defensive disrobing effect of a bolstering mindset. Specifically, the 
current study tests the hypothesis that individuals who exhibit high (low) chronic PK 
are less (more) likely to detect deceptive/manipulative advertising tactics when 
primed with a bolstering mindset.  
Second, the study tested a new hypothesis relating to a novel “episodic” 
priming procedure. Specifically, the study tested the hypothesis that a bolstering 
mindset could be activated via recollections of past bolstering episodes. Xu and Wyer 
(2012) demonstrated that counterarguing and bolstering mindsets may be induced 
incidentally. Simply watching a political speech (debate) was found to prime 
bolstering (counterarguing) mindsets respectively (see Study 4, Xu & Wyer, 2012). 
However, all of the four studies by Xu and Wyer (2012) involved the real-time 
activation of cognitive procedures. The current study extended their research by 
testing the hypothesis that episodic recall may activate a bolstering mindset. 
Specifically, it is hypothesised that asking participants to recall past bolstering 
episodes would reactivate these past cognitive procedures and thus prime a bolstering 
mindset.  
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Recent research suggests that an episodic recall task may be used to activate 
non-conscious resistance (Fransen & Fennis 2014). Specifically, the authors primed 
“persuasive intent” by asking participants to “think of a situation in which someone 
tried to influence you” (Fransen & Fennis 2014; p. 922). The results indicate that 
participants primed with persuasive intent were more resistant to subsequent 
persuasion attempts than those in the control condition. Indeed, participants in the 
‘resistance primed’ condition demonstrated levels of resistance comparable to those 
who have been explicitly forewarned of an impending persuasion attempt. This 
research suggests that unconsciously activated resistance offers the same defensive 
properties as consciously activated resistance strategies. Interestingly, this 
unconsciously activated resistance does not exhaust participants’ regulatory resources 
(Fransen & Fennis, 2014). Participants in the ‘resistance primed’ condition employed 
fewer cognitive resources than participants in the forewarned condition when 
defending themselves against a persuasive attack. The current study tested whether 
the opposite scenario is possible. The implicit resistance primed by Fransen and 
Fennis (2014) is likely to have been mobilised as a result of cognitively accessing 
concepts and cognitive procedures related to resistance. Indeed, in order to 
cognitively access past episodic memories of resistance participants would have had 
to access the cognitive procedures associated with these memories. If bolstering 
cognitive procedures are reactivated using an episodic priming task then it seems 
plausible that these cognitive procedures may carryover to influence future evaluative 
judgements. To test this hypothesis, Study 3 includes an episodic priming procedure 
in the experimental design. However, the procedural priming procedure already 
employed in Study 1 and Study 2 was also retained. It was hoped that the inclusion of 
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two different priming procedures in one study may allow the researcher to assess the 
strength of priming effects produced by these two different priming techniques. The 
hypothesised carryover effects of a bolstering mindset on perceptual, behavioural and 
cognitive dependent variables remain largely unchanged from Study 2. The following 
hypotheses are postulated for Study 3: 
 
Hypotheses 1a-b: Compared to participants in control and counterarguing 
conditions, participants in the bolstering condition will generate more 
favourable overall evaluations (composite measure of persuasiveness and 
appeal) of the pension scheme article (H1a) and more favourable evaluations 
of the proposed pension scheme (H1b).  
 
Hypotheses 2a-d: Compared to participants in control and counterarguing 
conditions, participants in the bolstering condition will be more willing to 
pay the pension levy (H2a), be more willing to volunteer for future studies 
(H2b), be more willing to volunteer their time (i.e. minutes) for future studies 
(H2c) and be more willing to sign a petition supporting the proposed pension 
scheme (H2d).  
 
Hypotheses 3a-b: Compared to participants in control and counterarguing 
conditions, participants in the bolstering condition will generate more 
positive thoughts (H3a) and fewer negative thoughts (H3b) in response to the 
pension scheme article. 
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Hypotheses 3c-d: Compared to participants in control and counterarguing 
conditions, participants in the bolstering condition will generate fewer PK 
thoughts (H3c) and exhibit greater attitude certainty (H3d) in response to the 
pension scheme article. 
 
Hypotheses 4a-b: The carryover effects of a bolstering mindset on 
participants’ overall evaluation of the pension article (composite measure of 
persuasiveness and appeal) (H4a) and participants’ evaluations of the 
pension scheme proposal (i.e. attractiveness of the mandatory pension) 
(H4b), will be particularly pronounced among participants exhibiting strong 
approach motivation (high BAS scores). 
 
Hypotheses 4c-f: The carryover effects of a bolstering mindset on 
behavioural variables; willingness to pay the pension levy (H4c), willingness 
to volunteer for future studies (H4d); number of minutes volunteered for 
future studies (H4e) and willingness to sign a petition supporting the pension 
scheme proposal (H4f) will be particularly pronounced among participants 
exhibiting strong approach motivation (high BAS scores). 
 
Hypothesis 5a: Participants in the bolstering condition will rate the pension 
scheme article as less deceptive/manipulative than participants in the control 
condition and participants in the counterarguing condition. 
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Hypothesis 5b: The carryover effects of bolstering mindset will be 
particularly pronounced among participants exhibiting low Persuasion 
Knowledge. 
 
Hypothesis 6: An episodic recall task will induce a bolstering mindset. 
 
5.3.2. Sample and Study Design 
The study employed a 3 (mindset: bolstering vs. counterarguing vs. control) x 
2 (manipulative intent of article: high vs. low) x 2 (priming types: procedural vs. 
episodic) between-subjects design. Three hundred and fifty-six students participated 
in the study; 182 participants were exposed to an episodic priming procedure and 174 
participants to the procedural priming procedure. Participants (142 males, 189 
females, 25 participants of unspecified gender) were aged between 18 – 53 years. The 
mean age of participants was 22.63 years (SD = 5.23).  
Procedure. Participants were recruited in tutorials. Having secured permission 
from the tutor, participants were asked if they were willing to partake in two unrelated 
studies. The group sizes typically ranged from 10 - 30 participants in these data 
collection sessions. In the first study (i.e. priming procedure), participants were 
randomly assigned to one of three priming conditions (bolstering, counterarguing or 
control conditions) and one two priming procedures conditions (procedural vs. 
episodic). Participants in the procedural priming conditions undertook the same 
writing task used in Study 2. Participants in the episodic priming conditions wrote 
about a past occasion in which they engaged in counterarguing or bolstering 
behaviours. For example, participants in the bolstering condition were asked to 1) 
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“please describe a situation in your own life in which you strongly reaffirmed your 
beliefs when someone challenged your beliefs”, 2) “describe how you behaved in this 
situation” and 3) “describe the emotions you experienced in this situation”. 
Conversely, participants in the counterarguing conditions wrote about a past 
experience in which they engaged in counterarguing (i.e. “Please describe a situation 
in your own life where you strongly argued against another person’s point of view 
which conflicted with your own”).  
As in the bolstering condition, participants were also asked to write about their 
cognitive and behavioural responses to the situation. Participants in the control 
condition wrote an essay about 3 neutral memories; 1) “describe the typical breakfast 
you eat before you go to college”, 2) “describe your typical journey to college” and 
3) “describe your typical day while at college”. All participants were given 15 
minutes to complete the task. Participants were informed that once they had 
completed this “study” they may begin a second, ostensibly unrelated study. In this 
second task, participants were exposed to one of two newspaper articles advocating a 
mandatory pension scheme for all Irish citizens over the age of 18 years. Manipulative 
Intent (moderate vs. high) was manipulated between the articles (see Appendix K). 
Participants were asked to complete a questionnaire which assessed their perceptual, 
behavioural and cognitive responses to the article. Once both studies were completed 
participants returned all materials to the researcher. Participants were thanked for their 
participation in the study and encouraged to contact the researcher if they had any 
questions or concerns. 
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Measuring Instruments 
Mood and motivational orientation. In Study 1 and Study 2, the 20 item 
PANAS measure was used to control for mood effects. However, in order to shorten 
the already long questionnaire it was decided to replace the PANAS with a one item 
measure for mood. A semantic differentiation mood scale ranging from -5 very sad to 
+ 5, very happy was used to control for mood effects in the current study. This 
measure, used by Xu and Wyer (2012) was considered a more parsimonious means of 
measuring participant mood. The BIS/BAS measure was again used to measure 
participants’ chronic motivational orientation in the current study. The BIS/BAS scale 
was found to have a satisfactory internal reliability with a Cronbach alpha coefficient 
of .74. The BIS subscale and the BAS subscale both demonstrated satisfactory 
internal reliability with Cronbach alpha coefficients of .79 and .82 respectively. 
Chronic PK. Participants’ chronic PK was assessed using a 6-item measure 
developed by Bearden, Hardesty and Rose (2001). An example item on the scale is “I 
know when an offer is too good to be true”. Participants’ responses were measured 
using a 5-point rating scale ranging from 1, extremely uncharacteristic (of me) to 5, 
extremely characteristic (of me). The PK exhibited high internal reliability with a 
Cronbach alpha coefficient of .82.  
Regulatory orientation. The Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (RFQ) was 
included in the questionnaire to assess participants’ regulatory orientation (Higgins et 
al. 2001) The (RFQ) was included for explorative purposes and was found to 
demonstrate satisfactory internal reliability with a Cronbach alpha coefficient of .67. 
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Dependent variables 
The same perceptual, behavioural and cognitive dependent variables in Study 2 were 
again tested in the current study. Perceptual variables again included participants’ 
overall evaluation of the article (composite measure of persuasiveness and appeal), 
the perceived attractiveness of the proposition (i.e. pension scheme) and the perceived 
manipulative intent within the article. Behavioural variables (i.e. willingness to pay 
into the pension scheme, willingness to volunteer for future studies, number of 
minutes volunteered for future studies and willingness to sign a petition supporting 
the pension scheme) were assessed. Similarly, cognitive variables relating to the 
number of thoughts generated by participants (positive thoughts, negative thoughts, 
PK thoughts) and participants’ attitude certainty was also assessed (for a detailed 
description of all variables please see Study 2).   
 
5.3.3. Results 
A series of full factorial, Analyses of Covariance (ANCOVA) were run to test 
the effects of mindset priming on perceptual, behavioural and cognitive variables 
adapted from previous studies (see Studies 1 and 2). As in previous studies (see 
Studies 1 and 2), mood was included as a covariate in the analysis to control for 
possible mood effects. A series of one-sided contrasts were also conducted for each 
set of analysis.  
The analyses revealed that the episodic priming failed to produce any mindset 
priming effects. In the interest of parsimony, the descriptive data and null results are 
reported in Tables 7.20 – 7.22 (see Appendix D). The results reported below relate 
only to participants in the procedural priming conditions. A correlation matrix for the 
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focal variables is provided in Table 7.13. The means and standard deviations for the 
perceptual, behavioural and cognitive variables appear in Table 7.14, Table 7.15, and 
Table 7.16 respectively (see Appendix D). 
Manipulation check. The IMC used in Study 2 was again included in this 
study to test the attention levels of participants. The results of the IMC showed that 
only 134 (82%) of participants would have been included in the analysis if 
successfully completing the IMC was used as the inclusion criterion. In order to 
maintain consistency between studies and to retain statistical power, the same priming 
manipulation check used in Study 2 was again applied in this study. Specifically, only 
participants who sufficiently elaborated (wrote at least 5 sentences and argued in the 
expected direction for each of the three priming propositions) were included in the 
dataset (see Dholakia et al. 2006). Importantly, this approached again resulted in 
fewer cases being removed from the dataset. Of the 174 procedurally primed 
participants, 12 cases were removed from the dataset; 10 participants did not argue in 
the expected direction for all three propositions and 2 participants failed to write at 
least 5 sentences for each proposition. The final procedurally primed sample consisted 
of 162 participants (63 males, 88 females, 11 participants of unspecified gender) aged 
between 18 - 43 years. The mean age of participants was 22.36 years (SD = 4.94).  
 
Perceptual Variables 
Article evaluation.12 There were no main effect of manipulative intent, F(1, 
104) = 1.08, p = .301 or priming, F(2, 104) = 1.06, p = .350 on participants’ overall 
                                                 
12
 Article persuasiveness. There were no main effect of manipulative intent, F(1, 104) = .01, p = .919 
or priming, F(2, 104) = .60, p = .551 on participant’s ratings of article persuasiveness. Nevertheless, 
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evaluations of the articles. Nevertheless, the pattern of means were in the expected 
direction and consistent with (H1a). Participants in the bolstering condition (M = 
3.78, SD = 1.73) gave slightly more favourable article evaluations than 
participants in the control condition (M = 3.26, SD = 1.39) and participants in the 
counterarguing condition (M = 3.29, SD = 1.73). However, planned contrasts did not 
reveal any significant differences between the priming conditions, all ps ≥ .17. Thus, 
H1a was not supported. 
Proposition attractiveness. There was no main effect of manipulative intent 
on participants’ ratings of pension scheme attractiveness, F(1, 104) = .18, p = .674. 
However, there was a main effect of priming on participants rating of pension scheme 
attractiveness, F(2, 104) = 2.99, p = .055, 
2
p
 
= .054. Participants in the bolstering 
condition (M = 6.48, SD = 1.77) rated the pension scheme as more attractive than 
participants in the control condition (M = 5.79, SD = 1.78), p = .043, and participants 
in the counterarguing condition (M = 5.63, SD = 2.20), p = .023. However, since only 
the later contrast was marginally significant, H1b was not supported.  
                                                                                                                                            
the pattern of means were in the expected direction. Participants in the bolstering condition (M = 3.63, 
SD = 1.75) rated the articles as slightly more persuasive than participants in the control condition (M = 
3.28, SD = 1.65) and participants in the counterarguing condition (M = 3.32, SD = 1.85). However, 
one-sided contrasts did not reveal any significant differences in rating of article persuasiveness between 
the priming conditions, all ps ≥ .32.  
Article appeal. There was a main effect of manipulative intent on ratings of article appeal, 
F(1, 105) = 4.01, p = .048, partial eta squared = .037. Participants exposed to the high manipulative 
article (M = 3.14, SD = 1.79) rated the article as less appealing than participants exposed to the less 
manipulative article (M = 3.73, SD = 1.79). There was no main effect of priming on ratings of article 
appeal, F(2, 105) = 1.22, p = .299. Nevertheless, the pattern of means were in the expected direction. 
Participants in the bolstering condition (M = 3.94, SD = 2.00) rated the articles as slightly more 
appealing than both participants in the control condition (M = 3.24, SD = 1.52) and participants in the 
counterarguing condition (M = 3.27, SD = 1.91). However, one-sided contrasts did not reveal any 
significant differences in article appeal between priming conditions, all ps ≥ .13.  
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Perceived manipulative intent. There was a significant main effect of 
manipulative intent on participant’s ability to detect deceptive/manipulative 
advertising tactics, F(1, 105) = 4.18, p = .043, 
2
p
 
= .038. Participants exposed to the 
highly manipulative article (M = 4.56, SD = 1.15) rated the article as significantly 
more manipulative than participants exposed to the less manipulative article (M = 
4.02, SD = 1.31). However, there was no main effect of priming on participants’ 
ability to detect manipulative intent, F(2, 105) = 1.31, p = .878. Participants in the 
bolstering condition (M = 4.23, SD = 1.09), control condition (M = 4.31, SD = 1.22) 
and counterarguing condition (M = 4.30, SD = 1.44) rated the article as equally 
manipulative. One-sided contrasts did not reveal any significant differences between 
the priming conditions, all ps = ≥ .61. Thus, H5a was not supported. 
 
Behavioural Variables 
Willingness to pay. The skewed data were transformed using a logarithm 
transformation. An ANCOVA subsequently revealed there were no main effect for 
manipulative intent, F(1, 63) = .91, p = .342 or priming, F(2, 63) = 2.09, p = .132 on 
participants’ willingness to pay the pension levy. Nevertheless, the pattern of means 
were in the expected direction and consistent with (H2a). Participants in the bolstering 
condition (M = 0.87, SD = 0.26) were willing to pay a higher percentage of their 
earning to the pension levy compared to participants in the control condition (M = 
0.65, SD = 0.39), p = .049, and participants in the counterarguing condition (M = 
0.66, SD = 0.39), p = .067.  Thus, H2a was supported. 
Volunteerism. Analysis revealed that participants in the bolstering condition 
(77%), control condition (80%) and counterarguing condition (74%) were equally 
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willing to volunteer for future research. A Pearson Chi-square test for independence 
indicated there was no significant association between priming condition and 
volunteerism, X2 (2, n = 149) = .06, p = .768, Cramer’s V = .05. Thus, H2b was not 
supported. 
Number of minutes volunteered. The skewed data were transformed using a 
logarithm transformation. There were no main effects of manipulative intent, F(1, 64) 
= .00, p = .947 or priming, F(2, 64) = .09, p = .918 on the number of minutes 
participants volunteered for future studies. Participants in the bolstering condition (M 
= 1.52, SD = 0.23), control condition (M = 1.60, SD = 0.30) and counterarguing 
condition (M = 1.48, SD = 0.28) were likely to volunteer a similar number of minutes 
of their time for future studies, all ps ≥ .68. Thus, H2c was not supported. 
Petition. There was no main effect of manipulative intent on participants’ 
willingness to sign a petition advocating the proposed pension scheme, F(1, 105) = 
1.25, p = .266. However, there was a marginally significant main effect of priming on 
participants’ willingness to sign the petition supporting the pension scheme, F(2, 105) 
= 2.44, p = .092, 
2
p
 
= .044. Consistent with (H2d), participants in the bolstering 
condition (M = 4.09, SD = 2.33) were more likely to sign a petition to support the 
introduction of the mandatory pension than participants in the control condition (M = 
3.43, SD = 1.96), p = .072, and participants in the counterarguing condition (M = 
3.30, SD = 2.17), p = .038. Thus, H2d was supported. 
 
Cognitive variables 
Number of positive thoughts. There was a no main effect of manipulative 
intent on the number of positive thoughts generated by participants, F(1, 58) = .18, p 
  
176 
 
= .671. However, there was a marginally significant main effect of priming on the 
number of positive thoughts generated by participants, F(2, 58) = 2.48, p = .093, 
2
p
 
= .079. Participants in the bolstering condition (M = 1.64, SD = 0.73) and participants 
in the control condition (M = 1.53, SD = 0.84) generated a similar number of positive 
thoughts, p = .302. Contrary to expectation, participants in the counterarguing 
condition (M = 1.76, SD = 0.83) generated significantly more positive thoughts than 
participants in the control, p = .030. Thus, H3a was not supported. 
Number of negative thoughts. There were no main effects of manipulative 
intent, F(1, 77) = 1.91, p = .171 or priming, F(2, 77) = .29, p = .742 on the number of 
negative thoughts generated by participants. Participants in the bolstering (M = 1.93, 
SD = 1.01), control condition (M = 2.05, SD = 0.84) and counterarguing condition (M 
= 1.94, SD = 1.04) generated a similar number of negative thoughts, all ps = >.45. 
Thus, H3b was not supported. Furthermore, there was no significant difference in the 
overall valence of thoughts generated between conditions13.  
PK thoughts. There were no main effects of manipulative intent F(1, 70) = 
.92, p = .340 or priming F(2, 70) = .06, p = .938 on the number of PK thoughts 
generated by participants. Participants in the bolstering condition (M = 0.20, SD = 
1.27) generated the same number of PK thoughts as participants in the control 
condition (M = 2.17, SD = 0.90) and counterarguing condition (M = 1.97, SD = 
1.08), all ps ≥ .76. Thus, H3c was not supported. 
                                                 
13
 Thought Index. There were no main effects of manipulative intent, F(1, 105) = .63, p = .428 or 
priming, F(2, 105) = 1.98, p = .144 on the overall valence of thoughts generated by participants. The 
valence of thoughts generated by participants in the bolstering (M = -0.51, SD = 2.05) was similar to 
that of participants in the control condition (M = -0.76, SD = 1.89) and participants in the 
counterarguing condition (M = - 0.18, SD = 1.94); p = .516), all ps ≥ .28. 
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Attitude certainty. There were no main effects of manipulative intent, F(1, 
105) = .04, p = .845 or priming, F(2, 105) = 1.54, p = .219 on participants’ attitude 
certainty towards their evaluative judgements. Participants in the bolstering condition 
(M = 6.49, SD = 2.11), control condition (M = 6.59, SD = 1.96) and counterarguing 
condition (M = 5.98, SD = 2.04) exhibited similar levels of attitude certainty, all ps ≥ 
.79. Thus, H3d was not supported. 
Involvement. There were a no main effects of manipulative intent, F(1, 105) = 
1.88, p = .173 or priming, F(2, 105) = 2.24, p = .112 on self-reported levels of task 
involvement. Interestingly though, participants in the bolstering condition (M = 4.29, 
SD = 1.64) exhibited higher levels of involvement than both participants in the control 
condition (M = 3.56, SD = 1.59), p = .040, and participants in the counterarguing 
condition (M = 3.81, SD = 1.38), p = .110. Only the former contrast reached statistical 
significance. It is worth noting that participants self-reported involvement levels were 
not used as a dependent variable in the current study. Rather these data were used to 
assess/control for any secondary effects of the priming (as was the case in the research 
by Xu and Wyer (2012). While Xu and Wyer (2012) found no difference in self-
reported involvement levels between the experimental conditions, the current result 
suggest that these mindsets can influence participant’s levels.   
 
Moderation and Simple Slopes Analysis  
A series of hierarchical regression analyses were employed to test the impact of the 
focal variables (priming, BAS, and the priming x BAS interaction) on dependent 
variables. In the first step, the control variable (mood) was entered. In the second step 
the predictors (priming and BAS) were entered. In the third step, the interaction term 
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(priming x BAS) were entered. In order to avoid the problem of multicollinearity 
when testing interaction effects the predictors were centered around the grand mean 
(Hox, 2002).  
Willingness to pay. A hierarchical multiple regression analysis was conducted 
to test if the amount of pension contribution participants were willing to pay was 
moderated by approach motivation. The amount of tax that participants in the 
bolstering condition were willing to pay served as the dependent variable in the 
regression model while BAS and BAS x priming (bolstering) served as independent 
variables. The total variance explained by the model was 17%, F(5, 86) = 3.54, p = 
.006. BAS x priming (bolstering) was significant and explained an additional 4.1% of 
the model after controlling for the effects of BAS, Mood and priming, R squared 
change = .04, F change (1, 86) = 4.22, p = .041. Priming was found to significantly 
predict participant’s willingness to pay, β = -0.28, t(86) = 3.22, p < .002. The 
interaction term in the model (Priming*BAS) was also found to significantly predict a 
variance in willingness to pay, β = -0.42, t(86) = 2.05, p< .043. The interaction is 
plotted in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4  
The Effect of Priming on Willingness to Pay Pension Contributions for High (+1SD) 
versus Low (-1SD) Levels of BAS 
 
 
The results suggest individuals exhibiting low approach motivation are especially 
influenced by a bolstering mindset. This result runs contrary to H4c which states that 
high strong approach motivation (high BAS score) will increase the effect of a 
bolstering mindset on participants’ willingness to pay. Simple slope analysis (Aiken 
& West, 1991) revealed a positive effect of priming (0 = control, 1 = bolstering) on 
the amount participants were willing to pay among those participants exhibiting low 
BAS (one standard deviation below the mean), β = .44, p = .000, t(86) = 3.63 but not 
for individuals high BAS (one standard deviation above the mean), β = .10, p = .398, 
t(86) = 0.85.  
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5.3.4. Discussion 
As in Study 2, the current study attempted to (a) replicate the carryover effects 
of a bolstering mindset and (b) to test the moderating effect of BAS on these 
carryover effects. The same hypotheses tested in Study 2 were again tested in Study 3. 
However, a number of additional hypotheses were tested in the current study. 
Specifically, Study 3 aimed to explore the possibility that the carryover effects of a 
bolstering mindset would be stronger when pitted against a moderately aversive 
proposition rather than the highly aversive proposition. Having used a high aversive 
proposition (i.e. web-tax) in Study 2, the use of a moderately aversive proposition (i.e. 
mandatory pension scheme) in the current study would allow the researcher to explore 
this possibility. The current study also tested if an individual’s chronic PK would 
moderate the effects of a bolstering mindset. It was hypothesised that individuals 
exhibiting low chronic PK would be especially vulnerable to manipulative persuasive 
appeals when primed with a bolstering mindset. Finally, the study tested the 
possibility that a bolstering mindset could be induced via episodic recall.  
Study 3 revealed a pattern of priming effects that were generally consistent 
with expectation. Despite not reaching statistical significance, participants in the 
bolstering condition provided more favourable overall evaluations of the pension 
article rating, and regarded the pension article as slightly more persuasive and more 
appealing than participants in the other conditions. Participants in the bolstering 
condition also perceived the pension proposition as significantly more attractive than 
participants in the control and counterarguing conditions. In the current study, 
proposition attractiveness was measured using a 6-item scale; (unfavourable-
favourable, unpleasant-pleasant, foolish-wise, bad-good, harmful-beneficial, and 
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negative-positive). This measure arguably provides a more robust measure to assess 
proposition attractiveness than the one item measure employed in the previous two 
studies. Similarly, participants’ willingness to pay was assessed by asking participants 
to indicate the percentage of their earnings they would be willing to contribute to the 
proposed pension scheme. Again, this may be considered to be a more valid measure 
for measuring willingness to pay given the potential difficulties that participants may 
encounter when trying to estimate the amount of money they will earn in the future.  
In contrast to Study 2, participants’ willingness to volunteer for future research 
did not differ between conditions in the current study. Furthermore, there was no 
difference in participants’ willingness to volunteer or the number of minutes 
volunteered between conditions. Consequently, the current study does not provide any 
evidence that a bolstering mindset increases behavioural compliance. However, the 
results do suggest that the bolstering mindset can influence behavioural intentions.  
In the previous study (i.e. Study 2), the bolstering mindset was found to 
influence some behavioural intentions (i.e. willingness to pay) but not others (i.e. 
petition signing). However, in the current study the bolstering mindset influenced 
both these behavioural intention measures. Participants in the bolstering condition 
were significantly more willing to pay into a pension scheme than participants in the 
control and counterarguing conditions. Compared to participants in the control 
(counterarguing) conditions, participants in the bolstering condition were marginally 
(significantly) more likely to sign a petition supporting the proposed pension scheme. 
The presence of this priming effect in the current study and the absence of this 
priming effect in Study 2 lend support to the suggestion that the target of the prime is 
an important determinant of the mindset’s influence. In Study 2, the bolstering 
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mindset did not boost petition signing behaviours when the target was a highly 
unfavourable proposition (i.e. web-tax). However, in the current study, the bolstering 
mindset increased petition signing when the target was a moderately unfavourable 
pension scheme. 
Contrary to expectation, but in line with the results of Study 2, participants in 
the bolstering condition did not exhibit increased attitude certainty or decreased 
sensitivity to manipulative intent. Interestingly though, participants in the bolstering 
mindset reported significantly higher levels of self-reported task involvement than 
participants in the control condition. This finding is contrary to the findings of Xu and 
Wyer (2012) who found that counterarguing and bolstering mindsets did not influence 
the level of self-reported task involvement among participants. However, it is not 
necessarily surprising that a bolstering mindset could increase task involvement. 
Indeed, it seems intuitive that a mindset which induces reaffirming thoughts would 
also induce greater feelings of involvement. Involvement levels did (did not) differ 
between participants in Study 2 (Study 3). This finding suggests that participants’ 
involvement levels might also be dependent upon the strength of their initial 
emotional response to the target stimulus. This result suggests that a bolstering 
mindset has the potential to induce higher levels of task involvement when the target 
stimulus is not overwhelmingly negative in nature.  
Analysis of the cognitive variables tendered some unexpected results. In line 
with expectation, participants in the bolstering condition generated more positive 
thoughts than participants in the control condition. What is surprising is that 
participants in the counterarguing condition also generated more positive thoughts 
than those in the bolstering and control conditions. This anomaly is contrary to 
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expectation and lead to a significant difference in the overall valence of thoughts 
generated between conditions. There were no differences in the number of negative 
thoughts or the number of PK thoughts generated between conditions.  
In the current study the priming effects on perceptual variables are weak. 
Congruent with the findings of Study 2, the strongest priming effects are found 
between the experimental conditions (i.e. bolstering and counterarguing conditions). 
This suggests that the counterarguing mindset does exert a subtle if non-significant 
negative effect on evaluative judgements. While the bolstering mindset is chiefly 
responsible for the priming effects observed, the consistency of the pattern is 
noteworthy. It is the consistency of this pattern of results rather than the statistical 
strength of the effects that is compelling.  
It was hypothesised that individuals exhibiting strong approach motivation 
(i.e. high BAS scores) would be most influenced by the bolstering priming procedure 
since bolstering thoughts should have been more congruent and cognitively accessible 
among these individuals. However, contrary to expectation participants in the 
bolstering condition who exhibited weak approach motivation (low BAS scores) were 
the most willing to pay pension contributions. This counter-intuitive finding is 
intriguing and provokes the researcher to reassess his assumptive position. One 
potential explanation is that the bolstering mindset exerts a relatively greater influence 
on individuals who are not inclined towards the generation of bolstering thoughts. 
This explanation employs a reversed logic to the assumptions previously formulised 
as hypothesis. Perhaps individuals who do not habitually think in a positive light are 
most influenced by the bolstering mindset. This finding is interesting as 
positive/reaffirming thoughts are generally associated with strong approach 
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motivation rather than weak approach motivation. It also conflicts with the findings of 
Study 2 which did support the hypothesis that strong approach motivation accentuates 
the effects of a bolstering mindset.  
Informed by theory, this research adopted the central assumption that a 
bolstering (counterarguing) mindset would be moderated by approach (avoidance) 
motivation. However, this appears to be too simplistic a conceptualisation. Analysis 
revealed that participants in the counterarguing condition who exhibited weak 
approach motivation (i.e. low BAS scores) were less willing to pay into the pension 
than individuals who exhibited strong approach motivation (i.e. high BAS scores). 
This result was not anticipated. It was assumed that the presence of strong avoidance 
motivation rather than the absence of strong approach motivation would moderate the 
counterarguing mindset. However, the results suggest the latter scenario is possible. 
Importantly, this moderating effect remains theoretically congruent with the original 
hypothesis. The complete lack of the results for the episodic priming procedure is 
surprising. Scholars suggest that procedural priming procedures generally produce 
relatively strong priming effects because of the direct link between the prime and the 
target behaviour (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). In contrast, when the link between the 
prime and the target is more abstract, there is less control over the downstream 
concepts that the prime activates. With this in mind it was assumed that the 
procedural priming procedure would exhibit stronger effects than the episodic 
priming. However, the complete absence of any priming effects for the episodic 
priming is difficult to explain.  
One possible explanation for this pattern of results may be that bolstering 
episodes are difficult to recall in a concrete manner. If this is the case, then the prime 
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(i.e. an episodic memory of bolstering) might not have the power to exert an effect on 
behaviours. It is possible that these memories are less cognitively accessible than 
more emotively laden memories relating to counterarguing episodes. Considering that 
counterarguing is a most frequently employed defensive response it also seems more 
feasible that counterarguing thoughts may be more prevalent and thus more 
cognitively accessible than bolstering thoughts (Zuwerink Jacks & Cameron, 2003). It 
seems plausible that an episodic priming procedure may be more potent when priming 
a counterarguing mindset than when priming a bolstering mindset. Neither the 
procedural priming procedure used in Study 1 nor the episodic priming procedure in 
the current study replicated the effects of a counterarguing mindset. Consequently, a 
variety of questions remain outstanding. The counterarguing mindset has yet to be 
replicated and the novel episodic priming procedure has yet to be successfully 
employed. The next study will attempt to reconcile both these outstanding issues by 
testing if an episodic priming procedure can activate a counterarguing mindset.  
 
 
5.4. Study 4 
 
5.4.1. Introduction to Study and Hypothesis 
Study 4 aims to test the hypothesis that a counterarguing mindset could be 
activated by an episodic recall task. Fransen and Fennis (2014) demonstrated that an 
episodic recall task can be used to activate “implicit resistance”. However, the authors 
did not prime a specific resistance strategy. Participants were simply asked to “recall a 
memory of a direct persuasion attempt; “Think of a situation in which someone tried 
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to influence you and describe this situation below” (Fransen & Fennis, 2014, p. 992). 
Consequently, there is no way to know what type of resistance strategies were 
activated as a result of their episodic priming task. The current research seeks to 
address this problem by testing whether activating memories of specific resistance 
strategy (i.e. counterarguing) can prime the deployment of this cognitive procedure in 
future, unrelated domains.  
In Study 3, an episodic priming procedure failed to produce any evidence of a 
bolstering mindset. Study 4 aims to test the hypothesis that a counterarguing mindset 
may be induced via episodic recall. The failure to prime a bolstering mindset using an 
episodic priming task may be due to the potential difficulty in recalling clear 
occasions of attitude bolstering. In contrast, counterarguing episodes are arguably 
more emotionally charged and thus more memorable. Consequently, counterarguing 
memories should also be more cognitively accessible and thus more amenable to 
producing priming effects. Accordingly, it is hypothesised that an episodic priming 
procedure will prime a counterarguing mindset.  
The same target materials used in Study 1 (hotel adverts) to test the 
counterarguing mindset were used again in this second attempt to replicate the 
counterarguing mindset. Similarly, the same moderating effect of avoidance 
motivation is again postulated for the counterarguing mindset. Indeed, apart from the 
priming procedure, all other aspects of Study 1’s experimental design remain 
unchanged. The hypotheses for the dependent variables in Study 4 are outlined in the 
following section. 
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Hypotheses 1a-b: Compared to participants in control and bolstering 
conditions, participants in the counterarguing condition will generate less 
favourable overall evaluations (composite measure of persuasiveness and 
appeal) of the hotel advert (H1a) and generate less favourable product 
evaluations of the hotel (i.e. hotel attractiveness) (H1b).  
 
Hypotheses 2a-d: Compared to participants in control and bolstering 
conditions, participants in the counterarguing condition will be less willing to 
pay for a one-night hotel stay (H2a), be less willing to volunteer for future 
research (H2b) and be less willing to volunteer their time (i.e. minutes) for 
future studies (H2c). 
 
Hypotheses 3a-b: Compared to participants in control and bolstering 
conditions, participants in the counterarguing condition will generate more 
positive thoughts (H3a) and fewer negative thoughts (H3b) in response to the 
advert. 
 
Hypotheses 4a-b: The carryover effects of a counterarguing mindset on 
participants’ overall evaluation of hotel advert (composite measure of 
persuasiveness and appeal) (H4a) and participant’s evaluations of the product 
(i.e. hotel attractiveness) (H4b), will be particularly pronounced among 
participants exhibiting strong avoidance motivation (high BIS scores). 
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Hypotheses 4c-f: The carryover effects of a counterarguing mindset on 
behavioural variables; willingness to pay for a one-night hotel stay (H4c), 
willingness to volunteer for future studies (H4d) and number of minutes 
volunteered for future studies (H4e) will be particularly pronounced among 
participants exhibiting strong avoidance motivation (high BIS scores). 
 
Hypothesis 6: An episodic recall task will induce a counterarguing mindset.  
 
5.4.2. Sample and Study Design 
The study employed a 3 (mindset: bolstering vs. counterarguing vs. control) x 
2 (favourableness of hotel: high vs. moderate) between-subjects design. Two hundred 
and ninety-one students (125 males, 163 females, 3 unspecified) participated in the 
study. Participants were exposed to one of two adverts (see Appendix K).14 Ten 
extreme outliers were excluded from the dataset. Analysis revealed that if the IMC 
was used as an inclusion criterion in the current study, only 137 (49%) of the sample 
would be included in the analysis. In order to maintain consistency between studies 
and to retain statistical power the priming manipulation check used in the previous 
studies was again employed as a means of filtering out non-primed participants. This 
approached again resulted in fewer cases being removed from the dataset. 
Specifically, eleven cases were removed from the dataset because they did not 
properly elaborate on the question asked; i.e. they did not describe a memory which 
directly related to a bolstering or counterarguing behaviour. A further two participants 
                                                 
14 Half of participants (146) were exposed to an advert promoting a highly attractive Igloo hotel in 
Switzerland (Advert 1), whereas the other half (145) were exposed to an advert promoting a 
moderately attractive hotel in Scotland (Advert 2). 
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were removed from the dataset because they did not write at least five sentences for 
each of the questions in the priming task. Thus the final dataset consisted of 268 
participants (88 participants in the counterarguing condition, 95 participants in the 
control condition and 85 participants in the bolstering condition). Participants (114 
male, 152 female) ranged in age from 17 to 59 years. The mean age of participants in 
the current study was 20.02 years (SD = 3.19). 
Procedure. Groups of students were recruited on the DCU campus during 
lunch times. Data collection took place in a nearby meeting room in the Student 
Union Centre. The meeting room accommodated approximately 10 people. 
Participants were also recruited in tutorials where tutor permission was granted. The 
group sizes typically ranged from 10 - 30 participants in these data collection 
sessions. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three priming 
conditions15.  
 
Independent Variables 
Advert type. The same adverts used in Study 1 (i.e. Advert 1: “Igloo hotel” in 
Switzerland, Advert 2: “Star hotel” in Scotland) were again used in the current 
experiment.  
Priming. Participants were primed using an same episodic recall task used in 
Study 3.  
 
                                                 
15 One hundred and twenty-nine participants (48%) were asked to evaluate Advert 1 (Igloo 
Hotel) while 139 participants (52%) were asked to evaluate Advert 2 (Scottish Hotel). Participants then 
completed the same questionnaire used in Study 1 which assessed participants’ perceptual, behavioural 
and cognitive responses to the advert.  
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Dependent Variables 
Perceptual variables 
Advert evaluation. A 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1, not at all, to 7, very 
was used to assess advert persuasiveness and advert appeal. An advert evaluation 
composite measure was computed by combining advert persuasiveness and advert 
appeal scores.  
Product attractiveness. Participants’ perceptions of product attractiveness (i.e. 
hotel attractiveness) were assessed using the 7-point Likert scale used previously (see 
Study 2).  
 
Behavioural Variables 
Willingness to volunteer. Participants were asked to indicate (Yes/No) if they 
were willing to volunteer for future research studies. Participants were asked to 
indicate the number of minutes they would be willing to volunteer for future studies. 
Willingness to pay. Participants were asked to indicate the amount of money 
they would be willing to pay for a one night stay in the hotel.    
 
Cognitive Variables  
Number of Positive/Negative thoughts generated. A thought listing task was 
used to assess participants’ thoughts relating to the advert. Positive thoughts and 
negative thoughts were subsequently coded by two independent coders who were 
blind to the experimental hypotheses.  
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Additional Measures 
As in Study 1, approach and avoidance motivation was measured using the BIS/BAS 
self-report measure. The BIS/BAS demonstrated satisfactory internal reliability in the 
current study with a Cronbach alpha coefficient of .71. The BIS subscale and the BAS 
subscale both demonstrated moderate to high internal reliability with Cronbach alpha 
coefficients of .69 and .79 respectively. Due to the fact that the questionnaire was 
much shorter than the questionnaire used in Study 3 it was decided to use the 20-item 
PANAS instrument to control for any mood effects. The PANAS demonstrated 
moderate internal reliability in the current study with a Cronbach alpha coefficient 
of .66. Importantly though, the subscales measuring positive mood and negative 
mood demonstrated high internal reliability with Cronbach alpha coefficients of .72 
and .79 respectively.  
 
5.4.3. Results 
A series of full factorial Analyses of Covariance (ANCOVA) were run to test 
the effects of mindset priming on perceptual variables (advert persuasiveness, advert 
appeal and hotel attractiveness) and behavioural variables (willingness to pay, 
willingness to volunteer for future studies, number of minutes volunteered for future 
studies). As in previous studies, a series of simple, one-sided contrasts were 
conducted for each set of analysis. A correlation matrix of the focal variables is 
provided in Table 7.23. The means and standard deviations for the perceptual, 
behavioural and cognitive dependent variables can be found in Table 7.24, Table 7.25, 
and Table 7.6 respectively (see Appendix E). The next section provides the test 
statistics for the current study. 
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Perceptual Variables 
Advert evaluation.16. There was a main effect of advert type on advert 
evaluations, F(1, 204) = 16.83, p = .000, 
2
p
 
= .076. Participants exposed to Advert 1 
(M = 4.24, SD = 1.52) rated the hotel advert more favourably than participants 
exposed to the Advert 2 (M = 3.34, SD = 1.27). However, there was no main effect of 
priming on advert evaluations, F(2, 204) = 2.29, p = .104. Nevertheless, the pattern of 
means were in the expected direction and are consistent with (H1a). Participants in the 
counterarguing condition (M = 3.40, SD = 1.47) gave slightly less favourable advert 
evaluations than participants in the control condition (M = 3.92, SD = 1.36), p = .311, 
and much lower advert evaluations than participants in the bolstering condition (M = 
3.98, SD = 1.53), p = .034. However, since only the later contrast was statistically 
significant, H1a was not supported.  
Product attractiveness. There was a main effect of advert type on participants 
ratings of hotel attractiveness, F(1, 204) = 55.66, p = .000, 
2
p
 
= .214. Participants 
                                                 
16 Advert persuasiveness. There was a main effect of advert type on participants ratings of advert 
persuasiveness, F(1, 204) = 9.19, p = .003, partial eta squared = .043. Participants exposed to Advert 1 
(M = 4.10, SD = 1.49) rated the hotel advert as more persuasive than and participants exposed to the 
Advert 2 (M = 3.41, SD = 1.36). However, there was no main effect of priming F(2, 204) = 2.24, p = 
.109 on ratings of advert persuasiveness. Nevertheless, the pattern of means were in the expected 
direction. Participants in the counterarguing condition (M = 3.38, SD = 1.47) rated the hotel advert as 
slightly less persuasive than participants in the control condition (M = 3.88, SD = 1.41), p = .315, and 
significantly less persuasive than participants in the bolstering condition (M = 3.97, SD = 1.46; p = 
.036). The later contrast was marginally significant.  
Advert appeal. There was a main effect of advert type on participants ratings of advert appeal, 
F(1, 204) = 19.66, p = .000, partial eta squared = .088. Participants exposed to Advert 1 (M = 4.37, SD 
= 1.82) rated the hotel advert as more appealing than participants exposed to the Advert 2 (M = 3.28, 
SD = 1.37). However, there was no main effect of priming F(2, 204) = 1.67, p = .190 on participants 
ratings of advert appeal. Nevertheless, the pattern of means were in the expected direction. Participants 
in the counterarguing condition (M = 3.44, SD = 1.65) rated the hotel advert as slightly less appealing 
than participants in the control condition (M = 3.98, SD = 1.61; p = .388), and much less appealing 
than participants in the bolstering condition (M = 3.99, SD = 1.77; p = .069). The later contrast was 
marginally significant.  
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exposed to Advert 1 (M = 4.75, SD = 1.72) rated the hotel as more attractive than 
participants exposed to the Advert 2 (M = 3.02, SD = 1.41). However, there was no 
main effect of priming on participants ratings of hotel attractiveness, F(2, 204) = .58, 
p = .563. Nevertheless, the pattern of means were in the expected direction and are 
consistent with (H1b). Participants in the counterarguing condition (M = 3.48, SD = 
1.78) rated the hotel as slightly less attractive than participants in the control condition 
(M = 4.06, SD = 1.67) and participants in the bolstering condition (M = 3.99, SD = 
1.87). However, one-sided contrasts did not reveal any significant differences 
between priming conditions, all ps ≥ .33. Thus, H1b was not supported.  
 
Behavioural Variables   
Willingness to pay. There was a main effect of advert type on participants’ 
willingness to pay for a one night hotel stay, F(1, 144) = 79.84, p = .000, 
2
p  = .357. 
Participants exposed to Advert 1 (M = 95.14, SD = 41.20) were willing to pay 
significantly more for a one-night hotel stay than participants exposed to the Advert 2 
(M = 49.09, SD = 20.06). However, there was a no main effect of priming F(2, 144) = 
.59, p = .557. Nevertheless, the pattern of means were in the expected direction and 
consistent with (H2a). Participants in the counterarguing condition (M = 62.24, SD = 
33.24) were slightly less willing to pay for a one-night hotel stay than participants in 
the control condition (M = 78.97, SD = 43.27) and participants in the bolstering 
condition (M = 72.77, SD = 39.70). However, simple contrasts did not reveal any 
significant differences between priming conditions, ps = ≥ .28. Thus, H2a was not 
supported. 
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Volunteerism. Analysis revealed that participants in the counterarguing 
condition (74%), control condition (80%) and bolstering condition (72%) were 
equally willing to volunteer for future research. A Pearson Chi-Square test of 
independence indicated there was no significant association between priming 
condition and volunteerism, X2 (2, n = 265) = .06, p = .661, Cramer’s V = .05. Thus, 
H2b was not supported. The results of the logistical regression predicting participants’ 
willingness to volunteer for future studies are reported in Table 7.27 (see Appendix 
D). 
Number of minutes volunteered. There was no main effect of advert type F(1, 
193) = .83, p = .362 or priming F(2, 193) = .88, p = .417 on the number of minutes 
participants volunteered for future studies. Nevertheless, the pattern of means were in 
the expected direction and consistent with (H2c). Participants in the counterarguing 
condition (M = 14.44, SD = 12.98) were slightly less willing to volunteer time for 
future studies than participants in the control condition (M = 17.32, SD = 15.87) and 
participants in the bolstering condition (M = 18.10, SD = 17.59). However, one-sided 
contrasts did not reveal any significant differences between priming condition, all ps 
≥ .19. Thus, H2c was not supported. 
 
Cognitive Variables 
Positive thoughts. There was no main effect of advert type F(1, 125) = .000, p 
= .987 on the number of positive thoughts generated by participants. However, there 
was a marginally significant effect of priming on the number of positive thoughts 
generated by participants, F(2, 125) = 2.36, p = .099, 
2
p = .036. Participants in the 
counterarguing condition (M = 1.80, SD = 0.87) generated a similar number of 
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positive thoughts to participants in the control condition (M = 2.17, SD = 1.06), p = 
.141. However, participants in the counterarguing condition generated significantly 
fewer positive thoughts than participants in the bolstering condition (M = 2.26, SD = 
1.25), p = .035. Nevertheless, since only the later contrast was statistically significant, 
H3a was not supported. 
Negative thoughts. There was no main effect of advert type F(1, 114) = .88, p 
= .350 or priming F(2, 114) = .09, p = .910 on the number of negative thoughts 
generated by participants. Participants in the counterarguing condition (M = 1.96, SD 
= 1.30) generated a similar number of negative thoughts when compared to 
participants in the control condition (M = 1.90, SD = 1.39) and participants in the 
bolstering condition (M = 1.15, SD = 0.97), all ps ≥ .682. Thus, H3b was not 
supported. There was no difference in the overall valence of thoughts generated 
between conditions.17 
 
5.4.4. Discussion 
The current study attempted to replicate the carryover effects of a 
counterarguing mindset using an episodic priming procedure. The study also aimed to 
test if BIS moderated the carryover effects of a counterarguing mindset. Specifically, 
the present study aimed to investigate the impact of a counterarguing mindset on 
perceptual variables: hotel advert evaluations (composite measure for persuasiveness 
and appeal) and product attractiveness (i.e. hotel attractiveness). The study also aimed 
                                                 
17 Thought Index. There were no main effects of advert type, F(1, 204) = 2.39, p = .124 or priming, 
F(2, 204) = .95, p = .388 on the overall valence of thoughts generated by participants. The valence of 
thoughts generated by participants in the counterarguing condition (M = -0.13, SD = 2.01) was similar 
to that of participants in the control condition (M = 0.42, SD = 2.14), p = .996) and participants in the 
bolstering condition (M =0.13, SD = 2.42), all ps ≥ .213.  
  
196 
 
to investigate the impact of a counterarguing mindset on behavioural variables 
(willingness to pay for a one-night hotel stay, willingness to volunteer for future 
studies and the number of minutes volunteered for future studies). The impact of a 
counterarguing mindset on cognitive variables (positive thoughts, negative thoughts) 
was also assessed. Finally, the study investigated if motivational orientation 
moderated the effects of the counterarguing mindset.  
Participants in the counterarguing condition provided less favourable overall 
evaluations of the hotel advert than participants in the bolstering condition. Contrary 
to expectation, there was no difference in the number of negative thoughts generated 
between conditions. Interestingly though, there was a significant influence of priming 
on the number of positive thoughts generated. Participants in the counterarguing 
condition generated significantly fewer positive thoughts than those in the bolstering 
condition.  
In Study 3 the episodic priming procedure failed to produce any priming 
effects. However, in the current study priming effects were observed. The expected 
pattern of effects was observed among the perceptual variables. Participants in the 
counterarguing condition gave significantly lower advert evaluations (p = .034) when 
compared to those in the bolstering condition. Analysis did not reveal any behavioural 
priming effects. Interestingly participants in the counterarguing condition generated 
fewer positive thoughts (p = .099) when compared to participants in the bolstering 
mindset. This result mirrors the findings from Study 1. In Study 1, it was the absence 
of negative thoughts rather than an abundance of positive thoughts that characterised 
the bolstering mindset. It was hypothesised that those in the counterarguing mindset 
would generate more negative thoughts relative to the bolstering condition.  
  
197 
 
Additional Studies 
Two additional online studies are reported in the following section. These studies 
were conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk or “Mturk”. Mturk is a crowd sourcing 
website which allows individuals to post online tasks which can be completed by a 
population of anonymous workers for a small financial incentive (Ross, Zaldivar, 
Irani, & Tomlinson, 2010). The speed and convenience of data collection on Mturk 
has prompted many social scientists to run online studies to supplement their lab 
based research (e.g. Xu & Wyer, (2012, Study 4). Mturk studies have become 
increasingly prevalent in scholarly journals in recent years. This growing acceptance 
of Mturk studies within academic journals is a testament to the robustness of the data 
these studies generate. Research suggests that Amazon Mturk is a reliable and 
inexpensive means of collecting high quality data (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 
2011; Crump, McDonnell, & Gureckis, 2013). In the interest of parsimony, the 
studies are briefly outlined and priming effects reported. The results of the null effects 
are reported in Appendix F.  
 
 
5.5. Study 5  
 
5.5.1. Introduction to Study  
Study 5 attempted to replicate the effects of a bolstering mindset using the 
same experimental design and target materials used by Xu and Wyer (2012, Study 2). 
All participants were exposed to the same (exotic snack food) advert used in the as the 
original study (see Appendix K).  
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5.5.2. Sample and Study Design 
The study employed a 3 (mindset: bolstering vs. counterarguing vs. control) x 
Advert between-subjects design. One hundred and fifty-four workers were recruited 
for the study. Of the 158 participants recruited, sixteen participants did not satisfy the 
priming manipulation check (did not write at least five sentences for each proposition 
in the expected direction). These cases were were removed from the dataset. The 
remaining 138 participants (73 males, 65 females) were aged between 20 - 68 years. 
The sample composed chiefly of Indian (77) and American (55) participants. The 
mean age of participants in the study was 35.77 years (SD = 11.74).  
Procedure. The current study was conducted online. Participants were 
recruited using the crowd sourcing website, Amazon Mturk. The challenges 
associated with running a successful mindset priming study online are daunting. The 
lack of control over the experimental conditions introduces a high risk of extraneous 
variables. In order to maximise the chances of success, a targeted approach to 
participant recruitment was adopted. First, the researcher used filter criteria on the 
Amazon Mturk website to target experienced mturk workers with a proven track 
record of providing high quality work18. Second, the researcher also tried to reduce 
the risk of extraneous variables by asking participants to indicate the level of 
distraction in their immediate environment. Specifically, workers who qualified for 
the experiment were required to answer the following opening question “To what 
extent does your immediate environment provide distractions?” Participants rated the 
level of distraction from 1, “not at all distracting” to 5, “extremely distracting”. Only 
                                                 
18 The number of HITs (i.e. job undertaken by the worker) for each participant ≥ 5000. Each participant 
had an  approval rate ≥ 98% for work completed. 
 
  
199 
 
participants who indicated that their immediate environment was “not at all 
distracting” were permitted to take part in the study. Respondents who passed this 
test were then asked to click on a web-link which directed them to questionnaire on 
surveymonkey.com. An introductory paragraph was used to establish the cover story. 
Respondents read that they were required to complete 2 separate and unrelated 
studies. Specifically, participants read that two independent researchers in Dublin City 
University had been awarded a joint prize and had decided to use their winnings to 
finance one study each. Participants were informed that they would have to complete 
both unrelated “studies” in order to received payment from this joint fund19. Each 
participant was paid $1.50 for their participation in the study.  
Participants in the procedural priming propositions were tailored to be 
applicable to an online sample. Participants in the bolstering (counterarguing) 
conditions responded to the following procedural priming propositions; “Recycling is 
a good (bad) idea”; “The internet enriches (does not enrich) my mind”; “The 
computer is (not) an important invention”. Following the priming procedure 
participants undertook the second study which asked them to evaluate the exotic food 
(i.e. scorpion snack) advert (see Appendix K). The study measured participants’ 
perceptual responses; advert evaluation (persuasiveness, appeal) and product 
evaluation (i.e. snack attractiveness). Participants’ behavioural responses were also 
measured (willingness to pay for the snack, willingness to volunteer for future studies, 
number of minutes volunteered for future studies).  
                                                 
19
 “We are inviting you to participate in 2 separate and unrelated academic studies. These two 
independent studies are being undertaken by different researchers for two different research projects. 
However, in the interests of efficiency we have decided to include both studies here within this one 
questionnaire. Both researchers are contributing to the cost of running the studies so participants will 
be only be paid when both studies are completed”. 
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5.5.3. Results 
In the interest of parsimony only (marginally) significant priming effects are 
reported below. Tables of the null results are reported in Table 7.27, Table 7.28 and 
Table 7.29 (see Appendix F).  
Willingness to pay. There was no main effect of priming on participants’ 
willingness to pay for the exotic snack, F(2, 91) = 1.76, p = .177. There was no 
difference in participants’ willingness to pay for the exotic snack between the 
bolstering condition (M = 1.39, SD = 1.44) and counterarguing condition (M = 1.33, 
SD = 1.61), p = .817. However, participants in the counterarguing condition were less 
willing to pay for the exotic snack than participants in the control condition (M = 
2.09, SD = 1.61), p = .098. However, since only the later contrast was (marginally) 
significant, H2a was not supported.  
 
5.5.4. Discussion 
The results of Study 5 do not provide any evidence of the bolstering mindset. 
In fact the opposite is the case. Contrary to expectation the only differences found 
between conditions was observed among participants in the control and 
counterarguing conditions. Specifically, participants in the counterarguing condition 
were found to be less willing to pay for the exotic snack than participants in the 
control condition. While Xu and Wyer (2012) have demonstrated that a 
counterarguing mindset has a detrimental effect on perceptual judgements of 
favourable stimuli (e.g. Hotels) the researchers found no evidence to suggest that a 
counterarguing mindset could further compound the negative perceptions of 
unfavourable stimuli. Indeed, such a finding runs contrary to their conceptualisation 
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of these behavioural mindsets which are thought to only with the mindsets are 
confined to influence response that are incongruent with the mindset. 
 
 
5.6. Study 6 
 
5.6.1. Introduction to Study  
Study 6 attempted to replicate the effects of a counterarguing mindset 
employing a similar experimental design and using the exact target materials (Advert 
1: Swiss Igloo Hotel, Advert 2: Milwalkee) originally used by Xu and Wyer (2012, 
Study 1).  Unlike the original study which only tested a procedural priming procedure, 
the current study also tests the impact of an episodic priming procedure. All 
participants in the current study were exposed to one of the two vacation spot adverts 
(see Appendix K).  
 
5.6.2. Sample and Study Design 
The study employed a 3 (mindset: bolstering vs. counterarguing vs. control) x 
2 (favourableness of hotel: high vs. moderate) x 2 (priming types: procedural vs. 
episodic) between-subjects design. Participants were randomly assigned to all 
conditions. Two hundred and ninety American “Mturkers” participated in the study; 
138 participants exposed to an episodic priming condition and 152 participants in the 
procedural priming condition. Participants were exposed to one of two adverts 
promotion vacation spots; 43% of participants (127) were exposed to Advert 1 (Igloo 
hotel in Switzerland) while the remaining 56% of participants (163) were exposed to 
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Advert 2 (Milwalkee) (see Appendix K). Participants (132 males, 158 females) were 
aged between 18 – 73 years. The mean age of participants was 35.86 years (SD = 
12.07). 
Procedure. The same inclusion criteria used in Study 5 (worker qualifications 
and distraction levels in the immediate environment) were again enforced in the 
current study. Furthermore, in order to try to match the participant profile in the 
original study, only American participants were permitted to partake in the current 
study. Participants read the same paragraph relating to the independence of the studies 
before undertaking either a procedural priming procedure (see Study 5) or an episodic 
priming procedure (see Study 3 and Study 4). The priming manipulation check 
revealed that all participants in the procedural priming condition wrote at least five 
sentences for each proposition in the expected direction. Participants were then 
exposed to one of the two vacation spot adverts in the second, seemingly unrelated 
study. Participants’ perceptual and behavioural responses to the adverts were 
measured using a questionnaire on surveymonkey.com. Participants’ evaluative 
judgements relating to advert evaluation (persuasiveness, appeal) and product 
evaluation (i.e. vacation spot attractiveness) were measured. Participants’ behavioural 
responses (willingness to visit the vacation spot, willingness to pay for a one-night 
hotel stay, willingness to volunteer for future studies and number of minutes 
volunteered for future studies) were also recorded.  
 
5.6.3. Results  
Analysis of Covariance revealed that there were no effects of procedural 
priming in this study. Furthermore, only three priming effects were found among 
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participants who undertook the episodic priming procedure. In the interest of 
parsimony only the significant priming effects are reported below. Table containing 
the results are reported in Table 7.33 and Table 7.34 (Appendix F). The correlation 
matrix for the focal variables is provided in Table 7.35. The means and standard 
deviations for the perceptual, behavioural and cognitive variables appear in Table 
7.35, Table 7.36, and Table 7.37 respectively (see Appendix F). 
Advert persuasiveness. There was no main effect of vacation spot 
attractiveness, F(1, 106) = .00, p = .950 or episodic priming F(2, 106) = 2.07, p = 
.131 on participants’ ratings of advert persuasiveness. Nevertheless, the means were 
in the expected direction. Participants in the counterarguing condition (M = 3.75, SD 
= 1.58) rated the vacation spot advert as slightly less persuasive than participants in 
the control condition (M = 4.10, SD = 1.92); p = .211, and significantly less 
persuasive than participants in the bolstering condition (M = 4.53, SD = 1.54), p = 
.035. However, since only the later contrast was marginally significant, H1a was not 
supported.  
Willingness to pay. There was a significant main effect of vacation spot 
attractiveness on participant’s willingness to pay for a one night stay at the vacation 
spot, F(1, 105) = 18.48, p = .000, 
2
p
 
= .150. Participants exposed to Advert 1 (M = 
199.72, SD = 139.37) were willing to pay more for a one night stay at the vacation 
spot than participants exposed to the Advert 2 (M = 121.29, SD = 84.50). There was 
also a significant main effect of priming on participants’ willingness to pay for a one 
night stay at the vacation spot, F(2, 105) = 3.16, p = .046, 
2
p
 
= .057. Participants in 
the counterarguing condition (M = 132.20, SD = 127.01) and participants in the 
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control condition (M = 151.10, SD = 105.94), exhibited a similar willingness to pay 
for a one night stay at the vacation spot, p = .918. Interestingly though, participants in 
the bolstering condition, (M = 194.68, SD = 122.23) exhibited a greater willingness to 
pay than participants in the control condition (M = 151.10, SD = 105.94), p = .020 
and participants in the counterarguing condition, (M = 132.20, SD = 127.01), p = 
.044. This result is interesting result because it clearly demonstrates the power of the 
bolstering mindset to exert a strong influence on participants even when the target 
stimulus is favourable. This result conflicts with the conceptualisation of the 
bolstering mindset postulated by Xu and Wyer (2012). Indeed, the counterarguing 
mindset did not have any influence on participants’ willingness to pay. Hense, H2a 
was not supported.  
Willingness to visit vacation spot. There was a significant main effect of 
vacation spot attractiveness on participants’ willingness to visit, F(1, 106) = 5.75, p = 
.018, 
2
p
 
= .051. Participants exposed to Advert 1 (M = 4.60, SD = 1.99) featuring the 
Igloo Hotel in Switzerland were significantly more willing to visit the vacation spot 
than participants exposed to Advert 2 (M = 3.56, SD = 1.87) which featured 
Milwalkee as the vacation spot. However, there was no main effect of priming on 
participant’s willingness to visit the vacation spot, F(2, 106) = 2.33, p = .102. 
Nevertheless, the means were in the expected direction. Participants in the 
counterarguing condition (M = 3.50, SD = 1.77) were slightly less willing to visit the 
vacation spot than participants in the control condition (M = 4.12, SD = 2.08), p = 
.359, and significantly less willing to visit the vacation spot than participants in the 
bolstering condition (M = 4.50, SD = 1.97), p = .035. Since only the later contrast was 
marginally significant, H2d was not supported. 
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5.6.4. Discussion  
Study 6 attempted to replicate a counterarguing mindset using both a 
procedural priming procedure and an episodic priming procedure. As in Study 1, the 
procedural priming failed to induce effects of a counterarguing mindset. However, as 
in Study 4, the episodic priming procedure was successful in inducing the 
counterarguing mindset. Nevertheless, the priming effects evidenced in this study are 
again weak. Regardless, this pattern of results is at least consistent between studies 
and corresponds closely with the previous priming effects found. Specifically, 
participants in the counterarguing condition rated the advert as less persuasive than 
participants in the bolstering condition. Participants in the counterarguing condition 
were also less willing to visit the vacation spot featured in the advert when compared 
to participants in the bolstering condition. More noteworthy is the finding that the 
participants in the bolstering condition were significantly more willing to pay for a 
one night stay at the vacation spot compared to participants in control and 
counterarguing conditions. The strength of the effect and the fact that this is not 
accounted for by Xu and Wyer’s conceptualisation of the mindset is of theoretical 
interest. It also has serious practical ramifications for consumers. It appears that the 
bolstering mindset can influence evaluative judgements on both positive and negative 
target stimuli. What is also striking is that the bolstering mindset consistently 
increases monetary judgements across studies. This has worrying implications for 
consumers who appear to be more likely to suffer the deleterious effects of a 
bolstering mindset than be awarded the cognitive protection offered by a 
counterarguing mindset.  
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CHAPTER  6:  GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so”. 
William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act 2, Scene 2 
 
The above philosophical musings of William Shakespeare assume a prophetic tone in 
light of recent consumer research on behaviour mindsets. However, one ventures that 
not even the bard himself truly grasped the full import of his words. Indeed, it is only 
in the last century that psychologists have begun to map the consumptive implications 
of cognition (for a review see Wyer & Adaval, 2008). What is more, it is only in the 
last four decades that psychologists have come to the startling realisation that many of 
the cognitive processes which drive consumer behaviour often occur outside of 
conscious awareness (for a review see Wyer, 2008). Mindsets orchestrate many of 
these non-conscious processes (for a review see Wyer & Xu, 2010). Interestingly, 
recent research has provided the first evidence of behavioural mindsets influencing 
persuasive appeals (Xu & Wyer, 2012). Specifically, bolstering (counterarguing) 
mindsets are found to positively (negatively) influence perceptual, behavioural and 
cognitive responses to subsequently encountered persuasive appeals (Xu & Wyer, 
2012). The research suggests that simply thinking in a critical or reaffirming manner 
can predispose individuals to re-enacting these thought processes in conceptually 
similar yet unrelated future situations. Consequently, these newly discovered mindsets 
have repercussions for consumer resistance. Metaphorically speaking, while a 
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bolstering mindset may furnish consumers with a pair of rose tinted glasses, a 
counterarguing mindset may serve them up a glass half empty. To contemporise 
Shakespeare’s assumptive proposition; it appears that there is nothing either good or 
bad, but mindsets make it so.  
An emerging body of work has found that consumer mindsets play a 
significant role in shaping impulsive and automatic consumer behaviours (for a 
review see Wyer & Xu, 2010). Consequently, the role of mindsets within consumer 
domains is a prominent topic in consumer psychology. Indeed, for the period 2009 - 
2014, the conceptual overview of mindsets provided by Wyer and Xu (2010) ranked 
in the top 10 most cited academic papers within the field of consumer psychology20. 
However, few studies have directly explored the interface between mindsets and 
consumer resistance (Knowles & Linn, 2004). 
This final chapter of the thesis begins with an overview of the current 
research. Here, the primary objectives of the research are outlined and a brief 
description of each study is provided. The main findings across the 6 studies are then 
reported and the theoretical and methodological research contributions explicated. 
Next, the practical implications of counterarguing and bolstering mindsets are 
outlined for both consumers and marketers. The specific limitations of the current 
research are also acknowledged and discussed. The chapter draws to a close by 
identifying potential avenues for future research. Specific questions arising from the 
current research are firstly discussed. Later, the author looks to new fields of research 
                                                 
20
 http://www.myscp.org/pdf/newsletters/mostcited_sep2014.pdf, [01/12/15] 
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that employ the same methodological approaches and which share a similar thematic 
outlook. Potentially exciting future research agendas are identified. In order to situate 
the current research within the academic literature and contextualise its broader 
relevance, a brief discussion on the future of priming research then follows. Casting 
light on the specific theoretical, methodological and political challenges associated 
with priming research, the author predicts the future trajectory of this specialised 
research within the complimentary field of consumer psychology and social 
psychology. The thesis concludes by offering recommendations to overcome the 
current challenges which threaten to road block potential exciting research avenues. 
 
6.2. Overview of the research 
A set of 6 experiments were conducted to investigate bolstering and 
counterarguing mindsets. The primary objectives of the studies were two-fold: 1) to 
examine the carryover effects of bolstering and counterarguing mindsets and 2) to test 
the boundary conditions of the priming effects associated with these mindsets. Across 
the six studies (Studies 1- 6), the research explored the possibility that an individual’s 
motivational orientation moderates the carryover effects of these mindsets. In one 
study (Study 3), the research also tested the hypothesis that an individual’s Persuasion 
Knowledge (PK) moderates the carryover effects of bolstering and counterarguing 
mindsets.  
Motivational orientation guides human actions across a wide range of contexts 
and is considered a fundamental building block of behaviour (Carver, 2006). This 
construct is especially appropriate for the current research since approach and 
avoidance tendencies characterise bolstering and counterarguing mindsets 
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respectively and consumer behaviours more generally (Knowles & Linn, 2004a). It 
was hypothesised that individuals exhibiting strong approach motivation would be 
especially influenced by a bolstering mindset while individuals exhibiting strong 
avoidance motivation would be especially influenced by a counterarguing mindset. 
Persuasion knowledge (PK) was also investigated as a potential moderator of 
bolstering and counterarguing mindsets. PK is often activated to protect individuals 
against deceptive and manipulative marketing communications (Friestad & Wright, 
2013). It was hypothesised that individuals exhibiting strong (weak) PK would be less 
(more) influenced by a bolstering mindset (Study 3). The secondary aims of the 
research were more explorative and scoping in nature. These investigated alternative 
methods of mindset priming (i.e. episodic priming) and assessed the potentially 
hidden cognitive costs (i.e. PK suppression) that may accrue as a consequence of 
mindset activation. The aims of each study are now outlined in the next section. 
Study 1 aimed to replicate the carryover effects of a counterarguing mindset 
and to test if these effects are moderated by avoidance motivation. The study 
employed the original procedural priming procedure used by Xu and Wyer (2012). 
However, following the non-replication of the counterarguing mindset in Study 1, an 
amended procedural priming procedure was used in all subsequent studies. Study 2 
and Study 3 aimed to replicate the carryover effects of a bolstering mindset and to test 
if these effects are moderated by approach motivation. Study 3 also tested the 
hypothesis that an individual’s PK moderates the effects of a bolstering mindset. 
Study 2 employed a procedural priming procedure. Study 3 used both procedural and 
episodic priming procedures in order to systematically assess the differential 
effectiveness of both approaches using a between subjects design. Study 4 aimed to 
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replicate the carryover effects of a counterarguing mindset and to test if these effects 
are moderated by avoidance motivation. The study used an episodic priming 
procedure. Study 5 (Study 6) aimed to replicate the carryover effects of a bolstering 
(counterarguing) mindset and to test if these effects are moderated by approach 
(avoidance) motivation. Study 5 and Study 6 were conducted online. Amazon Mturk 
was used to recruit participants and Surveymonkey.com was used to collect the data. 
Study 5 used a procedural priming procedure while Study 6 used both procedural and 
episodic priming procedures to again systematically test the effectiveness of both 
approaches. 
 
6.3. Research Contributions  
Mindsets are well established cognitive phenomena that have been shown to 
induce priming effects across a wide variety of human behaviours (for a review see 
Wyer and Xu, 2010). However, mindsets are inherently fragile phenomena (e.g. Dhar, 
Huber, & Khan, 2007; Hamilton, Vohs, Sellier, & Meyvis, 2011). The empirical 
evidence produced by Xu and Wyer (2012) attest to the former, while the data of the 
current author confirm the latter. The results of the studies generally point to much 
weaker effects than those reported by Xu and Wyer (2012). The anticipated priming 
effects were typically found when the experimental conditions were contrasted against 
each other. However, it is worth noting that while these priming effects are weak, they 
are in the predicted direction and generally consistent across the studies (see Tables 
6.2 and Table 6.3). Table 6.1 summaries the research contributions of the thesis. Table 
6.2 provides an overview of the main effects of priming across the 6 studies. Table 6.3 
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outlines the results of planned contrasts for each of the six studies. The research 
contributions of the current research are now discussed.  
 The current research provides both theoretical and methodological 
contributions to the extant literature on consumer mindsets generally, and 
bolstering/counterarguing mindsets, specifically. Theoretical contributions are made 
to the academic literature by demonstrating that (1) the bolstering mindset increases a 
willingness to pay for aversive and non-charitable products (Study 2), (2) that the 
bolstering mindset is moderated by approach motivation (Study 2 and Study 3), and 
(3) that counterarguing and bolstering mindsets may inhibit the activation of 
incongruent thoughts (Study 2 and Study 3). Methodological contributions are made 
to the mindset priming literature by (1) using a novel, episodic priming procedure to 
prime a counterarguing mindset (Study 1, Study 3 and Study 6) and (2) by making 
refinements to the procedural mindset priming procedure used by Xu and Wyer 
(2012) (Study 1 and Study 2). Looking across the six studies, a number of insights 
may be gained by considering the counterarguing and the bolstering mindsets in 
isolation.  
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Table 6.1 
Overview of Research Contributions 
Contributions Type Finding Study  
Main     
Bolstering/Counterarguing  Theoretical    Willingness to pay Study 2, 3 
Thought inhibition Theoretical    Incongruent thoughts (positive, negative, PK thoughts)  
Approach motivation Theoretical        Moderates the effects of bolstering mindset Study 2, 3 
Priming procedure   Methodological          New episodic priming procedure Study 1 
    
Minor     
Bolstering Mindset       Activated by procedural priming only Study 2, 3 
Perceptual variables    Persuasiveness, attractiveness Study 2 
Behavioural variables    Willingness to petition signing, willingness to pay Study 2,3 
Cognitive variables    Number of positive thoughts,   Number of negative thoughts & PK thoughts Study 2, 3 
Implications for Consumers    Spending on moderately aversive propositions  
Implications for Marketers    Behavioural intentions. Potential nudging applications  
    
Counterarguing Mindset       Activated by episodic priming only Study 4, 6 
Behavioural variables    Willingness to pay Study 6 
Cognitive variables    Number of positive thoughts  Study 4 
Implications for Consumers        Strategies for resistance (implementation intensions)  
Implications for Marketers        Strategies for mindset disruption/displacement  
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Table 6.2  
Main Effects of Priming 
   Study 1 
Hotel 
advert 
Study 2 
Web-tax 
article 
Study 3 
Pension scheme 
Article 
Study 4 
Hotel 
advert 
Study 5 
Food 
advert 
Study 6 
Vacation spot 
advert 
      n =  134 n = 233 n = 162 n = 182 n = 268 n = 138 n = 152 n = 138 
Variables 
 
Hypothesis Procedural Procedural Procedural Episodic Episodic Procedural Procedural Episodic 
Perceptual  Persuasiveness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 Appeal      
 
H1a Ad/Article evaluation 
     
 
H1b Product attractiveness 
 
 
   
 
H5b Perceived PK 
     
Behavioural H2a Willingness to pay  
   
 
 
H2b Willingness to volunteer  
     
 
H2c Minutes volunteered 
     
 
H2d Willingness to  
sign petition  
 
   
Cognitive H3a Positive thoughts 
 
  
  
 
H3b Negative thoughts  
    
 
H3c PK thoughts 
     
 
H3d Attitude certainty 
       
All ps ≤ .10 
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Table 6.3 
Overview of Planned Contrasts 
Study Hypothesis Variable Control Bolstering Counterarguing p 
Effect Size  
(Cohens d) 
Study 2 - Web-tax advert n/a  Persuasiveness      .022 0.41 
  H1a Advert/Article evaluation     .061 0.33 
  H2a Willingness to pay  

.036 0.42 
  H2a Willingness to pay 

  .001 0.86 
  H2a Willingness to pay 

 .041 0.40 
  H3a Positive thoughts  

.099 0.16 
  H3b Negative thoughts     .030 0.27 
  H5b Perceived PK      .095 0.23 
Study 3 - Pension scheme  H1b Product attractiveness  

.043 0.39 
  H1b  Product attractiveness 

  .023 0.43 
  H2a Willingness to pay  

.049 0.68 
  H2a Willingness to pay 

  .067 0.65 
  H2d Willingness to sign petition  

.072 0.31 
  H2d Willingness to sign petition 

  .038 0.35 
  H3a Positive thoughts     .030 0.28 
   n/a  Involvement     .040 0.45 
Study 4 - Hotel advert  n/a  Persuasiveness      .036 0.40 
   n/a  Appeal     .069 0.32 
  H1a Advert/Article evaluation     .034 0.39 
  H3a Positive thoughts     .035 0.43 
Study 5 - Food advert H2a Willingness to pay     .098 0.47 
Study 6 - Vacation spot  n/a  Persuasiveness      .035 0.50 
  H2a Willingness to pay     .044 0.50 
  H2a Willingness to pay  

.020 0.38 
  H2d Willingness to visit      .035 0.53 
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6.4. Theoretical Contributions 
The current research makes a number of theoretical contributions to the 
literature on behavioural mindsets. The results suggest that both bolstering and 
counterarguing mindsets have the power to promote behavioural intension and inhibit 
incongruent thoughts. Importantly, the research also demonstrates that the bolstering 
mindset is moderated by approach motivation. These theoretical contributions to the 
literature are explicated in the next sections.  
 
6.4.1. Promoting behavioural intentions and inhibiting incongruent thoughts 
 Counterarguing Mindset. Studies 1, 4 and 6 investigated the effects of a 
counterarguing mindset on different types of attractive target stimuli (i.e. hotel adverts 
and vacation spot adverts). The priming effects of a counterarguing mindset were only 
observed when an episodic priming procedure was employed. The results suggest that 
the counterarguing mindset has the ability to inhibit the generation of incongruent 
(positive) thoughts (Study 4) and can decrease an individual’s willingness to pay 
(Study 6). Interestingly, Study 4 provides evidence that a counterarguing mindset can 
exert an inhibitory effect on positive thought generation. While Xu and Wyer (2012) 
demonstrated that the counterarguing mindset could promote the generation of 
negative thoughts, they did not find evidence to suggest that the mindset could inhibit 
the activation of positive thoughts. These results contribute to our understanding of 
the counterarguing mindset and demonstrate that the mechanisms governing its 
operation may be more complex than originally envisaged. Interestingly, Study 5 
provides some evidence to suggest that the remit of the counterarguing mindset may 
be more expansive than originally conceptualised by Xu and Wyer (2012). 
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Participants in the counterarguing condition were less willing to pay when compared 
to participants in the control condition. This result was unanticipated because the 
target stimulus was aversive in nature (i.e. an exotic scorpion snack). In contrast, Xu 
and Wyer (2012) found that a counterarguing mindset could only exert its influence 
on attractive stimuli (i.e. hotel advert). The results of Study 5 suggest that the scope of 
the counterarguing mindset to depress behavioural intentions might not necessarily be 
restricted to positive stimuli. Future research could explore this possibility further. 
Bolstering Mindset. Studies 2, 3 and 5 investigated the effects of a bolstering 
mindset on different types of aversive target stimuli (i.e. a web-tax, a mandatory 
pension scheme, and exotic snack food respectively). In contrast to the counterarguing 
mindset, the effects of the bolstering mindset were only observed when a procedural 
priming procedure was employed. The current research demonstrates that a 
procedurally primed, bolstering mindset can positively influence ratings of product 
attractiveness (Study 3) and promote a greater willingness to pay for aversive 
propositions (Study 2). While Xu and Wyer (2012; study 3) demonstrated that a 
bolstering mindset could increase charitable donation intentions they did not 
specifically test if a bolstering mindset could increase an individual’s willingness pay 
for non-charitable (i.e. commercial) propositions that induce aversive responses. The 
current research overcomes this potential limitation by testing aversive propositions 
such as webtax (Study 2) and a mandatory pension scheme (Study 3). This represents 
an important extension of the research undertaken by Xu and Wyer (2012). Monetary 
behavioural intentions are of central importance within consumer domains. The 
ability of the bolstering mindset to increase an individual’s willingness to pay is found 
in Study 2 and Study 3. Indeed, it appears to be the most robust of the priming effects 
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observed (see Table 6.3). The relative strength of the priming effect on monetary 
behavioural intentions is relatively stronger than the priming effects observed on 
perceptual variables (i.e. article evaluations or product evaluations). This is perhaps 
due to the open format of the “willingness to pay” question which is likely to facilitate 
priming effects by increasing the potential for misattribution.  
Interestingly, the priming effects of the bolstering mindset appear to be 
context bound. Behavioural intentions unrelated to the target (e.g. willingness to 
volunteer for future studies, number of minutes volunteered for future studies) are 
unaffected by the mindset. This suggests that the carryover effects of the bolstering 
mindset are restricted to influencing behavioural variables directly related to the 
target. For example, the bolstering mindset induced individuals to sign a petition in 
support of an aversive proposition but did not induce them to volunteer for future 
studies. It is worth noting that participants in Study 2 did not exhibit an increased 
willingness to sign a petition. This suggests that perhaps the bolstering mindset can 
positively influence behavioural intentions but only if the target stimulus is not overly 
negative in nature. This caveat provides a new theoretical contribution to the sparse 
literature and suggests that the gravitational pull of a bolstering mindset may be 
dependent on the target stimulus. The pattern of results suggests that the bolstering 
mindset may increase an individual’s willingness to undertake aversive behaviours if 
the proposition is moderately objectionable but not if it is highly objectionable. In 
short, the results of Study 2 and Study 3 suggest that the bolstering mindset does not 
make individuals mindlessly compliant but rather makes them more amenable to 
reasonable requests. This finding is in line with past research which finds that primes 
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can only occur when they do not have to compete with strong motivational goals that 
hinder their activation (Higgins, 1996).  
The current research provides some evidence to suggest that a bolstering 
mindset can impede the activation of negative thoughts (see Study 2) in addition to 
promoting the generation of positive thoughts (see Xu & Wyer, 2012). This pattern of 
results mirrors those found for the counterarguing mindset in Study 4. In Study 4, the 
counterarguing mindset was found to impede the activation of positive thoughts. 
Taken together, the results suggest that these behavioural mindsets can induce thought 
inhibition in addition to thought generation. This is a theoretical contribution to the 
existing literature and aligns with past research that also demonstrates that mindsets 
may induce thought inhibition (see Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995).  
There is also some evidence to suggest that the bolstering mindset can inhibit 
the activation of Persuasion Knowledge (i.e. reduce the number of PK thoughts 
generated). The effect is weak and only observed between the experimental 
conditions. Nevertheless, such an effect has thought provoking implications for 
consumers. Mindsets that hamper or subdue PK activation are potentially harmful to 
consumers who need to navigate an often treacherously deceptive marketplace (Boush 
et al., 2009). This finding contributes to both the mindset priming literature and to the 
persuasion knowledge literature. With some notable exceptions (see Kirmani & Zhu, 
2007), few studies have sought to build theoretical bridges between these two 
respective literatures. This is surprising when one considers the stand-alone 
importance of both topics. Consumer mindsets are important because they influence 
all stages of information processing and may infiltrate all consumer domains (Wyer, 
2012). On the other hand, PK is important because it is “one of the most valuable 
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socioeconomic resources” available to individuals and is central to consumer welfare 
(Friestad & Wright, 1999; p. 185). The current research has addressed the gap 
between these two important literatures.  
In sum, the effects of bolstering and counterarguing mindsets are more subtle 
that those reported by Xu and Wyer (212). Indeed, the priming effects reported herein 
are less pronounced than those typically found in well cited goal priming studies. 
Pashler et al. (2012) found that goal priming studies typically report large effect sizes 
ranging from d = 0.5 to d = 1. The authors noted that these priming effects eclipsed 
the much smaller effects found in perceptual priming studies (d= .06). 
In the current research, the most prevalent and robust priming effect shared 
between both mindsets is also arguably the most important; willingness to pay. 
Specifically, the bolstering (counterarguing) mindset is found to increase (decrease) 
an individual’s willingness to pay. Few other metrics are more central to consumer 
behaviour and consumer welfare than willingness to pay. Admittedly, the results of 
the studies do not provide the same compelling narrative that typifies papers within 
high ranked psychology journals. However, the implications of the file drawer 
problem (see Finkel et al., 2015; Simonsohn, Nelson, & Simmons, 2014) and the 
abundant evidence of publication bias within academia (see Francis, 2012; Sterling, 
Rosenbaum, & Weinkam, 1995; Versa, Rosenbaum, & Weinkam, 2015) suggest that 
all may not be as it seems. There is reason to suspect that the oft profusion of 
statistically significant results may be somewhat misrepresentative of reality. In 
contrast, the more modest results reported herein are arguably a diagnostic criterion 
for authenticity. 
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6.4.2. Approach Motivation moderates the Bolstering Mindset 
Both motivational orientation and persuasion knowledge inform the 
information processing strategies that individuals employ when assessing persuasive 
appeals (Gerend & Shepherd, 2007; Kirmani & Zhu, 2007; Mann et al., 2004; 
Sherman et al., 2006; Updegraff et al., 2007). To the author’s knowledge, no research 
has yet investigated the conditions which influence the priming effects associated 
with bolstering and counterarguing mindsets. Accordingly, the current research makes 
a theoretical contribution to the scarce literature by testing potential moderators of 
these mindset priming effects. Across 6 studies, the current research tested the 
hypothesis that approach (avoidance) motivation moderates the effects of bolstering 
(counterarguing) mindsets. One study (Study 3) also tested the hypothesis that PK 
moderated the effects of a bolstering mindset. Past research has found that PK can 
influence how individuals process advertising appeals (Kirmani & Zhu, 2007). 
However, no evidence was found to support the hypothesis that PK moderates the 
bolstering mindset. Nevertheless, the approach motivation was found to moderate the 
effects of the bolstering mindset (Study 2 and Study 3). Intriguingly though, both 
studies provide conflicting evidence with regard to the nature of the moderating effect 
of approach motivation. In Study 2, the hypothesised “fit” effect between approach 
motivation and bolstering mindset was found. Specifically, individuals exhibiting 
strong approach motivation were found to be significantly more willing to pay (a 
webtax) than individuals exhibiting weak approach motivation. This is an important 
theoretical contribution to the literature. Furthermore, this result is theoretically 
congruent with regulatory fit theory. Individuals experience regulatory “fit” when 
they adopt goal pursuit strategies or engage in activities that sustain their motivational 
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orientation (Avnet & Higgins, 2006). Thus, according to fit theory, when an 
individual’s (approach) orientation fits the cognitive strategies induced by the 
(bolstering) mindset, stronger priming effects should occur (e.g. Crowe & Higgins, 
1997; Friedman & Förster, 2001). This was found to be the case. Past research that 
has already demonstrated that fit effects increase perceptions of worth and promote 
increased spending (e.g. Avnet & Higgins, 2006; Avnet & Higgins, 2003; Higgins, 
2006). The results of Study 2 therefore provide further evidence in support of the 
“value from fit” effect (Higgins et al. 2005; Higgins et al. 2003). Interestingly though, 
the reverse effect is found in Study 3. 
In Study 3, individuals exhibiting weak approach motivation were found to be 
more willing to pay (pension scheme contributions) than individuals exhibiting strong 
approach orientation. While contrary to the hypothesis formulated by the researcher, 
this finding is nevertheless another important theoretical contribution to the literature. 
Offering an explanation for this finding is difficult but not impossible. However, 
reconciling this counter-intuitive finding with priming theory requires an appreciation 
of contemporary priming models.  
Recent priming models have been used to reconcile some of the many 
discrepant findings that populate the priming literature. These “constructionist 
models” explore the impact of contextual and situational demands on priming effects 
in an attempt to reacquaint empirical evidence with theory. As such, these models 
seek to provide overarching theoretical frameworks which accommodate a wide 
variety of moderators while also making provision for counterintuitive or theoretically 
challenging results. One such model is the Situated Inference Model (Loersch & 
Payne, 2014).  
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The Situated Inference Model holds that researchers need to know 1) what 
thoughts the prime activates, 2) who these thoughts are attributable to and 3) where, 
i.e., in what context they may be applied (e.g. perceptual, behavioural, motivational 
contexts). The model asserts that different situations provide different “situational 
affordances”. Situational affordances relate to the various inferential implications of a 
prime. Depending on the situation, a prime may provoke different perceptual, 
behaviour or goal pursuit responses to the same stimuli. For example, the decision to 
enact a flight or fright behaviour in response to a threatening stimulus is highly 
dependent upon situational variables. Similarly, priming effects are contextual derived 
by situational affordances; “when one considers the situated nature of priming, it is no 
surprise primes affect judgment and behaviour differently in different labs and in 
samples from different populations....humans are not automatons” (Loersch & Payne, 
2014; p. 145-146).  
This assimilative priming effect for the non-fit combination of a bolstering 
mindset and weak approach motivation is puzzling. However, a few possible 
explanations for this result may be offered. One possible explanation is that the 
mandatory pension scheme featured in Study 3 represents a financial product that 
“fits” with low approach motivation. The mandatory pension scheme featured in the 
study made salient the defensive and prudent nature of saving. Such a financial 
product is likely to be more congruent with the absence of an approach tendency than 
the presence of an approach tendency. If one considers that a pension scheme is an 
avoidance orientated, financial product then it seems quite feasible that individuals 
with a lack of approach motivation are more likely to be convinced by its merits. 
Other explanations also exist.  
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Fujita and Trope (2014) draw attention to the context-specificity of priming 
effects and postulate that priming effects are actually the result of different self-
regulation processes. This theoretical perspective is far removed from the earliest 
priming models which characterised individuals as the submissive recipients of 
primes (e.g. Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982). Fujita and Trope (2014) posit that the 
effects of a prime are largely dependent upon the nature of the regulatory challenge. 
The authors suggest that when individuals engage in “structured regulation” they use 
internal value goals and are thus less likely to be sensitive to any non-goal relevant, 
situational cues during information processing. In contrast, when individuals engage 
in “unstructured regulation” they are more sensitive to situational demands and less 
likely to be led by their goals and internal motivations. It is possible that in Study 3, 
participants were not led by their internal approach motivation but rather by the 
external motivation provided by the context. If this was the case, then individuals who 
do not normally engage in approach behaviours may be differentially more sensitive 
to the priming procedure than individuals who habitually engage in approach 
behaviours as a matter of course. The conflicting results with regard to the moderating 
role of approach motivation add richly to the sparse literature on the bolstering 
mindset. However, future research is necessary to resolve these inconclusive results. 
In light of these conflicting results, the author recommends that future studies should 
be conducted in a psychology laboratory where the contextual variables can be strictly 
controlled. In addition to the theoretical contributions outlined, the current research 
also makes a number of methodological contributions to the literature on mindset 
priming 
 
  
224 
 
6.5. Methodological Contributions 
The current research makes a methodological contribution to the mindset 
priming literature by developing a novel, episodic priming procedure that is found to 
induce a counterarguing mindset. Lesser methodological contributions also accrue 
from adjustments made to the procedural priming procedure used by Xu and Wyer 
(2012). Following the non-replication in Study 1, the original procedural priming 
procedure was refined to 1) make the priming propositions more broadly applicable to 
a wider audience and 2) make the task framing and task instructions less ambiguous 
and more conducive to inducing priming effects. Each of the methodological 
contributions are discussed in the next sections. 
 
6.5.1. New (episodic) and improved (procedural) priming procedures  
Episodic priming. Xu and Wyer (2012) demonstrated that bolstering and 
counterarguing mindsets can be induced procedurally (Studies 1, 2 and 3) and 
incidentally (Study 4). These demonstrations of priming involved the real time 
processing of external information. In contrast, the current research explored the 
possibility that internally generated, recollections of bolstering and counterarguing 
episodes may prime these mindsets by reactivating the associated cognitive 
procedures. The current research employed a novel, episodic priming procedure to 
test this hypothesis. The new priming procedure makes a methodological contribution 
to the mindset priming literature. Interestingly, while the episodic priming procedure 
was found to activate a counterarguing mindset it was not found to activate a 
bolstering mindset.  
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Studies 1, 4 and 6 investigated the effects of a counterarguing mindset. Study 
4 and Study 6 specifically aimed to replicate the effects of the counterarguing mindset 
using the episodic priming procedure. The episodic priming procedure was found to 
decrease the number of positive thoughts generated by participants (see Study 4) and 
decrease participants’ willingness to pay for a one night stay at a vacation spot (see 
Study 6). Studies 2, 3 and 5 investigated the effects of a bolstering mindset. Study 2 
specifically aimed to replicate the effects of the bolstering mindset using the episodic 
priming procedure. However, no evidence of mindset priming effects was found in 
Study 2. In Study 3 (testing the bolstering mindsets) and Study 6 (testing the 
counterarguing mindset), both procedural and episodic priming procedures were 
included to systematically test the differential priming potential of both priming 
procedures. The inability of the episodic priming procedure to activate the bolstering 
mindset is interesting. It seems possible that memories relating to counterarguing 
episodes are more cognitively accessible than memories relating to bolstering 
episodes. Considering that counterarguing is arguably a more emotionally engaging 
experience than bolstering, the memories associated with these episodes are perhaps 
more distinct and easier to recall. In the current research, mood effects were 
controlled for in all analysis. Consequently, negative affect can be ruled out as a direct 
causal factor of the priming effects. Another plausible explanation for the result 
relates to the number of bolstering and counterarguing memories an individual may 
have access to at any given time. It may simply be the case that counterarguing 
episodes are more numerous than bolstering episodes in memory. Since 
counterarguing is the most widely used strategy for resisting persuasion (see 
Zuwerink Jacks & Cameron, 2003), memories associated with this resistance strategy 
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may exhibit heightened cognitive accessibility. This heightened accessibility may help 
explain the results observed. In any case, the current research has demonstrated that in 
addition to being primed procedurally (see Xu & Wyer, 2012; Studies 1-3) and 
primed incidentally (see Xu & Wyer, 2012; Study 4), the counterarguing mindset may 
also be primed episodically. This is a theoretical contribution to the scarce literature. 
Furthermore, the novel episodic priming procedure used to activate the 
counterarguing mindset represents a methodological contribution to the mindset 
priming literature.  
 Procedural priming. The current research attempted to replicate the effects of 
a bolstering and counterarguing mindset by adopting the same procedural priming 
procedure used by Xu and Wyer (2012, Study 1). Studies 1, 4 and 6 investigated the 
effects of the counterarguing mindset. Study 1 and Study 6 specifically aimed to 
replicate the effects of the counterarguing mindset using a procedural priming 
procedure (see Xu & Wyer, 2012). However, no evidence of the counterarguing 
mindset was found using this approach. Studies 2, 3 and 5 investigated the effects of a 
bolstering mindset. Study 2 and Study 3 specifically aimed to replicate the effects of 
the bolstering mindset using the procedural priming procedure employed by Xu and 
Wyer (2012). In both studies, the procedural priming procedure was found to induce 
priming effects. In Study 2, the procedural priming procedure increased the 
persuasiveness of a persuasive appeal and increased participants’ willingness to pay (a 
webtax). It also decreased the number of negative thoughts generated by participants. 
In Study 3, the procedural priming procedure increased the perceived attractiveness of 
a counter-attitudinal proposition (mandatory pension scheme) and increased non-
monetary behavioural intentions (willingness to sign a petition). It also increased the 
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number of positive thoughts generated by participants. However, it should be noted 
that the procedural priming procedure used in Study 2 and Study 3 was an amended 
version of the priming procedure used by Xu and Wyer (2012).  
 The inability of the procedural priming procedure to activate a counterarguing 
mindset is difficult to explain. Considering that counterarguing is more frequently 
employed in daily life (see Zuwerink Jacks & Cameron, 2003) the author had 
envisaged that procedurally activating a counterarguing mindset would have been 
easier than procedurally activating a bolstering mindset. However, the data suggest 
this is not the case. 
Following the failure of the procedural priming procedure in Study 1, a 
number of refinements were made to the priming procedure to improve its 
effectiveness and reliability. Amendments to the priming propositions, the task 
framing and the instruction framing all helped to make the priming procedure more 
widely applicable. These minor alterations to the procedural priming procedure offer 
modest methodological contributions to the mindset priming literature but offer 
important methodological insights to future researchers.  
In Study 1, the priming task was entitled “critical writing task” in order to 
promote critical (counterarguing) thoughts among participants. However, the Masters 
students sampled appear to have interpreted the word “critical” as “balanced” (writing 
task). This subtle semantic difference in interpretation induced bidirectional rather 
than unidirectional message elaboration among the intellectually sophisticated 
Masters students. In retrospect, this is unsurprising since Masters students are 
inculcated to think “critically” as a matter of course. Unfortunately, the task framing 
induced participants to deliberate on the pros and cons of the proposition rather than 
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the pros or cons of the proposition. This was an unfortunate oversight by the author 
who later learned that Xu and Wyer had entitled the task “opinions questionnaire”. 
This more neutral title was less directive and likely promoted more instinctive 
information processing. Importantly, the actual labelling of the task was not 
specifically cited in their paper although it was alluded to. The author only became 
privy to this important information months later when the authors of the original study 
finally replied to a number of requests for the source materials. At this stage the 
experiment had already been run. The effect of this small omission highlights the 
importance of detailed reporting in priming studies and the use of the original 
materials where possible. These issues have also been highlighted by other 
researchers (e.g. Brandt et al., 2014). It appears that small details have 
disproportionally large ramifications which often only become apparent with the 
benefit of hindsight. Recent researchers have noted the costs of “information leakage” 
and the importance of the fulsome reporting of operational and situational conditions 
(Dijksterhuis et al. 2014). Replication efforts remain highly dependent upon a 
confluence of factors which often remain nameless or unidentified due to the under 
reporting of non-significant results (i.e. the file drawer problem). The methodological 
contributions provided by the current research are, therefore, valuable to priming 
researchers and aspirant “replicators”. 
Finally, the current research makes a potential methodological contribution to 
the mindset priming literature by making refinements to the procedural priming 
procedure employed by Xu and Wyer (2012). The non-replication in Study 1 
highlights the importance of context relevant primes.  It also suggests that the 
procedural priming procedure used by Xu and Wyer (2012) is potentially limited in its 
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application due to its context specificity. The propositions used by Xu and Wyer 
(2012) are tailored towards invoking responses from undergraduate students. It 
appears they are less well suited to postgraduate or non-student populations who may 
adopt a nuanced and balanced approach when assessing counter-attitudinal 
information. In order for a procedural priming procedure to be successful, the priming 
propositions must be applicable to the target sample. Due to the problems associated 
with the priming propositions in Study 1, all subsequent studies used a priming 
procedure that employed more reliable priming propositions. The current research 
designed priming propositions that were generic enough to invoke predictable 
responses from undergraduate, postgraduate and non-student populations. 
Specifically, the revised procedural priming procedure used propositions that question 
the merits of recycling and the utility of computers. Such priming propositions were 
less likely to be improperly contested or misinterpreted by participants in the studies.  
The failure of the priming procedure in Study 1 reinforces the point that 
priming effects are “who and where” effects that are contextually bound (Stapel, 
2011). The results in Study 1, or rather the lack thereof, serves to highlight important 
differences between postgraduate and undergraduate cohorts in mindset priming 
studies. While psychology studies rely heavily on student samples (Wilson, Aronson, 
& Carlsmith, 2010), few studies in the priming literature have noted differences 
between postgraduate and undergraduate students. Indeed, to the author’s knowledge, 
no research has made a distinction between undergraduate and postgraduate students 
in relation to their respective responsiveness to primes. This may be due to the fact 
that differences between both cohorts are only likely to be observed in mindset 
priming studies where participants actively engage with the prime and report their 
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interpretations of it. It would also require that researchers use both postgraduate and 
undergraduate students in their series of studies to discern the differences between 
cohorts. From the author’s reading of psychology papers, most researchers appear to 
restrict themselves to convenience samples of undergraduate students. Consequently, 
the differences found between postgraduate and undergraduate samples may prove 
important considerations for researchers who wish to use procedural priming 
techniques. This finding is an important methodological consideration for future 
researchers who seek to conduct mindset priming studies among different (student) 
populations.  
In conclusion, the current research provides a number of methodological 
contributions to aid future researchers when designing and conducting mindset 
priming studies. Specifically, the research offers concrete and actionable 
methodological recommendations relating to task framing, instruction framing and 
priming procedure construction. These methodological insights are likely to be 
valuable to future mindset priming researchers. This insight also serves to stem 
information leakage within the field of consumer behaviour. More substantially, it 
offers a novel priming procedure to the scarce literature on bolstering and 
counterarguing mindsets.  
 
6.6. Practical Implications of the Present Research 
Today, consumers are immersed in sensory rich environments “that are easily the 
most rapidly moving and complex that (have) ever existed on this planet” (Cialdini, 
2001; p. 7). The daily demands of everyday life are such that they necessitate low 
involvement decision-making and the widespread adoption of heuristics (Wyer, 
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2008). Consequently, consumer environments are likely to be especially conducive to 
priming effects. The current research has investigated how bolstering and 
counterarguing mindsets influence resistance towards persuasive appeals. In pursuing 
this line of enquiry, the research has adopted a consumer-centric perspective. 
Ironically though, the practical implications of bolstering and counterarguing 
mindsets reside chiefly within the field of marketing. This is due to the fact that 
priming effects, are, by definition, non-conscious.  
 
6.6.1. Counterarguing mindset 
Implications for consumers. The counterarguing mindset makes individuals 
more likely to generate negative thoughts and less willing to pay for products. Thus, 
the counterarguing mindset has implications for both consumer and marketers. The 
vested interests of consumers (marketers) are generally likely to be best served by the 
promotion (prevention) of counterarguing thoughts. The current research has found 
that the effects of a counterarguing mindset could only be replicated using an episodic 
priming procedure. This priming procedure induced individuals to recall past 
counterarguing episodes.  
Since a counterarguing mindset operates outside of conscious awareness it is 
not possible for consumers to control its influence. However, the mechanisms that 
underpin a counterarguing mindset may well be used to consciously boost resistance. 
For example, it seems feasible that the tactic of recalling, past counterarguing 
episodes may be beneficial to consumers who experience difficulty in controlling 
their spending. Such a tactic could potentially be used as an intervention for impulsive 
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spending. Recent research has already demonstrated the effectiveness of harnessing 
implicit resistance by recalling past resistance episodes (Fransen & Fennis, 2014).  
The mental rehearsal of counterarguing may also provide resistive benefits. 
Early research on resistance has demonstrated that the act of counterarguing 
information on a specific topic serves to inoculate the individuals against subsequent 
persuasion attempts relating to the topic (McGuire, 1964). These “inoculation effects” 
could be replicated by customers who are willing to mentally rehearse, context 
specific counterarguing strategies. Specifically, an individual should consider the 
arguments that the salesperson is likely to employ and then generate 
counterarguments to counteract these sales gambits. By carrying out this pre-emptive 
inoculation task, a consumer is much more likely to be able to rebuff the advances of 
the salesperson during the upcoming sales encounter. Furthermore, recalling past 
counterarguing episodes and mentally rehearsing future counterarguing episodes is 
likely to help create “friction” and thus inhibits excessive purchasing by breaking 
“shopping momentum” (see Dhar et al., 2007). Such counterarguing strategies are 
likely to help individuals to fully consider the true financial costs of their actions. 
Implications for marketers. From a marketer’s perspective, the implications 
of a counterarguing mindset are troubling. Xu and Wyer (2012) suggest that the 
counterarguing mindset can be activated procedurally or incidentally. The current 
research suggests the counterarguing mindset may also be activated episodically. A 
number of implications follow from these findings. Within a sales context, it is 
recommended that a salesperson avoid statements that are likely to induce 
counterarguing responses from the consumer. Indeed, the opposite strategy of 
inducing potential clients to make a series of positive, affirmative statements (i.e. a 
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“yes sets close”21) is a well-established sales technique. Since a counterarguing 
mindset can also be activated episodically, marketers should also avoid putting 
consumers in situations where they have to recall past counterarguing episodes or past 
customer service failures.  
Past research has also demonstrated that distraction and cognitive loading 
strategies can be used to inhibit an individual’s ability to counterargue (e.g. Keating & 
Brock, 1974; Osterhouse & Brock, 1970). In contrast to these ethically questionable 
tactics, marketers might also attempt to disrupt the onset of the counterarguing 
mindset. Marketers may disrupt the counterarguing mindset by inducing consumers to 
switch between different modes of thought. This tactic is likely to provide 
“interference” that will break the mindset (Hamilton et al. 2011).  
Marketers may also simply attempt to displace a counterarguing mindset by 
activating more purchase friendly mindsets. For example, using questioning strategies 
that induce potential clients to make comparative assessments or engage in low risk 
decision-making may well increase the likelihood of purchase behaviours being 
enacted (e.g. Xu & Wyer, 2008, Xu & Wyer, 2007). From an advertising perspective, 
it also seems prudent to follow the advice of Xu and Wyer (2012) who caution 
marketers against advertising their products after current affairs shows, news 
broadcast or any other media coverage likely to induce active or incidental 
counterarguing. Exposing consumers to brands after these potential primes may be 
counterproductive from a marketing perspective.  
 
                                                 
21 http://changingminds.org/disciplines/sales/closing/yes-set_close.htm, 01/03/16 
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6.6.2. Bolstering Mindset 
Implications of consumers. The bolstering mindset erodes consumer 
resistance by favourably increasing perceptions of advert persuasiveness and product 
attractiveness. However, the most compelling attribute of the bolstering mindset is its 
ability to increase behavioural intentions (willingness to sign petitions) and monetary 
behavioural intention (willingness to pay). The latter effect is the most robust mindset 
priming effect observed in the current research. This particular priming effect is also 
likely to be especially interesting to marketers who seek to nudge monetary 
behavioural intentions skyway and thus represents an exciting opportunity for 
marketing professionals. However, the bolstering mindset is a double edged sword. 
The discovery of the bolstering mindset is a disconcerting development that has 
worrisome implications for consumers. Indeed, from a consumer perspective, the 
mindset provides yet more evidence that they are vulnerable market actors. The 
bolstering mindset makes consumers soft targets in the marketplace by increasing 
their (non) monetary behavioural intensions.  
Past research has already demonstrated that resource depletion can erode 
resistance and increase purchasing behaviours (Burkley, 2008, Wheeler et al. 2007). 
Similarly, various consumer mindsets conspire to relieve consumers of their money; 
e.g. the which-to-buy mindset (Xu & Wyer, 2007), the comparative mindset (Xu & 
Wyer, 2008) and the implemental mindset (Dhar, Huber & Khan, 2007; Lee & Ariely, 
2006).  
Priming effects are the manifestation of source monitoring errors (Loersch & 
Payne, 2014). Simply put, since mindsets occurs outside of conscious awareness they 
are difficult to detect. Attempts to continually canvassing internal thoughts in the 
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hope of identifying their incidental origins would be a Sisyphean task doomed to 
fatigue and failure. Perhaps a feasible alternative is the deployment of cognitive 
strategies that minimise the risks associated with a bolstering mindset.  
Past research on Implementation Intentions (see Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2009) 
and inductive reasoning (see Coutinho & Sagarin, 2006) has shown that cognitive 
strategies can be used to boost self-regulation and consumer resistance. A similar if X, 
then Y rule based strategy could potentially be used to promote critical thinking in 
situations where consumer needs it most. This mode of thinking might be especially 
useful in negotiation situations for example. One can conceive of various negotiation 
scenarios where customer’s shyness or reluctance to haggle may well hamper their 
ability to secure a good deal. Within Western cultures haggling is less common and 
therefore consumers are often relatively inexperienced at actively counterarguing the 
offers of marketing professionals. Sales professionals (e.g. car salesperson) who have 
been trained to negotiate can potentially exploit this inexperience. In order to resist 
the charms of a salesperson and their mindset inducing patter, consumers are advised 
to formulate concrete, rule based strategies in advance of a sales encounter. By using 
implemental intensions to guide their interactions with sales professionals and by 
assigning pre-determined, “walk-away” cut off points in the negotiation, the consumer 
is less likely to get swept up in the moment. Such mental planning is likely to militate 
against the activation of the bolstering mindset, which, like other priming effects, is 
subservient to salient motivational goals.  
Implications for marketers. Undoubtedly, there is an appetite among 
marketing professionals for strategies that may be (ethically) deployed to increase 
their bottom line. For example, Kolenda (2013) provides a number of inventive 
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communication strategies and pricing tactics22 that are based on academic research 
and empirical data. Many of the suggestions offered relate to creative ways of 
leveraging the impact of message framing and anchoring effects (see Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973). These marketing tactics are widely used in the marketplace and 
can hardly be considered controversial. Other suggestions are based on more 
contemporary consumer research based on information processing and embodied 
cognition literatures. Such tactics may also help marketers to subtly tip the 
psychological balance in their favour. Laudably, Kolenda (2013) appeals to marketers 
to employ these priming techniques ethically. The use of priming strategies in the 
marketplace is ethically questionable and likely to provoke a lively debate on the 
constituent components of “ethical persuasion” (see Perloff, 2013). Regardless of the 
intention, there can be little doubt that profit maximisation remains a primary goal of 
many marketing professionals. While this goal aligns well with the bolstering mindset 
but is incongruous with the goals of consumers. However, this misalignment of goals 
is not set in stone.  
 
“The path of least resistance is the path of the loser” – H.G. Wells23 
 
The above quote from H.G. Wells nicely encapsulates the implications of the 
bolstering mindset within the context of a commercial paradigm. The current research 
has also taken the philosophical position that consumer resistance is inherently 
                                                 
22 http://www.nickkolenda.com/psychological-pricing-strategies/, 05/04/16.  
23http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/649263-the-path-of-least-resistance-of-the-path-of-the, [ 01/09/15] 
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desirable. However, this is an over-simplification of the matter. Indeed, often 
consumer resistance is unwarranted and unhealthy. The incongruous relationship 
between the bolstering mindset and consumer welfare is not fixed but rather a matter 
of context. For example, goal alignment could be achieved by leveraging the 
bolstering mindset to promote pro-social goals rather than commercial goals. 
Governments are particularly interested in promoting pro-social behaviour and have a 
vested interest in behaviour change.  
The Behavioural Insight Team (BIT), aka “the nudge unit” became the world’s 
first government institution dedicated to the application of behavioural sciences24. 
Based on the work of Sunstein & Thaler (2008), the BIT apply “Nudge Theory” to 
promote pro-social change and consumer wellbeing through non-coercive means. 
Enshrined within Nudge Theory is the guiding philosophy of “libertarian 
paternalistism” which dictates the ethical parameters of “nudging”. “Nudges” 
frequently involve inexpensive manipulations of “choice architecture” that can 
produce impactful and cost-effective behavioural interventions. For example, simply 
changing the sign-up default in an organ donation programme from “opt out” to “opt 
in” almost doubled (i.e. 42% to 82%) the number of organ donors in the programme 
(Goldstein & Johnson, 2003).  
The BIT have recently produced a framework to help policy makers optimise 
the design and implementation of their policies. Specifically, the “MINDSPACE” 
report identified “9 of the most robust (non-coercive) influences on (human) 
behaviour” (Dolan, Hallsworth, Halpern, King, & Vlaev, 2010; p. 8). These 
                                                 
24 http://www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk/about-us/  [ 06/04/16] 
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influences are captured in the mnemonic MINDSPACE; Messenger, Incentives, 
Norms, Defaults, Salience, Priming, Affect, Commitments, Ego). These are the most 
potent behavioural change strategies that behavioural science has to offer. However, 
by the authors own admission, priming is the least well understood of these behaviour 
change strategies. Nevertheless, emerging research hints at the potential of this subtle, 
albeit subversive approach to promoting behavioural change. 
Research has demonstrated that environmental cues influence consumer 
consumption patterns for good or for ill. For example, Wansink & Kim (2005) 
demonstrated that larger containers primed individual’s to eat more. The colour of 
cutlery is also found to prime consumption patterns. For example, Genschow, Reutner 
and Wänke (2012) have found that red product packaging can reduce food intake and 
snacking. Research has also demonstrated that priming can also promote healthier 
lifestyles. Wryobeck and Chen (2003) found that activating concepts related to fitness 
and health induced individuals to use the stairs rather than the lift. In light of such 
research, “government should seek the ways it may be unintentionally priming people 
- or it may seek to “build in” priming effects to its current attempts to change 
behaviour” (Dolan et al., 2010; p. 25).  
The bolstering mindset appears potentially compatible with Nudge theory. 
Indeed, it is quite plausible that the bolstering mindset may find application in 
domains where consumers are encouraged to take moderately aversive actions. 
Considering the power of the bolstering mindset to increase willingness to pay, the 
potential for its application in areas relating to taxation and the payment of fines (e.g. 
traffic offenses) are areas worthy of further investigation. The bolstering mindset is 
likely to be particularly effective in scenarios where the behaviour being sought is 
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ultimately in the individual’s interest (e.g. a pension scheme sign up) but where 
inertia or mild aversion impedes the behaviour itself.  
It is worth noting that the procedural nature of the bolstering priming also 
lends itself to the administrative form filling that already typifies many citizens’ 
interactions with governmental and state bodies. Thus, it seems feasible that a subtle 
bolstering priming procedure could be inserted into these forms to nudge individuals 
towards more pro-social goals. Indeed, Dijksterhuis (2014) commends emerging 
research that has begun to explore the use of behaviour priming within pro-social 
contexts (e.g. fund raising, health eating, and anti-smoking initiatives). However, 
despite the pro-social goals of Nudge Theory, the deployment of priming strategies by 
governments is highly controversial and evokes unsettlingly thoughts of an Orwellian 
future. Both researchers and the public at large are left to ponder the age old question. 
Do the ends justify the means? 
 
6.7. Limitations of the Research 
 
“Take, say, physics, which restricts itself to extremely simple questions. If a molecule becomes too 
complex, they hand it over to the chemists. If it becomes too complex for them, they hand it to 
biologists. And if the system is too complex for them, they hand it to psychologists”.  
– Noam Chomsky (Lawton, 201225). 
 
Almost two centuries ago, philosopher August Comte first proposed that not all 
sciences demonstrated the same explanatory power. Comte’s “Hierarchy of Science” 
                                                 
25 http://chomsky.info/20060301/, [ 04/04/15] 
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postulated that “scientific disciplines differ(ed) systematically in the complexity and 
generality of their subject of study, in the precision with which these subjects are 
known, and in their level of intellectual and historical development” (Fanelli, 2010 p. 
1). “Hard” sciences such as physics deal with inanimate objects and study closely 
definable variables. “Softer” sciences such as psychology deal with human cognition. 
Consequently, while harder sciences lend themselves to definite answers, psychology 
does not. The complexity of the human condition does not submit to the same level of 
analytical interrogation nor relinquish the same certitudes that elemental entities 
proffer (Cesario, 2014). Accordingly, while most view psychology as a soft science, 
in terms of conducting rigorous research, it may well be “the hardest of sciences” 
(Cesario, 2014 p. 45).  
The current research has a number of strengths. Firstly, the current research 
has investigated an important consumer welfare issue that has practical implications 
for consumers. Consumer mindsets are important determinant of consumer behaviour 
(Wyer, 2012). However, few studies have adopted a consumer-centric perspective 
when investigating consumer mindsets. The current research makes a much needed 
contribution to the overlapping, yet under developed literature on consumer resistance 
and consumer mindsets. Second, the research has used large sample sizes to 
investigate the effects of bolstering and counterarguing mindsets. The relatively large 
sample sizes permitted high powered studies which increase the credibility of the 
research findings. Third, the research has used samples which are likely to differ 
significantly from those used in the original studies. The Irish samples used in the 
research (Studies 1 - 4) help to establish the generalisability and robustness of these 
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mindsets outside of an American cohort. Nevertheless, the current research does have 
a number of limitations which must be acknowledged. 
The current research has a number of limitations; 1) the data collection did not 
take place in a psychology laboratory, 2) a funnel debrief was not administered in all 
studies, 3) the behavioural measures used in the online studies (Study 5 and Study 6) 
may not have been valid, and 4) the convenience sampling of university students 
(Studies 1 - 4) limits the generalisability of the results. These limitations will now be 
discussed in more detail. 
First, the studies did not take place in a strictly controlled psychology 
laboratory. These facilities were not available at the author’s university. A psychology 
laboratory would have provided the researcher with the ability to control for external 
influences and minimise the threat of extraneous situational variables. Such 
considerations are likely to be especially important when attempting to replicate 
priming effects that may be sensitive to situational affordances.  
Studies (1, 3 and 4) took place in small group settings. In contrast, Study 2 
took place in large lecture hall. Study 5 and Study 6 were conducted online. In all 
studies, precautions were taken to minimise the effects of extraneous variables and to 
ensure the adequate control of situational variables. For example, in Studies 1 - 4, all 
participants sat apart from each other and participants were not permitted to 
communicate with each other. This removed the threat of distraction or influence 
from other participants. It also ensured that participants believed they were exposed to 
the same priming propositions and target stimuli. In order to reinforce the cover study, 
all participants received 2 envelopes containing the materials for both “independent 
studies”. Similar precautions were taken when conducting the online studies (Study 5 
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and Study 6). In these studies, a screening question was used to remove individuals 
who reported distractions in their environment. Nevertheless, the inability to ensure 
control over all the situational variables in the studies may have compromised the 
strength of the priming effects observed. That said, mindset priming effects are 
theoretically less volatile than other priming effects (e.g. subliminal priming effects) 
where the participant’s undivided attention is paramount. It is questionable whether 
the additional control afforded by a psychology lab setting would have had a 
significant bearing on the results.  
A second limitation of the current research relates to the inability to administer 
a funnel debrief in all studies. While the current research did provide participants with 
a highly credible cover story, the author cannot be sure that all participants were fully 
convinced. Ideally, a funnelled debrief would have been used in all studies rather than 
only in Study 5 and Study 6. A funnelled debrief involves a series of questions that 
probe participant’s general awareness and specific suspicions regarding the true goals 
of the study. The specificity of the questions asked “funnel down” from broad open 
questions to narrow probing questions. For example, Chartrand & Bargh (1996) asked 
participants to indicate (a) what they thought was the purpose of the experiment, (b) 
whether they thought any of the different tasks had been related, (c) whether anything 
they had done on one task had affected what they had done on any of the other tasks. 
Bargh and Chartrand (2000) suggest that a funnelled debrief is important in order to 
establish if the cover story has been believed by participants. A credible cover story is 
important because it reduces the risk of demand effects that threaten to compromise 
the results (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). It also reduces the risk of contrast effects that 
have been found to occur when a priming procedure is too blatant or the prime too 
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explicit (Martin, Seta & Crelia, 1990). Mindset priming studies are vulnerable in this 
regard since participants have to actively engage with the prime and elaborate upon its 
implication (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000).  
In the current series of studies, a two task priming paradigm was employed. 
Participants were informed that the two ostensibly unrelated studies were being 
undertaken by two different researchers. Specifically, participants were told that the 
first study belonged to the author’s supervisor who had asked that the author use this 
opportunity to disseminate her research questionnaire in addition to his own 
“advertising” study. This cover study was designed to sound authentic and plausible. 
In order to reinforce this cover story, different coloured paper and different formatting 
styles were used in the documentation for each study. However, in order to protect the 
integrity of the cover story, the author did not have the opportunity to administer a 
funnelled debrief. The desire for large sample sizes in the studies necessitated that the 
data be collected over a number of sessions. Rather than administering a funnelled 
debrief at the end of each data collection session, participants were instead provided 
with a debrief letter after all the data were collected. This approach ensured that 
participants could not jeopardise the study by relaying the true nature of the study to 
classmates. However, this approach did not permit the researcher to ascertain the 
participant’s perceptions with regard to the independence of the studies. The design of 
future studies could be improved to address this issue. For example, by having a 
confederate pose as the researcher for the “second study” would likely add further 
weight to the cover story. To reinforce the cover story still further the second 
“researcher”, perhaps another PhD candidate, could make a separate pitch for 
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participation in “their” study. The author recommends the adoption of this approach 
in future mindset priming studies.  
While there is no way to know for sure if participants fully believed the cover 
story, there are two reasons for cautious optimism. First, both online studies (Study 5 
and Study 6) employed the same two-task experimental design used in the previous 
studies. In these studies, the researcher had the opportunity to ask participants if they 
could detect any link between the two ostensibly unrelated studies. No participants 
reported seeing a link between the studies. Even when specifically asked to guess, 
none of these guesses were correct. However, it may be argued that these online 
experiments are problematic because participants may be unwilling to admit seeing a 
link between studies in case this might jeopardise their chances of payment. It may 
also be argued that online participants have less opportunity to discern links between 
the studies given the piecemeal fashion of the work on Amazon Mturk. Arguably, 
participants involved in offline experiments are more likely to be able to see through a 
cover story than online participants. However, if this was the case then contrast 
effects should theoretically affect both experimental conditions within the one 
experiment. No such pattern of results was found.  
A third limitation of the current research relates to the behavioural intentions 
measures used in Study 5 and Study 6 (i.e. willingness to volunteer for future studies, 
number of minutes volunteered for studies). In the interests of maintaining a 
consistent approach between studies, both these measures were retained in Study 5 
and Study 6. However, there is good reason to suspect that both these measures are 
problematic when one considers that participants in these studies are likely to expect 
remuneration for any additional time “volunteered”. Considering the financial 
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incentive to indicate a willingness to participate in future studies, it is likely that most 
participants were willing to “volunteer” their time for some presumed monetary 
reward. However, while problematic, these measures should still have the ability to 
detect priming effects, although their sensitivity to measures differences between 
conditions is hampered by the financial incentives offered. In any case, since no 
differences were detected between the priming conditions for these variables, this 
point is moot.  
A fourth limitation of the current research relates to the sampling methodology 
employed in the current set of studies. Past research has highlighted the dangers of 
using student samples in psychological research (Henrich et al., 2010). The 
convenience sampling of students gives rise to questions relating to the 
generalisability of the results. However, convenience sampling is a long standing 
problem within the field of social psychology which has traditionally relied heavily 
upon student samples (Wilson, Aronson, & Carlsmith, 2010). While the current study 
is also guilty of convenience sampling college students, it does have the merit of 
using non-American samples (Studies 1 - 5). This is important. Psychology studies 
that use non-American samples are especially valuable since non-American samples 
are massively under-represented in the academic literature (Arnett, 2008; Henrich et 
al., 2010). Despite the fact that Americans represent less than 5% of the world 
population, 95% of papers published in the top six American Psychological 
Association journals are results from American samples (Arnett, 2008). Studies 1 - 4 
used Irish student samples to test the generalizability of counterarguing and bolstering 
mindsets on a non-American sample. 
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In sum, the current research has a number of limitations. However, these 
limitations are by no means insurmountable obstacles to future research. In order to 
overcome the limitations of the current research the author recommends that 1) future 
mindset priming studies are conducted in a psychology laboratory, 2) a funnel debrief 
is administered after all data collection sessions, 3) a confederate is used to reinforce 
the cover story, 4) all dependent variables relating to volitional actions are omitted in 
studies that use samples that are fiscally motivated, 5) future studies attempt to source 
participants from non-student populations. The first four measures will serve to 
increase the internal reliability of future studies. The fifth measure will serve to 
increase the overall ecological validity of future studies. The final sections of the 
thesis will now discuss the potential for future research. The barriers to future 
research will also be outlined and discussed in order to provide the reader with a full 
idea of how this research might manifest itself. 
 
6.8. Future research 
In recent years the calls for greater replication efforts within the fields of 
consumer behaviour and social psychology have reached fever pitch (e.g. Kahneman, 
2012; Koole & Lakens, 2012; Simons, 2014). This research is a timely answer to the 
vociferous calls to action by commentators both inside and outside the field of 
psychology. The research has also acceded to the more specific request for theory 
building efforts within the field of consumer psychology. Specifically, the research 
has answered the recent call by proponents of priming research who have implored 
their research peers to focus their investigative efforts on moderator testing. (see 
Dijksterhuis, Knippenberg, & Holland, 2014; Fujita & Trope, 2014). The current 
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preoccupation with voguish demonstrations of ever more exotic priming effects has 
had a detrimental impact on theory development within the field of consumer 
psychology (Dijksterhuis, 2014). The decline of research exploring the boundary 
conditions of priming effects has resulted in a theoretically impoverished literature 
which needs to be reconstituted (Dijksterhuis, 2014). Other scholars echo these 
sentiments; “we propose that more needs to be done to understand the active 
“ingredients” in priming effects and how these ingredients operate and interact” 
(Fujita & Trope, 2014; p. 69). Dijksterhuis et al. (2014) have called upon researchers 
to renew their efforts to rectify this situation. Indeed, in a recent paper entitled 
“Welcome Back Theory”, the main author specifically calls for a resurgence of 
research on moderating effects (Dijksterhuis, 2014). Future consumer research must 
continue to answer this call. In this last section of the thesis, the author will briefly 
identify some of the outstanding questions raised by the current research. It will also 
identify future research questions that lie at the rarely explored interface between 
consumer mindset and consumer welfare.  
A number of specific questions arise as a direct consequence of the current 
research. For example, further research needs to be undertaken in order to resolve the 
puzzling relationship between approach motivation and the bolstering mindset. The 
conflicting evidence which suggests that both strong and weak approach motivation 
can strengthen the effects of a bolstering mindset is intriguing. This vexing question 
certainly warrants further investigation given the theoretical dividend and practical 
marketing applications on offer. Future lab based studies may resolve these 
conflicting findings by strictly controlling the research environment and thus reducing 
the situational affordances indirectly offered to study participants. Methodological 
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questions also require investigation. For example, the researcher’s inability to 
replicate a counterarguing (bolstering) mindset using a procedural (episodic) priming 
procedure remains a source of confusion. Both questions warrant further 
investigation. It may simply be the case that bolstering episodes are less concrete in 
memory and thus may not boast the same priming potential as counterarguing 
episodes. One way around this potential issue might be to ask individuals to imagine a 
specific bolstering scenario rather than recall a particular bolstering episode. Future 
research on the counterarguing mindset could potentially strengthen the procedural 
priming procedure further by asking individual to specifically counterarguing a 
counter-attitudinal proposition rather than simply inducing them to do so. Future 
research could also explore the possibility that a counterarguing mindset might 
increase an individual’s confidence in their ability to counterargue. It would be 
interesting to assess if there is a motivational by-product to a counterarguing mindset. 
The current research found no evidence to suggest that a counterarguing mindset 
influences meta-cognition. Indeed, neither the counterarguing nor the bolstering 
mindset were found to influence attitude certainty. However, it remains to be seen if 
asking individuals to recall counterarguing memories might influence how self-
confident they feel about their ability to resist persuasive attacks. The ease with which 
individuals can retrieve counterarguing memories may well influence their self-
perceptions. It is also worth considering that participants in the current studies may 
have recalled situations in which they engaged in counterarguing behaviours but 
where they, nevertheless, lost the argument. It is possible that future research could 
test if the outcome of the counterarguing episodes influences the strength of the 
priming effect observed.   
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Taking a broader perspective, a number of exciting lines of inquiry come into 
view. The role of priming pro-social behaviour in line with the paternalistic ideals of 
Nudge Theory is an interesting if somewhat provocative prospect. The priming of 
different “good-citizen” mindsets could potentially nudge individuals towards better, 
safer, co-operative behaviours. While this is an underdeveloped area of social 
research, the significant theoretical and practical implications of such a research 
agenda are self-evident. Despite the intimidating ethical quagmire that surrounds this 
emergent field of research, this research domain area holds the promise of exciting 
and potential impactful research. Future research could also adopt a more direct 
approach to promoting consumer welfare.    
In contrast to marketers, the power of consumers is more distributed and their 
vested interests more diverse. From a consumer perspective, future research on 
consumer resistance might profitably investigate protective cognitive strategies that 
empower consumers in the marketplace. As we have seen, maintaining a measure of 
mental sovereignty is an ongoing and onerous exercise in defensive resistance. 
Psychological interventions that could help consumers to assess the credibility of a 
persuasive appeal, the honesty of a sales claim or the credentials of a persuasion agent 
would be of significant practical value to vulnerable customers. For example, it is 
likely that children would benefit from being taught how to systematically assess 
marketing communications from an early age. The same might be said of elderly 
consumers who have been forced to migrate to online consumerscapes. 
Counterarguing tactics would likely underpin the inductive strategies used by 
consumers to protect themselves in the marketplace.  
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Using a social psychological lens, this doctoral research examined how 
bolstering and counterarguing mindsets influence consumer resistance. In binary 
opposition to a marketing perspective, the current research has adopted a consumer-
centric posture that views consumer resistance as a protective resource to be 
maintained rather than an obstacle to be surmounted. This value laden perspective 
holds that the ability to resist the machinations of marketers is central to both the 
welfare of consumers and to society at large. Financial debt, obesity, and an 
assortment of addictions have been linked to low levels of self-regulation (Baumeister 
& Heatherton, 1996; Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007; Muraven et al., 1998). Perhaps 
today, more than any other time in history, a consumer’s ability to self-regulate and 
resist the advances of marketers is ever more important.  
To the author’s knowledge, the current research provides the first supporting 
evidence for bolstering and counterarguing mindsets. The current research has 
demonstrated that these mindsets can influence perceptual, behavioural and cognitive 
responses to persuasive communications. It has also shown that an individual’s 
approach motivation can influence the effects of the newly discovered, bolstering 
mindset. Admittedly, the priming effects observed are weaker than those reported by 
Xu and Wyer (2012). This is not in itself surprising. Indeed, many would argue that 
weaker priming effects are to be expected (e.g. Wheeler, DeMarree, & Petty, 2014). 
Weak priming effects may even be considered a defining characteristic of replication 
studies (Cesario, 2014). In any case, the current research has investigated an 
important research that has important implications for consumers. There already 
exists an abundance of research advising marketers and salespersons on how to 
improve their market position and further their vested interests. However, the same 
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cannot be said for consumers who lie on the wrong side of the transactional divide. 
The current research has aimed to make a start at redressing this imbalance. Future 
research should continue to explore consumer resistance and continue to tackle the 
current knowledge deficit in the academic literature. However, in order to pursue this 
important research agenda, researchers must surmount both theoretical and political 
hurdles that may impede their future progress. This final section of the thesis 
discusses these challenges. 
 
6.9. Barriers to future research 
Priming research is still in its infancy and remains at an early stage of 
evolution (Cesario, 2014). The conceptually fuzzy boundaries between different types 
of priming effects and the lack of a unifying theory within the field are issues of 
concern (Ferguson & Mann, 2014). However, recent public denouncements of 
priming research are both unwarranted and unhelpful (Ferguson & Mann, 2014). 
Priming effects are well established within psychology literature and are supported by 
decades of research (e.g. Janiszewski & Wyer, 2014). According to Ferguson and 
Mann (2014), the controversy surrounding priming studies is due to “definitional 
imprecision”. The authors note that most of the controversies surrounding priming 
effects relate to a narrow subgroup of priming studies that have emerged in the last 20 
years, namely “goal priming”, “behaviour priming” or “social priming”. Ferguson and 
Mann, (2014 p. 34) rightly point out that “the recent publicity frenzy surrounding 
priming” is driven by critics who refer to different types of priming as if they are 
distinct categories; e.g. priming (Yong, 2012), social priming (Kahneman, 2012), goal 
priming (Pashler et al., 2012) or behavioural priming (Doyen et al., 2012). While 
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Förster et al. (2007) do specify criteria for identifying goal priming effects they do 
concede that the conceptual lines of demarcation for priming effects are blurry and 
imprecise. For example, Xu and Wyer (2012) invoke “goal” systems theory to 
describe the operation of “behaviour” mindsets (i.e. counterarguing and bolstering 
mindsets) that have been primed using a “procedural” priming procedure. Murky 
definitional distinctions aside, the primary reason for the controversy surrounding 
social priming, behavioural priming, or goal priming studies is due to the large effect 
sizes they tend to report (Ferguson & Mann 2014).  
The strength of the effect sizes reported in goal priming studies has raised 
doubts among some researchers who find the results counterintuitive and improbable 
(e.g. Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012). Pashler et al. (2012) argue that goal primes are 
abstract in nature when compared to the more concrete semantic primes that operate 
via a more direct mechanism (i.e. spreading activation). Thus, the large effects found 
in goal priming studies seem counterintuitive. Pashler et al. (2012) also suggest that 
the relatively small number of underpowered goal/behavioural priming studies may be 
indicative of a large body of unsuccessful studies that have been consigned to the file 
drawer. The researchers also note that abstract primes such as stereotypes are 
problematic because of the numerous downstream dependent variables that the 
concept could potentially activate. They argue that the wide choice of dependent 
variables provides researchers with too much interpretative discretion. However, 
proponents of priming research dismiss these objections as a “disregard of theory in 
combination with premature or faulty logic” (Dijksterhuis, 2014 p. 72).  Dijksterhuis 
et al. (2014) contend that critics of priming studies are ignorant of the subtleties that 
characterise the research. They also make the point that “research on issues such as 
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free will, unconscious processes, and automaticity is sometimes, unavoidably so it 
seems, ideological….not trusting an effect because it is counterintuitive is often 
essentially a form of circular reasoning” (Dijksterhuis et al., 2014 p. 200). 
Dijksterhuis (2014) asserts that behavioural priming studies produce strong 
priming effects because they tend to use stronger primes. Indeed, Dijksterhuis (2014) 
argues that human behaviour is the most natural and ecologically valid measure of 
construct accessibility. Dijksterhuis (2014) also addresses the apparent lack of 
evidence for behavioural priming research. The author estimates there are now 
between 200 - 400 empirical papers that have reported some evidence of behavioural 
priming effects. While this represents a small subset of the estimated 12,000 priming 
studies conducted within the social sciences (Janiszewski & Wyer, 2014), it 
nevertheless represents a significant body of evidence in support of behavioural 
priming effects. However, doubts remain. In light of recent developments within the 
field of social psychology, distrust has become an occupational hazard for social 
psychologists. Recent tectonic changes within the field of social psychology have 
precipitated the emergence of a new research landscape which future researchers will 
have to carefully navigate.  
 
"The great enemy of the truth is very often not the lie, deliberate, contrived and dishonest, but the 
myth, persistent, persuasive and unrealistic." - John F. Kennedy 
 
It would be remiss of the researcher not to mention the elephant in the room; the 
“crisis within social psychology”. Social psychology has weathered a “storm of 
doubt” in recent years. Rocked by high profile frauds and misconduct cases (e.g. 
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Diderick Stapel, Karen Ruggiero, Marc Hauser, Dirk Smeesters and Lawrence 
Sanna), speculation regarding the validity and indeed the veracity of results is now 
commonplace both inside and outside of the field (Yong, 2012). To exasperate 
matters, there is a rising chorus of discontent among frustrated researchers who are 
consistently failing to replicate the “elusive” priming effects reported in the literature 
(e.g. Shanks et al., 2013). The prevailing headwind of scepticism and distrust blowing 
through the field has proponents of priming research feeling “under siege” 
(Dijksterhuis, van Knippenberg, Holland, & Knippenberg, 2014). These feelings may 
be well founded. Prominent critics cite fears of a “train wreck looming” within the 
field of social psychology (Kahneman, 2012). In short, social psychology has become 
a “poster child for doubts about the integrity of psychological research” (Kahneman, 
2012). At the heart of the problem are priming studies.  
Problems associated with replicating priming effects have been widely 
reported in academic literature (e.g. Doyen et al., 2012; Pashler et al., 2012; Yong, 
2012). Kahneman observes that early stage researchers are most likely to suffer as a 
consequence of the recent revelations that have shrouded the field in controversy. 
Greater transparency and documentation are deemed necessary to restore the 
credibility of the field. Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman characterises himself as a 
“general believer in priming”26. However, he believes the defensive posture taken by 
some prominent researchers (namely Dijsterhuis and Bargh) is counter-productive. 
Despite repeated calls to develop a priming protocol to enable researchers to replicate 
his results, Dijksterhuis has steadfastly refused saying that “focusing on a single 
                                                 
26http://www.nature.com/polopoly_fs/7.6716.1349271308!/suppinfoFile/Kahneman%20Letter.pdf, 
[01/06/15] 
  
255 
 
phenomenon is not that helpful and won’t solve the problem”27. Dijksterhuis also 
suggests that rigor should not be applied retrospectively but rather used to ensure 
future studies are fully tested. This movement towards full transparency will 
inevitably slow the career progression of researchers engaged in this research. The 
days of piecemeal publication may also be coming to an end. Piecemeal publication is 
defined as “the unnecessary splitting of the findings from one research effort into 
multiple articles” (APA, 2010; p. 13). Finkel et al. (2015) accuse past researchers of 
engaging in piecemeal publication. Indeed, the authors speculate that such academic 
opportunism has potentially contributed to false positive results within the scientific 
literature. It is only through the eradication of such practices that the future of 
consumer research may be secured. Similar sentiments have been expressed with 
regard to the field of social psychology (Kahneman, 2012).  
Within social psychology, the rudimental role of replication has been 
underappreciated and actively disincentivised. Replication efforts require a 
community of researchers who are willing to invest time, energy and resources into an 
inherently risky venture. Admittedly, many of the priming effects uncovered in the 
current research are subtle, or to be more blunt, weak. However, this is the lot of the 
would-be replicator. To prevaricate about the “weak” effects is to digress from the 
substantive issue. Replication remains the cornerstone of all sciences. The escalating 
pressure to publish statistically significant results has contributed to the crisis that the 
field now finds itself in. In contrast to those gifted with compliant data and 
consolatory p values, the lassitude that invariably accompanies less co-operative data 
                                                 
27
http://www.nature.com/news/disputed-results-a-fresh-blow-for-social-psychology-1.12902, 
[04/04/15] 
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has traditionally been exasperated by the diminished opportunities for publication. 
Hopefully, recent developments within the field of social psychology will help foster 
a research environment where the costs of exercising restraint and caution are 
rewarded rather than punished. The future survival of social psychology as a field of 
study may well depend upon this.  
Securing the future survival of social psychology as a field of study is hugely 
important. It is little over a century ago since Norman Triplett’s seminal study on 
social facilitation effects (see Triplett, 1898) gave birth to the field of social 
psychology. In the intervening years, the scope of the field has expanded 
immeasurably and delivered powerful insights into human nature and the social world 
we inhabit (see Fiske, Gilbert, & Lindzey, 2010). The importance of social 
psychology becomes self-evident when one considers its perennial relevance. Its 
importance is also evidenced by its ability to contribute to various field of study (e.g. 
neuroscience, psychology and sociology etc.). Importantly, social psychology has 
demonstrated an ability to build theoretical bridges between these previously disparate 
domains.  
In recent times, social psychologists have preoccupied themselves by trying to 
unravel the subtle priming effects that saturate social situations (for a review see 
Hassin, Uleman, & Bargh, 2005). Priming effects preside over our everyday lives and 
infiltrate virtually all aspect of the human condition. Primes are embedded within the 
fabric of our social and physical worlds. Furthermore, primes both influence and are 
influenced by these interconnected worlds. Within consumer domains, these 
symbiotic worlds combine intractably. What is more, the costs and consequences of 
priming effects are likely to be most keenly felt within consumer domains due to 
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transactional nature of the environment. Accordingly, consumer psychologists have 
taken up this investigative challenge with vim and vigour. However, this enthusiasm 
and ambition must be tempered with the requisite rigor. In order to secure the future 
of the field it falls to a new generation of researchers to seek restitution for their 
efforts without recourse to “data dredging” or “significance chasing” antics. In short, 
priming research must continue but at a slower, safer pace. 
The current research has replicated the priming effects of bolstering and 
counterarguing mindsets. The mindsets have been found to influence perceptual 
(persuasiveness, proposition attractiveness), behavioural intentions (willingness to 
pay, willingness to sign a petition) and cognitive variables (the number of positive 
thought generated and the number of negative thoughts generated). In conclusion, the 
priming effects are weaker than those found by Xu and Wyer (2012). However, as 
discussed, this is to be expected and in line with the results of replication studies 
generally. Indeed, the modest effects reported here are arguably indicative of 
authentic results. They also perhaps exemplify the slower, safer pace of future 
priming research.  
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Ethical Approval for Research 
  
306 
 
Plain Language Statement 
 
Two, independent and unrelated studies being are undertaken. 
 
Study 1 
 
The purpose of this study is to assess DCU student’s ability to express their views 
on various topics/memories.  
Principal investigator: Janine Bosak, DCU Business School  
 
Study 1 will involve a writing task lasting no longer than 15 minutes.  
 
Study 2 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate how personality traits influence a 
person’s evaluation of a newspaper article.  
Principal investigator: Brian Harman 
DCU Business School 
Email: brian.harman2@mail.dcu.ie 
 
Study 2 will involve participants viewing a newspaper article and rating it in terms of 
its persuasiveness. Participants will also be asked to complete two personality 
questionnaires. The study will last no longer than 20 minutes.  
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Plain Language Statement  
 
Data will be maintained and stored securely for the duration of both research studies. 
All the data collected is private and confidential. Data will not be disseminated to any 
other individuals or parties outside of the respective studies. The anonymity of 
participants will be respected at all times. No data will be collected which would 
permit the subsequent identification of any participant. Data will be destroyed when it 
deemed no longer of use to the researchers as compliant with the Data Protection Act 
2003.  
Participants are advised that participation in both studies is voluntary. Participants are 
free to withdraw from the study at any point. Non participation in either study will not 
result in any adverse effects for any persons.  
 
If participants have concerns about this study and wish to contact an 
independent person please contact: 
 
The Secretary, Dublin City University Research Ethics Committee, 
c/o Office of the Vice-President for Research,  
Dublin City University,  
Dublin 9.  
Tel 01-7008000 
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Informed Consent Form – Study 1 
 
Study 1: “Assessing the critical reasoning skills of students within DCU” 
The purpose of this study is to assess DCU student’s ability to express their views 
on various topics/memories. 
Principal investigator: Janine Bosak, DCU Business School 
 
 
 
Study 1 will involve a writing task lasting no longer than 15 minutes.  
 
 
Participant – please complete the following (Circle Yes or No for each question) 
I have read the Plain Language Statement (or had it read to me) Yes/
No 
I understand the information provided Yes/
No 
I have had an opportunity to ask questions and discuss this study Yes/
No 
I have received satisfactory answers to all my questions Yes/
No  
I understand that I may withdraw from the Research Study at any point. Yes/
No 
 
Note: All data collected will be stored securely for the duration of the research. All 
the data collected is private and confidential. Data will not be disseminated to any 
other individuals or parties outside of the study. The anonymity of participants will be 
respected at all times. No data will be collected which would permit the subsequent 
identification of any participant. Data will be destroyed when it deemed no longer of 
use to the researchers as compliant with the Data Protection Act 2003. 
 
I have read and understood the information in this form. My questions and concerns 
have been answered by the researchers, and I have a copy of this consent form. 
Therefore, I consent to take part in this research project 
 
 Participants Signature:        
 Name in Block Capitals:        
 Witness:           
 Date:             
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Informed Consent Form – Study 2 
 
Study 2: “Perceptions of advertising” 
The purpose of this study is to investigate how personality traits influence a person’s 
evaluation of a newspaper article. 
Principal investigator: Brian Harman, DCU Business School 
Email: brian.harman2@mail.dcu.ie 
 
Study 2 will involve participants viewing a newspaper article and rating it in terms of 
its persuasiveness. Participants will also be asked to complete two personality 
questionnaires. The study will last no longer than 20 minutes.  
 
Participant – please complete the following (Circle Yes or No for each question) 
I have read the Plain Language Statement (or had it read to me) Yes/No 
I understand the information provided Yes/No 
I have had an opportunity to ask questions and discuss this study Yes/No 
I have received satisfactory answers to all my questions Yes/No  
I understand that I may withdraw from the Research Study at any point. Yes/No 
Note: All data collected will be stored securely for the duration of the research. All 
the data collected is private and confidential. Data will not be disseminated to any 
other individuals or parties outside of the study. The anonymity of participants will be 
respected at all times. No data will be collected which would permit the subsequent 
identification of any participant. Data will be destroyed when it deemed no longer of 
use to the researchers as compliant with the Data Protection Act 2003. 
 
I have read and understood the information in this form. My questions and concerns 
have been answered by the researchers, and I have a copy of this consent form. 
Therefore, I consent to take part in this research project. 
 
   Participants Signature:        
   Name in Block Capitals:        
   Witness:          
Date:            
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Sample Introduction Sheet 
 
Dear Participant, 
 
We are kindly inviting you to participate in 2 separate and unrelated studies being 
undertaken within DCU Business School. In the interests of efficiency we propose 
that both studies be run during one class. 
 
Study 1: Life experiences 
Study 1 entitled “Life experiences” investigates students’ ability to recall and describe 
their life experiences.   
 
Study 2: Perceptions of advertising 
Study 2 entitled “Perceptions of advertising” looks at individual differences in 
perceptions to advertising.  
 
 
You are asked to read and answer all questions carefully. Please answer all 
questions based on your own personal opinion. Confidentiality is guaranteed in both 
studies. All completed questionnaires are anonymous. Your participation is voluntary 
and is much appreciated. Your involvement or non-involvement in these studies will 
not affect your ongoing assessment/grades or your relationship with DCU in any way. 
 
Thank you in advance for your time and effort. We greatly appreciate your help. If 
you have any questions, you may contact Brian Harman at the following email 
address: brian.harman2@mail.dcu.ie. In addition, if participants are concerned and 
wish to contact an independent person, please contact: The Secretary, DCU Ethics 
Committee, c/o Office of the Vice-President of Research, DCU. Tel: 01-7008000 
 
Yours faithfully, 
Brian Harman 
Dr. Janine Bosak 
 
 
Brian Harman       Dr. Janine Bosak 
PhD student       Lecturer 
DCU Business School     DCU Business School 
Email: brian.harman2@mail.dcu.ie 
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Appendix B: Tables for Study 1 
 
Procedural priming 
 
Table 7.1 
Correlation Matrix for Focal Variables (procedural priming) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Advert persuasiveness 1 
     
   
Advert appeal .865** 1 
    
   
Advert evaluation .962** .969** 1 
   
   
Hotel attractiveness .702** .746** .751** 1 
  
   
Willingness to pay (€) .520** .562** . 562** .614** 1 
 
   
Willingness to volunteer -.013 .004 -.004 .043 -.217* 1    
Minutes volunteered -.115 -.059 -.088 -.023 -.035 .462** 1   
Positive thoughts .447** .489** .486** .362** .314** .065 -.001 1  
Negative thoughts .475** -.586** -.552** -.488** -.389** .044 .181* -.487** 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).    
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).    
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Procedural priming 
Table 7.2 
Means (SDs) for Perceptual Variables as a Function of Priming 
 
      Priming Condition       
     Counterarguing   Control   Bolstering   Total 
Advert persuasiveness 
           Igloo Hotel 6.00 (1.88) 
 
5.50 (2.42) 
 
7.16 (1.67) 
 
6.24 (2.06) 
Scottish Hotel 3.94 (2.84) 
 
3.94 (1.89) 
 
3.80 (1.67) 
 
3.89 (1.76) 
Total 5.15 (2.11) 
 
4.68 (2.27) 
 
5.44 (2.37) 
 
5.11 (2.25) 
Advert appeal 
           Igloo Hotel 6.70 (1.96) 
 
6.44 (2.42) 
 
7.53 (1.46) 
 
6.90 (1.98) 
Scottish Hotel 3.44 (1.75) 
 
3.72 (1.99) 
 
3.45 (1.84) 
 
3.54 (1.84) 
Total 5.36 (2.46) 
 
5.00 (2.57) 
 
5.44 (2.64) 
 
5.28 (2.54) 
Advert evaluation 
           Igloo Hotel 6.35 (1.85) 
 
5.96 (2.24) 
 
7.34 (1.47) 
 
6.57 (1.91) 
Scottish Hotel 3.68 (1.70) 
 
3.83 (1.90) 
 
3.62 (1.63) 
 
3.71 (1.71) 
Total 5.25 (2.21) 
 
4.84 (2.30) 
 
5.43 (2.43) 
 
5.19 (2.30) 
Hotel attractiveness 
           Igloo Hotel 6.65 (1.89) 
 
6.13 (2.12) 
 
6.89 (1.23) 
 
6.59 (2.06) 
Scottish Hotel 3.81 (2.34) 
 
3.56 (1.38) 
 
3.20 (1.67) 
 
3.50 (1.80) 
Total 5.49 (2.50)   4.76 (2.17)   5.00 (2.69)   5.10 (2.47) 
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Procedural priming 
 
Table 7.3 
Means (SDs) for Behavioural Variables as a Function of Priming 
 
      Priming Condition       
     Counterarguing   Control   Bolstering   Total 
Willingness to pay (€) 74.65 (45.81) 
 
71.03 (55.68) 
 
61.77 (30.79) 
 
69.22 (44.95) 
Willingness to volunteer 96% 
  
95% 
  
93% 
  
95% 
 Minutes volunteered 50.50 (29.57)   49.67 (22.43)   38.08 (20.21)   45.87 (24.95) 
 
 
Table7.4 
Means (SDs) for Cognitive Variables as a Function of Priming 
  
      Priming Condition       
       Counterarguing   Control   Bolstering   Total 
Positive thoughts 1.72 (1.76) 
 
1.56 (1.65) 
 
1.67 (1.64) 
 
1.65 (1.67) 
Negative thoughts 2.03 (1.84) 
 
2.15 (1.74) 
 
1.85 (1.72) 
 
2.00 (1.76) 
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Procedural priming 
 
Table 7.5 
Logistical Regression Predicting Willingness to Volunteer for Future Studies (procedural priming) 
 B S.E Wald df p Odds Ratio 95% C.I. for Odds Ratio 
       Lower Upper 
         
Control 
  
.01 2 .95 
   Bolstering -.39 1.26 .01 1 .76 .68 .06 7.99 
Counterarguing -.23 1.28 .03 1 .86 .80 .06 9.83 
Negative Mood -1.05 .67 2.42 1 .12 .35 .9 1.31 
Positive Mood -.40 .67 .36 1 .55 .67 .180 2.48 
Constant 7.29 3.29 4.90 1 .03 1471.44     
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Table 7.6 
Results of Moderated Regression Analyses for Dependent Variables (Avoidance Motivation) 
 Persuasiveness Appeal Advert 
evaluation 
Hotel 
attractiveness 
Willingness 
to pay 
Willingness 
to volunteer 
Number of 
minutes 
Positive 
thoughts 
Negative 
thoughts 
Predictor ∆R2 B ∆R2 B ∆R2 B ∆R2 B ∆R2 B ∆R2 B ∆R2 B ∆R2 B ∆R2 B 
Step 1 .01 
 
.01 
 
.01 
 
.04  .01 
 
.02  .01 
 
.01 
 
.00 
 
Negative Mood 
 
.18 
 
.35 
 
.23  .08 
 
5.18  -.05 
 
.41 
 
-.21 
 
.04 
Positive Mood 
 
.30 
 
.34 
 
.31  .72* 
 
6.19  -.01 
 
3.63 
 
.12 
 
.11 
Step 2 .26 
 
.44 
 
.38 
 
.42  .39 
 
.04  .04 
 
.11 
 
.23 
 
Negative Mood 
 
.19 
 
.27 
 
.21  .16 
 
2.96  -.04 
 
-.04 
 
-.15 
 
.05 
Positive Mood 
 
.22 
 
.26 
 
.20  .65* 
 
5.42  -.01 
 
3.80 
 
.11 
 
.18 
Advert 
 
2.27** 
 
.35** 
 
2.81**  3.09 
 
55.40**  -.08 
 
-6.72 
 
1.00** 
 
-1.69** 
Priming 
 
-.23 
 
.37 
 
-.25  .11 
 
.97  .00 
 
8.06 
 
-.02 
 
.24 
BIS 
 
-.16 
 
.59 
 
-.01  -1.31* 
 
-3.21  -.03 
 
4.89 
 
-.66 
 
-.12 
Step 3 .00 
 
.00 
 
.00 
 
.00  .01 
 
.00  .00 
 
.00 
 
.00 
 
Negative Mood 
 
.18 
 
.27 
 
.21  .16 
 
2.96  -.04 
 
-.015 
 
-.15 
 
.05 
Positive Mood 
 
.19 
 
.06 
 
.18  .62* 
 
4.48  -.01 
 
3.85 
 
.10 
 
.16 
Advert 
 
2.26** 
 
.36** 
 
2.80**  3.07 
 
54.61**  -.08* 
 
-6.70 
 
1.00** 
 
-1.70** 
Priming 
 
-.22 
 
.38 
 
-.25  .11 
 
1.10  .00 
 
8.08 
 
-.02 
 
.24 
BIS 
 
-.43 
 
.74 
 
-.20  -1.55* 
 
-12.98  -.01 
 
5.90 
 
-.72t 
 
-.26 
Prime*BIS 
 
.75 
 
1.23 
 
.54  .66 
 
26.45  -.05 
 
-2.24 
 
.17 
 
.39 
t p ≤ .01   *p ≤ .05  **p ≤ .005 
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Appendix C: Tables for Study 2 
 
Procedural priming 
 
Table 7.7 
Correlation Matrix for Focal Variables (procedural priming) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Article persuasiveness 1 
        
    
Article appeal .576** 1 
       
    
Article evaluation .889** 886** 1 
      
    
Web-tax attractiveness .496** .647** 642** 1 
     
    
Attitude certainty -.186** -.274** -.258** -.266** 1 
    
    
Perceived MI -4.09** -.444** -.484** -473** .278** 1 
   
    
Willingness to pay (€) .125 .217** .189* .300** -.025 -.095 1 
  
    
Willingness to sign petition .399** .609** .566** .688** -.151* -.254** .152 1 
 
    
Willingness to volunteer .148* .018 .096 .077 .012 -.041 .045 .081 1     
Minutes volunteered .063 -.026 .025 .034 .037 .004 .054 -.008 .691** 1    
Positive thoughts -.206 .104 -.056 .052 -.053 .110 -.059 .090 .009 .140 1   
Negative thoughts -.068 -.066 -.075 .003 .006 .054 -.103 -.042 -.057 -.025 -.127 1  
PK thoughts -.063 -.195 -.141 -.171 .165 .300** -.024 -.188 -.096 -.007 .094 .140 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).     
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).     
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Table 7.8 
Means (SDs) for Perceptual Variables as a Function of Priming 
  Counterarguing   Control   Bolstering   Total 
Article persuasiveness   
          Low MI article 2.48 (1.35) 
 
2.48 (1.52) 
 
2.92 (1.63) 
 
2.6 (1.50) 
High MI article 2.09 (1.02) 
 
2.88 (1.51) 
 
2.86 (1.65) 
 
2.68 (1.47) 
Total 2.31 (1.23) 
 
2.69 (1.52) 
 
2.89 (1.62) 
 
2.64 (1.48) 
Article appeal 
           Low MI article 2.45 (1.59) 
 
2.21 (1.56) 
 
2.48 (1.61) 
 
2.35 (1.57) 
High MI article 1.82 (1.18) 
 
2.42 (1.46) 
 
2.43 (1.54) 
 
2.27 (1.42) 
Total 2.18 (1.45) 
 
2.32 (1.50) 
 
2.46 (1.56) 
 
2.32 (1.50) 
Article evaluation 
           Low MI article 2.47 (1.40) 
 
2.36 (1.40) 
 
2.7 (1.46) 
 
2.48 (1.41) 
High MI article 1.95 (0.90) 
 
2.65 (1.29) 
 
2.64 (1.25) 
 
2.48 (1.22) 
Total 2.24 (1.23) 
 
2.52 (1.34) 
 
2.67 (1.35) 
 
2.48 (1.32) 
Web-tax attractiveness  
           Low MI article 3.18 (1.95) 
 
2.78 (1.52) 
 
3.48 (1.84) 
 
3.09 (1.75) 
High MI article 2.93 (1.60) 
 
3.08 (1.81) 
 
3.36 (1.72) 
 
3.11 (1.73) 
Total 3.08 (1.80) 
 
2.94 (1.69) 
 
3.43 (1.77) 
 
3.1 (1.74) 
Attitude certainty 
           Low MI article 5.93 (2.63) 
 
5.74 (2.82) 
 
6.04 (2.51) 
 
5.88 (2.65) 
High MI article 7.05 (2.19) 
 
6.69 (2.26) 
 
5.81 (2.40) 
 
6.57 (2.30) 
Total 6.41 (2.49) 
 
6.26 (2.55) 
 
5.93 (2.43) 
 
6.22 (2.50) 
Perceived MI 
           Low MI article 4.44 (1.11) 
 
4.54 (1.10) 
 
4.12 (1.08) 
 
4.39 (1.10) 
High MI article 4.73 (1.03) 
 
4.55 (1.30) 
 
4.52 (1.40) 
 
4.59 (1.25) 
Total 4.56 (1.07)  4.54 (1.21)  4.3 (1.24)  4.49 (1.18) 
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Procedural priming 
 
 
Table 7.9 
Means (SDs) for Behavioural Variables as a Function of Priming 
  Priming   
    Counterarguing   Control   Bolstering   Total 
Willingness to pay (€) 14.26 (13.26) 
 
21.42 (22.98)   32.31 (28.78) 
 
22.17 (23.26) 
Willingness to volunteer 61% 
  
49% 
  
65% 
  
56% 
 Minutes volunteered 11.55 (14.84) 
 
12.87 (18.01) 
 
14.39 (16.29) 
 
12.88 (16.72) 
Willingness to sign petition 1.55 (1.01)   1.70 (1.31)   1.54 (1.00)   1.62 (1.15) 
 
 
Table 7.10 
Means (SDs) for Cognitive Variables as a Function of Priming 
  
      Priming       
       Counterarguing   Control   Bolstering   Total 
Positive thoughts 1.19 (0.40) 
 
1.19 (0.40) 
 
1.13 (0.34) 
 
1.17 (0.38) 
Negative thoughts 1.15 (0.43) 
 
1.12 (0.37) 
 
1.06 (0.24) 
 
1.11 (0.36) 
PK thoughts 2.25 (1.36)   1.75 (0.68)   1.45 (0.82)   1.82 (1.00) 
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Procedural priming 
 
Table 7.11  
Logistical Regression Predicting Willingness to Volunteer for Future Studies (procedural priming) 
 B S.E Wald df p Odds Ratio 95% C.I. for Odds Ratio 
       Lower Upper 
Control 
  
4.22 2 .12 
   Bolstering .69 .38 3.24 1 .07 1.99 .94 4.21 
Counterarguing .53 .353 2.27 1 .13 1.70 .85 3.40 
Negative Mood .10 .22 .23 1 .63 1.11 .73 1.69 
Positive Mood .24 .15 2.56 1 .11 1.27 .94 1.71 
Constant -.77 .34 5.08 1 .02 .46     
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Procedural priming 
 
Table 7.12 
 Results of Moderated Regression Analyses for Dependent Variables (Approach Motivation) 
 Article 
evaluation 
Webtax 
attractiveness 
Attitude 
certainty 
Willingness 
to pay 
Willingness 
to  sign petition 
Willingness 
to volunteer 
Number 
of minutes 
Perceived 
MI 
Positive 
thoughts 
Negative 
thoughts 
PK  
Thoughts 
Predictor ∆R2 B ∆R2 B ∆R2 B ∆R2 B ∆R2 B ∆R2 B ∆R2 B ∆R2 B ∆R2 B ∆R2 B ∆R2 B 
Step 1 .01 
 
.01 
 
.00  .00  .01  .07  .02 
 
.02  .07 
 
.00 
 
.00  
Negative Mood 
 
-.13 
 
-.21  .23  -.93  -.17  .04 
 
.27  -.07 
 
-.09 
 
-.01  .06 
Positive Mood 
 
-.03 
 
.11  -.14  .47  .10  .07* 
 
1.69  .14 
 
-.02 
 
.01 .01 -.00 
Step 2 .02 
 
.01 
 
.02  .08  .00  .01  .02 
 
.03  .08 
 
.02 
 
  
Negative Mood 
 
-.09 
 
-.16  .21  .72  -.19  .05 
 
.82  -.12 
 
-.11 
 
-.02  .07 
Positive Mood 
 
-.07 
 
.08  -.04  -.52  .10  .06 
 
1.24  .18 
 
-.02 
 
.01  .03 
Article 
 
.06 
 
.03  .69t  -5.54  .12  .06 
 
1.35  .11 
 
.13 
 
.08  .08 
Priming 
 
.26 
 
.39  .-23  13.44  -.16  .11 
 
2.14  -.32 
 
-.09 
 
-.08  .08 
BAS 
 
.27 
 
.05  .02  -2.41  .05  .02 
 
5.40t  -.24 
 
.19 
 
.01  .13 
Step 3 .00 
 
.01 
 
.03  .03  .00  .01  .02 
 
.00  .05 
 
.00 
 
.00  
Negative Mood 
 
-.09 
 
-.15  .17  1.16  -.18  .05 
 
1.10  -.12 
 
-.13 
 
-.02  .07 
Positive Mood 
 
-.07 
 
.07  -.02  -.48  .09  .06 
 
1.10  .18 
 
.00 
 
.01  -.03 
Article 
 
.06 
 
.04  .67t  -5.01  .13  .05 
 
1.39  .11 
 
.17t 
 
.08  .08 
Priming 
 
.28 
 
.42  -.34  13.47  -.15  .10 
 
2.11  -.33 
 
-.04 
 
-.07  .06 
BAS 
 
.18 
 
-.16  .65  -10.06  -.03  .08 
 
3.27  -.18 
 
.24 
 
-.03  .20 
Prime*BAS 
 
.23 
 
.55  -1.65*  18.53  .22  -.16 
 
13.30  -.14 
 
-1.47t 
 
.08  -.14 
                                                                                                                                                                                t p ≤ .01   *p ≤ .05  **p ≤ .005 
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Appendix D: Tables for Study 3 
 
Procedural Priming 
Table 7.13 
Correlation Matrix for Focal Variables (procedural priming) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Article persuasiveness 1 
        
    
Article appeal .659** 1 
       
    
Article evaluation .907** 914** 1 
      
    
Pension attractiveness .542** .602** .630** 1 
     
    
Attitude certainty .116 .182* 163* .179* 1 
    
    
Perceived MI -.546** -.593** -.626** -.602** -.248** 1 
   
    
Willingness to pay (€) .250** .246** .267** .382** .153 -.337** 1 
  
    
Willingness to sign petition .636** .681** .724** .778** .233** -.588** .356** 1 
 
    
Willingness to volunteer .013 -.039 -.016 .067 .182* -.005 .074 .024 1     
Minutes volunteered -.033 -.049 .009 -.002 .191* .002 .033 .069 .014     
Positive thoughts .244* .168 .223* .147 .115 -.192* -.102 .196* -.053 -.092 1   
Negative thoughts -.349** -.438** -.432** -.404** -.079 .430** -.080 -.374** .123 .036 -.190 1  
PK thoughts -.156 -.320** -.261** -.137 -.023 .204* .045 -.140 .098 -.070 .033 .280** 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2 tailed).     
* Correlation is significant at the .005 level (2 tailed).     
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Table 7.14 
Means (SDs) for Perceptual Variables as a Function of Priming 
 
      Priming Condition      
    Counterarguing   Control   Bolstering   Total 
Article persuasiveness 
        Low MI article 3.17 (1.90) 
 
3.28 (1.62) 
 
3.88 (1.90) 
 
3.39 (1.80) 
High MI article 3.50 (1.82) 
 
3.28 (1.72) 
 
3.39 (1.61) 
 
3.38 (1.70) 
Total 3.32 (1.85) 
 
3.28 (1.65) 
 
3.63 (1.75) 
 
3.39 (1.74) 
Article appeal 
           Low MI article 3.17 (1.79) 
 
3.64 (1.52) 
 
4.65 (1.87) 
 
3.73 (1.79) 
High MI article 3.40 (2.09) 
 
2.85 (1.43) 
 
3.28 (1.93) 
 
3.14 (1.79) 
Total 3.27 (1.91) 
 
3.24 (1.52) 
 
3.94 (2.00) 
 
3.44 (1.80) 
Article evaluation 
           Low MI article 3.17 (1.61) 
 
3.46 (1.31) 
 
4.26 (1.72) 
 
3.56 (1.57) 
High MI article 3.45 (1.90) 
 
3.06 (1.46) 
 
3.33 (1.65) 
 
3.26 (1.65) 
Total 3.30 (1.73) 
 
3.26 (1.39) 
 
3.79 (1.73) 
 
3.41 (1.61) 
Pension attractiveness 
           Low MI article 5.47 (2.54) 
 
6.11 (1.89) 
 
6.89 (1.59) 
 
6.09 (2.12) 
High MI article 5.82 (1.79) 
 
5.47 (1.65) 
 
6.09 (1.88) 
 
5.76 (1.75) 
Total 5.63 (2.20) 
 
5.79 (1.78) 
 
6.48 (1.77) 
 
5.92 (1.95) 
Attitude certainty 
           Low MI article 5.83 (2.12) 
 
6.56 (1.98) 
 
6.59 (2.06) 
 
6.30 (2.05) 
High MI article 6.15 (1.98) 
 
6.62 (1.98) 
 
6.39 (2.20) 
 
6.41 (2.02) 
Total 5.98 (2.04) 
 
6.59 (1.96) 
 
6.49 (2.11) 
 
6.35 (2.03) 
Perceived MI 
           Low MI article 4.31 (1.47) 
 
3.91 (1.21) 
 
3.78 (1.21) 
 
4.02 (1.31) 
High MI article 4.30 (1.44) 
 
4.71 (1.12) 
 
4.65 (0.79) 
 
4.56 (1.15) 
Total 4.30 (1.44)   4.31 (1.22)  4.23 (1.09)  4.29 (1.26) 
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Procedural Priming 
 
Table 7.15 
Means (SDs) for Behavioural Variables as a Function of Priming 
  Priming   
    Counterarguing   Control   Bolstering   Total 
Willingness to pay (€) 0.66 (0.39) 
 
0.66 (0.39)   0.87 (0.26) 
 
0.71 (0.37) 
Willingness to sign petition 3.30 (2.17)   3.43 (1.96)   4.09 (2.33)   3.56 (2.15) 
Willingness to volunteer 74% 
  
80% 
  
77% 
  
77% 
 Minutes volunteered 1.48 (0.28) 
 
1.60 (0.30) 
 
1.52 (0.23) 
 
1.54 (0.28) 
Log transformation used for willingness to pay (€) 
       Log transformation used for no of minutes 
 
 
Table 7.16 
Means (SDs) for Cognitive Variables as a Function of Priming 
  
      Priming       
       Counterarguing   Control   Bolstering   Total 
Positive thoughts 1.76 (0.83) 
 
1.53 (0.84) 
 
1.64 (0.73) 
 
1.65 (0.80) 
Negative thoughts 1.94 (1.04) 
 
2.05 (0.84) 
 
1.93 (1.01) 
 
1.98 (0.95) 
PK thoughts 1.97 (1.08)   2.17 (0.90)   2.04 (1.27)   2.07 (1.05) 
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Procedural Priming 
 
 
Table 7.17 
Logistical Regression Predicting Willingness to Volunteer for Future Studies (procedural priming) 
 B S.E Wald df p Odds Ratio 
95% C.I. for 
Odds Ratio 
       Lower Upper 
Control 
  
.45 2 .80 
   Bolstering -.17 0.48 .12 1 .73 .85 .33 2.18 
Counterarguing -.32 0.48 .45 1 .50 .73 .28 1.85 
Mood .05 0.09 .27 1 .60 1.05 .88 1.26 
Constant 1.29 0.36 12.68 1 .00 3.64     
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Procedural Priming 
 
Table 7.18 
Results of Moderated Regression Analyses for Dependent Variables (Approach Motivation) 
 
Article 
evaluation 
Pension 
attractiveness 
Willingness 
to pay 
Attitude 
Certainty 
Willingness to 
sign petition 
Willingness 
to volunteer 
Number 
of minutes 
Perceived 
MI 
Positive 
thoughts 
Negative 
thoughts 
PK 
thoughts 
Predictor ∆R2 B ∆R2 B ∆R2 B   ∆R2 B ∆R2 B ∆R2 B ∆R2 B ∆R2 B ∆R2 B ∆R2 B 
Step 1 .09 
 
.03 
 
.00  .04  .04  .00  .03 
 
.11  .04 
 
.09 
 
.11  
Mood 
 
.22** 
 
.15t  -.00  .19*  .20  .00 
 
-.02t  -.19** 
 
.08t 
 
-.12**  -.19** 
Step 2 .03 
 
.04 
 
.13  .05  .04  .02  .01 
 
.07  .00 
 
.01 
 
.07  
Mood 
 
.22 
 
.15t  -.01  .21  .20*  .00 
 
-.02t  -.19** 
 
.09t 
 
-.12**  -.19** 
Article 
 
-.38 
 
-.44  .047  -.06  -.66*  .11 
 
-.02  .62** 
 
-.06 
 
.11  .62 
Priming 
 
.47 
 
.62t  .27**  .18  .64  -.01 
 
-.04  -.14 
 
.02 
 
-.14  -.14 
BAS 
 
-.15 
 
-.21  -1.82t  1.09*  -.08  .01 
 
.05  .20 
 
-.06 
 
.12  .20 
Step 3 .00 
 
.00 
 
.04  .01  .00  .01  .00 
 
.00  .00 
 
.00 
 
.00  
Mood 
 
.22** 
 
.15t  -.01  .22*  .20*  .00 
 
-.02t  -.19** 
 
.09t 
 
-.12**  -.20** 
Article 
 
-.38 
 
-.44  .06  -.04  -.65t  .12 
 
-.02  .62** 
 
-.06 
 
-.12  .62** 
Priming 
 
.47 
 
.62t  .28**  .16  .64  -.01 
 
-.04  -.14 
 
.02 
 
-.14  -.14 
BAS 
 
-.25 
 
-.13  -.05  1.48*  .07  .09 
 
.04  .27 
 
-.08 
 
-.00  .27 
Prime*BAS 
 
.30** 
 
.-23  -.42*  -1.11  -.42  -.23 
 
.04  -.21 
 
.08 
 
.32  -.21 
                                                                                                                                                                                   t p ≤ .01   *p ≤ .05  **p ≤ .005** 
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Procedural Priming 
 
Table 7.19  
Results of Moderated Regression Analyses for Dependent Variables (Persuasion Knowledge) 
 Article 
evaluation 
Pension 
attractiveness 
Attitude 
certainty 
Willingness 
to pay 
Willingness 
to sign petition 
Willingness 
to volunteer 
Number 
of minutes 
Perceived 
MI 
Positive 
thoughts 
Negative 
thoughts 
PK 
thoughts 
Predictor ∆R2 B ∆R2 B ∆R2 B ∆R2 B ∆R2 B ∆R2 B ∆R2 B ∆R2 B ∆R2 B ∆R2 B ∆R2 B 
Step 1 .06 
 
.03 
 
.06  .00  .03  .00  .02 
 
.10  .04 
 
.10 
 
.02  
Mood 
 
.19** 
 
.16*  .24**  .00  .18*  .01 
 
-.02  -.19** 
 
.09t 
 
-.13**  -.07 
Step 2 .00 
 
.03 
 
.01  .07  .02  .02  .02 
 
.06  .00 
 
.00 
 
.03  
Mood 
 
.19** 
 
.16*  .24**  .00  .18*  .01 
 
-.02t  -.19** 
 
.08t 
 
-.13**  -.07 
Article 
 
-.16 
 
-.26  .02  .02  -.46*  .12 
 
-.03  .57** 
 
-.01 
 
.-.04  .40* 
Priming 
 
.17 
 
.61t  -.115  .21*  .45  -.01 
 
-.07  -.07 
 
.09 
 
-.08  .08 
PK 
 
.42 
 
-.83    -.17  .26  .00 
 
-.08  -1.24t 
 
-.29 
 
-.04  -.17 
Step 3 .00 
 
.00 
 
.02  .00  .00  .00  .03 
 
.00  .01 
 
.01 
 
.00  
Mood 
 
.19** 
 
.16*  .24**  .00  .18*  .01 
 
-.02  -.19** 
 
.09t 
 
-.14**  -.07 
Article 
 
-.16 
 
-.26  .03  .02  -.46  .12 
 
-.03  .57** 
 
-.00 
 
-.05  -.40* 
Priming 
 
.16 
 
.61t  -.10  .21*  .45  -.01 
 
-.07  -.07 
 
.09 
 
-.08  .08 
PK 
 
.78 
 
-.44  -2.83*  -.17  .41  -.01 
 
-.37  -1.18 
 
-.89 
 
.48  -.22 
Prime* PK 
 
-.86 
 
-.88  4.25*  -.00  -.34  .02 
 
.61t  -.15 
 
1.30 
 
-1.08  .11 
                                                                                                                                                                                     t p ≤ .01   *p ≤ .05  **p ≤ .005 
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Episodic Priming 
 
Table 7.20 
Correlation Matrix for Focal Variables (episodic priming) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Persuasiveness 1 
        
 
Appeal .663** 1 
       
 
Article evaluation .915** .909** 1 
      
 
Pension attractiveness .515** .572** .596** 1 
     
 
Attitude certainty  .059 .196** .139 .168* 1 
    
 
Perception of PK -.370** -.373** -.407** -.348** -.037 1 
   
 
Willingness to pay .328** .357** .373** .529** -.065 -.112 1 
  
 
Willingness to sign petition .615** .670** .704** .783** .195* -.392** .445** 1 
 
 
Willingness to volunteer .066 .132 .108 .135 .174* .011 -.097 .134 1  
Minutes volunteered -.122 -.061 -.101 -.086 .158 .317** -.016 -.083 .431 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2 tailed).  
* Correlation is significant at the .005 level (2 tailed).  
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Table 7.21 
Means (SDs) for Perceptual Variables as a Function of Priming 
 
       Priming Condition       
     Counterarguing   Control   Bolstering   Total 
 Article persuasiveness 
        Low MI article  3.88 (1.75) 
 
3.28 (1.61) 
 
3.72 (1.41) 
 
3.59 (1.62) 
High MI article  3.68 (1.65) 
 
3.62 (1.20) 
 
3.11 (1.41) 
 
3.50 (1.43) 
Total  3.78 (1.69) 
 
3.43 (1.44) 
 
3.41 (1.42) 
 
3.55 (1.52) 
Article appeal  
           Low MI article  3.62 (1.55) 
 
3.22 (1.41) 
 
3.72 (1.64) 
 
3.47 (1.51) 
High MI article  3.40 (1.80) 
 
3.23 (1.56) 
 
2.95 (1.27) 
 
3.21 (1.57) 
Total  3.51 (1.66) 
 
3.22 (1.46) 
 
3.32 (1.49) 
 
3.35 (1.54) 
Article evaluation  
           Low MI article  3.75 (1.53) 
 
3.25 (1.37) 
 
3.72 (1.37) 
 
3.53 (1.43) 
High MI article  3.54 (1.63) 
 
3.42 (1.28) 
 
3.03 (1.24) 
 
3.36 (1.40) 
Total  3.65 (1.57) 
 
3.33 (1.32) 
 
3.36 (1.34) 
 
3.45 (1.42) 
Pension attractiveness  
           Low MI article  6.01 (2.12) 
 
5.88 (1.69) 
 
5.84 (1.62) 
 
5.92 (1.81) 
High MI article  5.98 (2.03) 
 
5.79 (2.01) 
 
5.84 (1.89) 
 
5.87 (1.95) 
Total  5.99 (2.06) 
 
5.84 (1.82) 
 
5.84 (1.73) 
 
5.89 (1.87) 
Attitude certainty  
           Low MI article  6.50 (1.61) 
 
6.22 (1.91) 
 
6.11 (1.60) 
 
6.29 (1.73) 
High MI article  6.16 (2.30) 
 
6.31 (2.28) 
 
6.11 (2.02) 
 
6.20 (2.19) 
Total  6.33 (1.97) 
 
6.26 (2.06) 
 
6.11 (1.81) 
 
6.25 (1.96) 
Perceived MI  
           Low MI article  4.17 (0.99) 
 
4.10 (1.20) 
 
4.09 (1.44) 
 
4.12 (1.18) 
High MI article  4.17 (1.09) 
 
4.46 (1.19) 
 
4.35 (0.97) 
 
4.33 (1.09) 
Total  4.18 (1.03)   4.26 (1.20)  4.22 (1.22)  4.22 (1.14) 
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Episodic Priming 
 
Table 7.22 
Means (SDs) for Behavioural Variables as a Function of Priming 
  Priming    
    Counterarguing   Control   Bolstering   Total 
Willingness to pay (€) 0.71 (0.35) 
 
0.76 (0.31)   0.74 (0.27) 
 
(0.74) (0.32) 
Willingness to sign petition 3.55 (2.14)   3.48 (2.04)   3.65 (1.86)   3.55 (2.02) 
Willingness to volunteer 80% 
  
81% 
  
80% 
  
80% 
 Minutes volunteered 1.49 (0.43) 
 
1.45 (0.33) 
 
1.40 (0.25) 
 
1.45 (0.36) 
Log transformation used for “willingness to pay” and “minutes volunteered” variables  
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Appendix E: Tables for Study 4 
 
Episodic Priming 
Table 7.23 
Correlation Matrix for Focal Variables (episodic priming) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Advert persuasiveness 1 
     
   
Advert appeal .709** 1 
    
   
Advert evaluation .914** .051 1 
   
   
Hotel attractiveness .574** .621** .000 1 
  
   
Willingness to pay (€) .335c .373** -.004 .518** 1 
 
   
Willingness to volunteer .114 .055 -.102 .183** .117 1    
Minutes volunteered .116 .075 -.064 .123* .158* .638** 1   
Positive thoughts .296** .379** .010 .255** .236** .119 .143 1  
Negative thoughts -.239** -.267** -.012 -.100 -.021 -.016 -.017 -.270** 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).    
* Correlation is significant at the .005 level (2 tailed). 
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Episodic Priming 
Table 7.24 
Means (SDs) for Perceptual Variables as a Function of Priming 
 
      Priming       
     Counterarguing   Control   Bolstering   Total 
Advert persuasiveness 
           Igloo hotel 3.72 (1.53) 
 
4.13 (1.47) 
 
4.39 (1.46) 
 
4.10 (1.49) 
Scottish hotel 3.17 (1.40) 
 
3.54 (1.27) 
 
3.59 (1.38) 
 
3.41 (1.36) 
Total 3.38 (1.47) 
 
3.88 (1.41) 
 
3.97 (1.47) 
 
3.74 (1.46) 
Advert appeal 
           Igloo hotel 4.24 (1.86) 
 
4.52 (1.87) 
 
4.52 (1.87) 
 
4.37 (1.82) 
Scottish hotel 2.96 (1.30) 
 
3.46 (1.20) 
 
3.51 (1.56) 
 
3.28 (1.37) 
Total 3.44 (1.65) 
 
3.98 (1.61) 
 
4.00 (1.78) 
 
3.80 (1.69) 
Advert evaluation 
           Igloo hotel 3.98 (1.64) 
 
4.24 (1.43) 
 
4.45 (1.56) 
 
4.24 (1.52) 
Scottish hotel 3.06 (1.24) 
 
3.50 (1.13) 
 
3.34 (1.39) 
 
3.34 (1.27) 
Total 3.40 (1.47) 
 
3.93 (1.36) 
 
3.98 (1.51) 
 
3.77 (1.46) 
Hotel attractiveness 
           Igloo hotel 4.83 (1.75) 
 
4.85 (1.52) 
 
4.52 (1.97) 
 
4.75 (1.72) 
Scottish hotel 2.67 (1.23) 
 
2.97 (1.20) 
 
3.51 (1.68) 
 
3.02 (1.41) 
Total 3.48 (1.78)   4.06 (1.67) 
 
4.00 (1.88) 
 
3.83 (1.78) 
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Episodic Priming 
Table 7.25 
Means (SDs) for Behavioural Variables as a Function of Priming 
  Priming   
    Counterarguing   Control   Bolstering   Total 
Willingness to pay (€) 62.24 (33.24) 
 
78.97 (43.27)   72.77 (39.68) 
 
71.57 (39.52) 
Willingness to volunteer 73% 
  
78% 
  
73% 
  
75% 
 Minutes volunteered 14.44 (12.98)   17.32 (15.87)   18.10 (17.59)   16.61 (15.57) 
 
 
Table 7.26 
Means (SDs) for Cognitive Variables as a Function of Priming 
  
      Priming       
       Counterarguing   Control   Bolstering   Total 
Positive thoughts 1.80 (0.87) 
 
2.17 (1.06) 
 
2.26 (1.25) 
 
2.07 (1.07) 
Negative thoughts 1.96 (1.30) 
 
1.90 (1.39) 
 
2.15 (0.97) 
 
1.99 (1.24) 
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Episodic Priming 
Table 7.27 
Logistical Regression Predicting Willingness to Volunteer for Future Studies (episodic priming) 
 B S.E. Wald df p 
Odds  
Ratio 
95% C.I. for  
Odds Ratio 
       Lower Upper 
Counterarguing 
  
.90 2 0.64 
   Control .22 0.36 .37 1 0.55 1.24 .61 2.54 
Bolstering  -.12 0.36 .10 1 0.75 .89 .44 1.81 
Negative Mood .24 0.23 1.17 1 0.28 1.28 .82 1.99 
Positive Mood .28 0.20 2.02 1 0.16 1.32 .90 1.94 
Constant -.40 0.84 .23 1 0.63 .67     
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Episodic Priming 
Table 7.28  
Results of Moderated Regression Analyses for Dependent Variables (Avoidance Motivation) 
 Persuasiveness Appeal Advert 
evaluation 
Hotel 
attractiveness 
Willingness 
 to pay 
Number of 
minutes 
Positive 
thoughts 
Negative 
thoughts 
Predictor ∆R2 B ∆R2 B ∆R2 B ∆R2 B ∆R2 B ∆R2 B ∆R2 B ∆R2 B 
Step 1 .039 
 
.04 
 
.05 
 
.02  .00 
 
.01 
 
.04 
 
.01 
 Negative Mood 
 
-.00 
 
-.08 
 
-.04  -.13 
 
1.76 
 
.66 
 
-.02 
 
.06 
Positive Mood 
 
.37** 
 
.42** 
 
.40**  .27t 
 
3.10 
 
2.07 
 
.28* 
 
-.13 
Step 2 .080 
 
.12 
 
.11 
 
.24  .35 
 
.02 
 
.03 
 
.01 
 Negative Mood 
 
-.07 
 
-.05 
 
-.06  .08 
 
3.22 
 
-.73 
 
-.05 
 
.05 
Positive Mood 
 
.37** 
 
.40** 
 
.38**  .26t 
 
4.49 
 
2.17 
 
.27* 
 
-.15 
Advert 
 
.63** 
 
1.08** 
 
.86**  1.67** 
 
47.18** 
 
-1.49 
 
.12 
 
-.26 
Priming 
 
-.42* 
 
-.35 
 
-.39*  -.34 
 
-8.26 
 
-3.07 
 
-.36t 
 
-.14 
BIS 
 
.20 
 
-.14 
 
.03  -.10 
 
2.88 
 
4.15 
 
-.08 
 
-.02 
Step 3 .00 
 
.00 
 
.00 
 
.00  .01 
 
.00 
 
.00 
 
.03 
 Negative Mood 
 
-.07 
 
-.05 
 
-.06  -.07 
 
2.97 
 
-.73 
 
-.05 
 
-.01 
Positive Mood 
 
.37** 
 
.40** 
 
.38**  .26t 
 
4.40 
 
2.16 
 
.28* 
 
-.17 
Advert 
 
.63** 
 
1.08** 
 
.85**  1.67** 
 
47.29** 
 
-1.49 
 
.12** 
 
-.26 
Priming 
 
-.41* 
 
-.36 
 
-.38*  -.35 
 
-7.36 
 
-3.10 
 
-.35t 
 
-.17 
BIS 
 
.09* 
 
-.08 
 
.01  .03 
 
-3.76 
 
4.47 
 
-.15 
 
-.47 
Prime*BIS 
 
.33* 
 
-.21* 
 
.06  -.39 
 
18.52 
 
-.95 
 
.20 
 
1.06* 
       
  
 
                                    t p ≤ .01   *p ≤ .05  **p ≤ .005  
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Appendix F: Tables for Study 5 & Study 6 
 
Tables for Study 5 
 
Procedural Priming 
 
Table 7.29 
Correlation Matrix for Focal Variables (procedural priming) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Advert persuasiveness 1 
     
Advert appeal .826** 1 
    
Advert evaluation 
      
Hotel attractiveness .718** .866** 1 
   
Willingness to pay (€) .557** .742** .685** 1 
  
Willingness to volunteer -.013 .015 .025 -.108 1 
 
Minutes volunteered .045 .034 .094 .027 .195* 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the .005 level (2 tailed). 
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Procedural Priming 
Table 7.30 
Means (SDs) for Perceptual Variables as a Function of Priming 
 
      Priming       
     Counterarguing   Control   Bolstering   Total 
Advert persuasiveness 3.93 (1.84) 
 
4.10 (1.79) 
 
3.29 (1.88) 
 
3.79 (1.85) 
Advert appeal 3.23 (1.81) 
 
4.03 (1.99) 
 
3.38 (1.98) 
 
3.59 (1.95) 
Advert evaluation 3.58 (1.69) 
 
4.06 (1.84) 
 
3.33 (1.85) 
 
3.69 (1.81) 
Food attractiveness 3.17 (2.02) 
 
3.78 (1.94) 
 
3.12 (2.01) 
 
3.38 (1.99) 
 
 
Table 7.31 
Means (SDs) for Behavioural Variables as a Function of Priming 
  Priming   
    Counterarguing   Control   Bolstering   Total 
Willingness to pay (€) 1.33 (1.61) 
 
2.09 (1.61)   1.39 (1.44) 
 
1.63 (1.58) 
Willingness to volunteer 97% 
  
90% 
  
98% 
  
95% 
 Minutes volunteered 46.21 (19.35)   39.86 (17.30)   38.97 (15.11)   41.41 (17.34) 
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Tables for Study 6 
 
Procedural Priming 
 
Table 7.32 
Correlation Matrix for Focal Variables (procedural priming) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Advert persuasiveness 1 
     
 
Advert appeal .822** 1 
    
 
Vacation spot attractiveness .690** .801** 1 
   
 
Like to visit .795** .775** .754** 
   
 
Willingness to pay (€) .544** .444** .382** .552** 1 
 
 
Willingness to volunteer .037 .055 .133 .054 .144 1  
Minutes volunteered .112 .126 .128 .135 .218* .203* 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the .005 level (2 tailed). 
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Procedural Priming 
Table 7.33 
Means (SDs) for Perceptual Variables as a Function of Priming 
 
      Priming        
    Counterarguing   Control   Bolstering   Total 
Advert persuasiveness 
           Igloo Hotel 5.40 (1.51) 
 
4.47 (1.70) 
 
4.75 (1.77) 
 
4.69 (1.69) 
Milwaukee  4.00 (1.49) 
 
4.30 (1.88) 
 
3.71 (1.66) 
 
3.99 (1.69) 
Total 4.47 (1.61) 
 
4.40 (1.76) 
 
4.06 (1.75) 
 
4.30 (1.75) 
Advert appeal 
           Igloo Hotel 5.60 (1.58) 
 
4.97 (1.76) 
 
5.13 (1.86) 
 
5.11 (1.75) 
Milwaukee 4.30 (1.60) 
 
4.63 (1.76) 
 
3.97 (1.87) 
 
4.28 (1.76) 
Total 4.73 (1.66) 
 
4.83 (1.76) 
 
4.36 (1.93) 
 
4.65 (1.79) 
Ad evaluation 
           Igloo Hotel 5.50 (1.53) 
 
4.72 (1.64) 
 
4.94 (1.80) 
 
4.90 (1.66) 
Milwaukee 4.15 (1.40) 
 
4.46 (1.70) 
 
3.84 (1.68) 
 
4.13 (1.62) 
Total 4.60 (1.55) 
 
4.61 (1.66) 
 
4.21 (1.78) 
 
4.47 (1.68) 
Vacation spot attractiveness 
           Igloo Hotel 5.70 (1.16) 
 
5.19 (1.72) 
 
4.81 (1.83) 
 
5.18 (1.67) 
Milwaukee 4.60 (1.60) 
 
4.85 (1.46) 
 
3.87 (1.61) 
 
4.40 (1.60) 
Total 4.97 (1.54) 
 
5.05 (1.61) 
 
4.19 (1.73) 
 
4.74 (1.67) 
Like to visit 
           Igloo Hotel 5.50 (1.51) 
 
4.22 (1.96) 
 
4.75 (1.77) 
 
4.56 (1.88) 
Milwaukee 3.65 (1.84) 
 
4.33 (1.86) 
 
3.52 (1.79) 
 
3.83 (1.84) 
Total 4.27 (1.93)   4.27 (1.90)   3.94 (1.86)   4.16 (1.89) 
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Procedural Priming 
 
Table 7.34 
Means (SDs) for Behavioural Variables as a Function of Priming 
 
      Priming        
     Counterarguing   Control   Bolstering   Total 
Willingness to pay (€) 152.38 (88.57) 
 
184.03 (126.59) 
 
163.36 (119.10) 
 
170.44 (117.00) 
Willingness to volunteer 86% 
  
94% 
  
83% 
  
89% 
 Minutes volunteered 42.11 (21.74)   34.41 (20.91)   37.44 (22.10)   37.03 (21.52) 
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Episodic Priming 
 
Table 7.35 
Correlation Matrix for Focal Variables (episodic priming) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Advert persuasiveness 1 
     
 
Advert appeal .824** 1 
    
 
Vacation spot attractiveness .672** .766** 1 
   
 
Like to visit .670** .726** .872** 1 
  
 
Willingness to pay (€) .492** .546** .530** .588** 1 
 
 
Willingness to volunteer .051 .046 .001 .019 -.008 1  
Minutes volunteered .115 .071 .001 -.031 .041 -.037 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the .005 level (2 tailed). 
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Episodic Priming 
 
Table 7.36 
Means (SDs) for Perceptual Variables as a Function of Priming 
 
      Priming        
    Counterarguing   Control   Bolstering   Total 
Advert persuasiveness 
           Igloo Hotel 3.84 (1.74) 
 
4.46 (1.86) 
 
4.43 (1.95) 
 
4.34 (1.85) 
Milwaukee  3.67 (1.46) 
 
3.68 (1.87) 
 
4.61 (1.19) 
 
3.90 (1.64) 
Total 3.75 (1.58) 
 
4.10 (1.92) 
 
4.53 (1.54) 
 
4.10 (1.74) 
Advert appeal 
           Igloo Hotel 4.11 (1.94) 
 
5.16 (1.70) 
 
5.07 (1.82) 
 
4.79 (1.84) 
Milwaukee 4.05 (1.75) 
 
3.82 (2.08) 
 
4.22 (1.63) 
 
3.99 (1.87) 
Total 4.08 (1.82) 
 
4.39 (2.02) 
 
4.59 (1.74) 
 
4.34 (1.89) 
Ad evaluation 
           Igloo Hotel 3.97 (1.78) 
 
4.92 (1.70) 
 
4.75 (1.80) 
 
4.56 (1.77) 
Milwaukee 3.86 (1.49) 
 
3.75 (1.92) 
 
4.62 (1.30) 
 
3.94 (1.67) 
Total 3.91 (1.62) 
 
4.24 (1.90) 
 
4.56 (1.52) 
 
4.22 (1.74) 
Vacation spot attractiveness 
           Igloo Hotel 4.47 (1.95) 
 
5.16 (1.84) 
 
4.79 (1.72) 
 
4.84 (1.84) 
Milwaukee 3.67 (1.53) 
 
3.65 (1.92) 
 
4.22 (1.31) 
 
3.79 (1.67) 
Total 4.05 (1.77) 
 
4.29 (2.02) 
 
4.47 (1.50) 
 
4.26 (1.82) 
Like to visit 
           Igloo Hotel 3.89 (1.99) 
 
5.00 (1.87) 
 
4.86 (2.07) 
 
4.60 (1.99) 
Milwaukee 3.14 (1.49) 
 
3.47 (2.02) 
 
4.22 (1.90) 
 
3.56 (1.87) 
Total 3.50 (1.77)   4.12 (2.08)   4.50 (1.97)   4.02 (1.99) 
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Episodic Priming 
 
Table 7.37 
Means (SDs) for Behavioural Variables as a Function of Priming 
 
      Priming        
     Counterarguing   Control   Bolstering   Total 
Willingness to pay (€) 132.20 (127.01) 
 
151.10 (105.95) 
 
194.68 (122.22) 
 
155.68 (118.08) 
Willingness to volunteer 90% 
  
97% 
  
94% 
  
94% 
 Minutes volunteered 40.17 (18.51)   41.32 (23.14)   37.97 (20.29)   40.16 (21.08) 
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Appendix G: Sample Questionnaire 
 
 
Perceptions of advertising 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the effectiveness of 
advertising. An advert for a vacation location is included in the 
envelope. Please read and answer all questions in the following 
questionnaire carefully. 
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It is critical that you carefully read and answer ALL questions. Your full attention is 
required throughout this questionnaire to complete it properly. Thank you in 
advance. 
 
 
I am interested in ﬁnding out about the thoughts that went through your mind as you 
read the information about the hotel. Please share any thoughts you had while you were 
reading the advert of the hotel. Please write your thoughts in the section below. Do not 
worry about spelling or grammar. Just make sure you express the main idea of each 
thought. 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Please circle the appropriate number on the scales below 
 
  Not at all                                                                                                   Very  
persuasive                                                                                                persuasive                   
 
 
Q1 How persuasive did you 
find the advert? 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 5 6 7 
 
  Not at all                                                                                                    Very  
appealing                                                                                                   appealing 
 
 
Q2 How appealing did you 
find the advert? 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 5 6 7 
 
  Not at all                                                                                                    Very  
attractive                                                                                                    attractive 
 
 
Q3 How attractive was the 
hotel featured in the 
advert? 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
How much would you be willing to pay for a one night stay in this hotel?  
€_______ 
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Please read each statement carefully. Then 
indicate the extent to which you agree or 
disagree with each of the statements by ticking 
the appropriate box. Please answer all questions. 
 
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
 
Agree 
 
 
 
Disagree 
 
 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
 
 
 
Q1 If I think something unpleasant is going to 
happen I usually get pretty worked up 
    
Q2 I worry about making mistakes 
 
    
Q3 Criticism or scolding hurts me quite a bit 
 
    
Q4 I feel pretty worried or upset when I think or 
know somebody is angry at me 
    
Q5 Even if something bad is about to happen to 
me, I rarely experience fear or nervousness 
    
Q6 I feel worried when I think I have done poorly 
at something 
    
Q7 I have very few fears compared to my friends 
 
    
Q8 When I get something I want, I feel excited and 
energized 
    
Q9 When I’m doing well at something, I love to 
keep at it 
    
Q10 When good things happen to me, it affects me 
strongly 
    
Q11 It would excite me to win a contest 
 
    
Q12 When I see an opportunity for something I like, 
I get excited right away 
    
Q13 When I want something, I usually go all-out to 
get it 
    
Q14 I go out of my way to get things I want 
 
    
Q15 If I see a chance to get something I want, I 
move on it right away 
    
Q16 When I go after something I use a ‘‘no holds 
barred’’ approach 
    
Q17 I will often do things for no other reason than 
that they might be fun 
    
Q18 I crave excitement and new sensations 
 
    
Q19 I’m always willing to try something new if I 
think it will be fun 
    
Q20 I often act on the spur of the moment 
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Please read each statement carefully. Then 
indicate to what extent each statement 
describes you by ticking the appropriate box. 
Please answer all questions. 
Extremely 
unlike me 
 
 
Unlike 
me 
 
 
Like 
me 
 
 
Extremely 
like me 
 
 
 
Q1 When someone challenges my beliefs, I 
remind myself why my beliefs are important 
to me. 
    
Q2 When someone has a different perspective on 
an issue, I like to make a mental list of the 
reasons in support of my perspective. 
    
Q3 When someone gives me a point of view that 
conﬂicts with my attitudes, I like to think 
about why my views are right for me. 
    
Q4 When someone tries to change my attitude 
toward something, I try to think about things 
that support the attitude I already have. 
    
Q5 When confronted with an opposing 
viewpoint, I think it’s good to think about my 
values and beliefs. 
    
Q6 When information contradicts my beliefs, I 
think of all the reasons in support of my 
beliefs. 
    
Q7 When someone challenges my beliefs, I enjoy 
disputing what they have to say. 
 
    
Q8 I take pleasure in arguing with those who 
have opinions that differ from my own. 
 
    
Q9 When someone gives me a point of view that 
conﬂicts with my own, I like to actively 
counterargue their point of view. 
    
Q10 When someone presents a view that differs 
from my own, I don’t like to engage in a 
debate. 
    
Q11 I don’t like to challenge people with views 
that differ from my own. 
    
Q12 When information challenges my beliefs, I 
don’t like to actively counterargue it. 
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Sports Participation 
 
Most modern theories recognise the fact that decisions do not take place in a vacuum. 
Individuals preferences and knowledge, along with situation variables can greatly impact 
the decision making process. In order to facilitate my research on decision making I am 
interested in knowing certain factors about you, the decision maker. Specially, I am 
interested in whether you actually take the time to read the directions; if not, then some 
of the results of this survey may be invalid. So, in order to demonstrate that you have read 
the instructions, please ignore the question on sports participation below. Instead, simply 
circle the heading “Sports participation” at the top of this paragraph.  
 
 
Which of these activities do you engage in regularly? 
 
 Soccer    Swimming  
 GAA   Running 
 Cycling    Basketball 
    Other 
 
The scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. 
Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. 
Indicate to what extent you have felt this way during the past week. Use the following 
scale to record your answers.  
 
1 
Very slightly, 
not at all 
 
2 
A little 
 
3 
Moderately 
 
4 
Quite a bit 
 
5 
Extremely 
 
 
 
  Interested   Irritable 
 Distressed   Alert 
 Excited   Ashamed 
 Upset   Inspired 
 Strong   Nervous 
 Guilty   Determined 
 Scared   Attentive 
 Hostile   Jittery 
 Enthusiastic   Active 
 Proud   Afraid 
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Biographical Information 
 
 
Age: ____________  years old   
 
 
 Male   Irish   1st year student 
  Female    Non Irish   2nd year student 
       3rd year student 
       4th year student 
       Post grad 
 
 
If non Irish, please specify: ________________ 
 
 
Is English your first language?   
 Yes 
  No 
 
 
Study Programme: (tick one box) 
 Business Studies  Actuarial Mathematics 
 Economics, Politics & Law  Accounting & Finance 
 Mathematical Sciences  Aviation Management 
 Marketing Innovation & Tech  Manu. Eng & Business 
 European Business Studies  Intern. Business & Langs. 
 Other   
 
 
Would you be willing to participate in future research studies?  
 Yes 
  No 
 
 
If yes, please specify the amount of time you are willing to volunteer for future studies. 
         
______________minutes 
 
 
You are at the end of the questionnaire.  
Thank you very much for your participation!! 
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Appendix H: Materials for Studies 
Study 1 / Study 4 Highly Attractive Hotel Advert 
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Study 1 / Study 4  Moderately Attractive Hotel Advert 
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Study 2 Materials 
High Manipulative Webtax Article 
 
 
Moderately Manipulative Webtax Article 
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Study 3 Materials 
 
Highly Manipulative Pension Article 
 
 
 
Moderately Manipulative Pension Article 
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Study 5 Materials 
 
Exotic Food Advert 
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Study 6 Materials 
 Moderately Attractive Vacation Spot Advert 
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 Highly attractive vacation spot advert 
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